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Abstract
In this dissertation, I explore the educative effects of deliberation through interviews
and observation at two community mediation organizations in Toronto. Theorists have long
claimed that participation in deliberation can change the skills and dispositions of
participants in ways that make them better citizens. Despite the normative work such claims
perform in justifications for participatory and deliberative democracy, they remain
theoretically and empirically underscrutinized. I seek to address this by developing
empirically grounded insights about the educative potential that can realistically be attributed
to deliberative processes. I argue that educative claims can best be examined when parsed
into three categories of efficacy, interests and relationships. I identify empirical contexts ripe for
the study of deliberation’s educative effects by sorting the deliberative field according to 1)
collective decision making, 2) issue scope, and 3) participative intensity. One such context is
community mediation, a process of facilitated negotiation for addressing small scale citizen
disputes convened by staff and volunteers at Community Dispute Resolution organizations
(CDRs). I study this case empirically through in-depth interviewing and observation at two
CDRs in Toronto.
I find limited evidence that participation in deliberation in this context can
strengthen the efficacy or clarify the interests of participants. Furthermore, the efficacy and
interest effects I do find are often limited to the specific context of the mediated relationship.
I find that relationship effects are the most salient in participants’ post-deliberation
narratives, but that they frequently characterize their renegotiated relationships in terms of
mistrust, indifference, and avoidance. This runs contrary to the thrust of theorizing about
the potential for deliberation to strengthen civic bonds between citizens. Yet participants
praise this avoidance suggesting that it should be viewed, at least in some cases, as an

appropriate ideal. I conclude that a wholly dismissive view of educative claims is not borne
out by the evidence of modest educative effects reported by a minority of participants. It
does however, provide reasons to moderate educative claims considerably and to
reinterrogate standard conceptions of what constitutes “better citizens”.

DOES DELIBERATION MAKE BETTER CITIZENS?
EXAMINING THE CASE OF COMMUNITY CONFLICT MEDIATION.

By
Heather Pincock
B.HUM. CARLETON UNIVERSITY, 2003
M.A. SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY, 2005

DISSERTATION
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
in the Graduate School of Syracuse University
May 2011

Pr
Date:

Af

.'Y

R

Copyright 2011 Heather Pincock
All rights Reserved

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract ......................................................................................................................... i
Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................vii
Chapter 1
Does Deliberation Make Better Citizens?
1.1
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1
1.2
Democratic Theory and Better Citizen Claims ............................................................... 6
1.3
Deliberation’s Educative Effects: The Empirics ..........................................................19
1.4
Conclusion ..........................................................................................................................42
Chapter 2
The Educative Potential of Community Mediation
2.1
Introduction .......................................................................................................................45
2.2
Categories of Educative Effects: Efficacy, Interests, Relationships ..........................46
2.3
Mapping the Deliberative Field for Educative Purposes.............................................50
2.4
Mapping Community Mediation in the Deliberative Field .........................................59
2.5
Community Mediation and Educative Claims ..............................................................67
2.6
Methods ..............................................................................................................................74
2.7
The “Toronto Model” of Community Mediation ........................................................84
2.8
Conclusion ..........................................................................................................................91
Chapter 3
Community Mediation & Efficacy
3.1
Introduction .......................................................................................................................93
3.2
Mediator Efficacy Expectations ......................................................................................96
3.3
Participant Efficacy Claims ........................................................................................... 100
3.4
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 127
Chapter 4
Community Mediation & Interest Clarification
4.1
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 129
4.2
Mediator Interest Clarification Expectations ............................................................. 132
4.3
Participant Interest Clarification Claims ..................................................................... 138
4.4
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 152
Chapter 5
Community Mediation & Relationships
5.1
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 155
5.2
Mediator Relationship Expectations ............................................................................ 157
5.3
Participant Relationship Claims .................................................................................... 164
5.4
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 178
Chapter 6
Rethinking the Educative Potential of Deliberative Moments
6.1
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 181
6.2
Does Mediation at the Toronto CDRs Make Better Citizens? ................................ 183
6.3
Does Deliberation Make Better Citizens? ................................................................... 194
6.4
Future Directions: Empirical, Normative, and Practical ......................................... 198
Appendix I.................................................................................................................. 213
Bibliography ............................................................................................................... 219

v

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2.1: Collective Decisions .......................................................................................................53
Figure 2.2: Scope ................................................................................................................................55
Figure 2.3: Intensity ...........................................................................................................................58
Figure 2.4: Community Mediation and Collective Decisions ......................................................63
Figure 2.5: Community Mediation and Scope ...............................................................................64
Figure 2.6: Community Mediation and Intensity ...........................................................................65

LIST OF TABLES
Table 2.1: Interviews with CDR Volunteers and Staff .................................................................81
Table 2.2: Mediation Participants and Cases ..................................................................................83
Table 3.1: Pre-existing Efficacy and Efficacy Claims ................................................................ 104
Table 3.2: Participant Confidence Claims.................................................................................... 108
Table 3.3: Participant Self-Reliance Claims ................................................................................. 113
Table 3.4: Participant Capacity Claims ......................................................................................... 118
Table 3.5: Scope of Participant Efficacy Claims ......................................................................... 126
Table 4.1: Participant Interest Clarification Claims .................................................................... 139
Table 5.1: Participant Relationship Claims .................................................................................. 165
Table 6.1: Summary of Educative Claims .................................................................................... 187
Table 6.2: Summary of Educative Effects ................................................................................... 188
Table 0.1: Practitioner Interview Participants ............................................................................. 213
Table 0.2: Descriptions of Mediation Cases ................................................................................ 215
Table 0.3: Mediation Participant Interviewees and Non-interviewees .................................... 217

vi

Acknowledgments
I hope not to overstate the finality of this moment with an excessive list of
acknowledgments. Completing a dissertation is after all only a modest start at something.
But without the support of countless people named and unnamed here, not even this
modest start would have been possible. Though I remain ever grateful for their help in
bringing this project to provisional completion, the usual caveat applies- I am solely
responsible for its shortcomings.
First and foremost, I wish to thank the staff and volunteers at St. Stephen’s
Community House Conflict Resolution Services and Conflict Mediation Services of
Downsview. Without their incredible work and dedication this project would simply not
exist. Special thanks go to Peter Bruer, Keri Long, Gregg Fenten and Joanne Gray for
letting me into their organizations and to all the mediation volunteers who participated in the
study. I am also especially grateful to the mediation participants who shared their stories
with me. They showed tremendous generosity with their time and openness about their
experiences.
To the members of my dissertation committee I offer my enormous thanks. Keith
Bybee has been a reliable advisor, an excellent mentor, and a constant source of good humor.
Elizabeth Cohen has been so helpful and inspiring that no amount of Canadian snack cakes
can ever repay the debt she is owed. Tina Nabatchi has been encouraging, responsive and
insightful since the day we met. Grant Reeher’s advice and input have been integral to the
growth and development of this project. Without Bruce Dayton’s guidance I could not have
begun, let alone completed, this project.
Numerous other faculty at Syracuse University now and in the past have provided
valuable feedback and support including Audie Klotz, Robert Rubinstein, Bob McClure,
vii

Dave Richardson, Kristi Andersen, Catherine Gerard, Rosemary O’Leary, Tom Keck, Matt
Cleary, Danny Hayes, and Heidi Swarts. I cannot thank them enough for their attention and
assistance. Thank you also to Candy Brooks and all of the staff in the Political Science
Department for all of their help.
I am grateful for financial support from the Department of Political Science, The
Campbell Public Affairs Institute, the Program for the Advancement of Research on
Conflict and Collaboration, and the Deans’ Office at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and
Public Affairs. Thanks also to Sallie Guyder for the invaluable transcription work she
completed.
The Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School also provided essential support.
While in residence there I had the opportunity to engage with Larry Susskind, Dennis
Thompson, and Archon Fung, among other talented scholars. Although they may not
remember our brief conversations, this project has benefited greatly from their insightful
commentary. A very special thanks goes to Jane Mansbridge. Her work has been a guiding
light and her advice and support have proven more valuable than she will probably ever
know.
I am also grateful for the friends and colleagues who formed a supportive
community during my time at PON. Thanks to Alex Crampton, Michael Graskemper, Sarah
Whitman, Lisa Witzler, Sarah Woodside, Kristen Benakis, and Angel Park. A special thanks
goes to Josh Manning, for providing healthy doses of fun and encouragement at times when
they were much needed, and for his continued friendship.
The completion of this dissertation would have been a bleak process indeed without
those who comprise my current intellectual and social community. There are far too many to
name but I wish to thank each and every one of them for the part they have played in
viii

helping me to this point. The friendships I have built while at Syracuse University have been
absolutely integral to my work on this project. Though many friends have moved on to
other places, the bonds we formed here in Syracuse have continued to deepen over time.
Thanks especially to Rob Alexander, Hannah Allerdice, Jessica Boscarino, Brent Boscarino,
Jessica Brill Ortiz, Nadine Georgel, Asli Ilgit, Jesse Lecy, Stephanie Lundquist-Arora, Angela
Narasimhan, Hector Ortiz, Tamara Pavasovic-Trost, Deepa Prakash, Kat Sepka, Anya
Stanger, Dave Stanger, and Haley Swedlund. They have brought immeasurable meaning and
joy to this chapter of my life, and I know they will continue to do so as we all chart our paths
into the future.
I am also fortunate that I arrived in Syracuse with an incredible network of friends
already in place and that they all played a role in this journey. Joe Marrie was there as I
began work on this project and long before, and for that I am forever grateful. I am also
grateful for April Rehel, Tessa Liu, Vicky An, Dianne and Derrick Wong, Alison and
Andrew Bradley, and Jessica Hurst. I simply cannot imagine my life without them in it, in
part because I can hardly remember a time when they were not. Collectively, they make up
one of the biggest reasons that I have been able to accomplish this goal. Caitlin Goggin and
Sophie Kalkreuth- though they are flung far and wide across this globe, have stayed close,
and it has made a world of difference. Special thanks to Larissa Atkison, who has been both
the greatest of friends and the best of interlocutors as I have developed this project. It is
thanks to her patient and interested ear, and her brilliant insights, that I have made important
breakthroughs along the way with this work. I know our friendship will last a lifetime, but I
hope that our scholarly conversations will as well.
Finally, and most of all, I wish to thank my family, Fred and Pat Pincock, Sally
Pincock, Chris Pincock, Tansel Yilmazer, Mark Pincock, and Jill Vanderzand for their
ix

constant presence and encouragement. My brothers Chris and Mark, have always been
stellar role models and have taught me by example about the rewards of hard work. My
sisters-in-law Tansel and Jill, inspire me constantly with their creativity and vibrancy. A
lifetime of gratitude goes to my parents, for their patient, unwavering support. If I have
learned how to love unconditionally, it is certainly to both of them that I owe this lesson. To
my Dad, Fred Pincock, thank you for your ongoing efforts to keep me connected to my
roots, both national and familial- I promise not to forget them. To my Mom, Sally Pincock,
thank you for giving me your passion, and for always believing in my capabilities- especially
when I do not. This dissertation is dedicated to you.

x

1
Pincock- Chapter 1

Chapter 1
Does Deliberation Make Better Citizens?
1.1

INTRODUCTION
The summer of 2009 in the United States was dubbed by some “the summer of the

town hall meeting”, much to the horror of many advocates of deliberative democracy. After
a failure to move forward on health care reform legislation congressional representatives
returned home to their districts for the summer recess in August, to consult with
constituents through a series of “town hall meetings”.1 But quite predictably, these public
displays of shouting, insults, guns, fist fights, fear mongering, ideological extremism, and
bald faced irrationality were nothing like the ideal public fora democratic theorists envision.
While some have warned that the meetings depicted on our television and computer screens
just might be a sensationalized rendering of what was really going on in many cities and towns
across America, suffice it to say that “the summer of the town hall meeting” will not be
remembered for its ability to inspire confidence in the promise of deliberative or
participatory reforms to current democratic institutions and practices in the United States, or
anywhere else for that matter. These spectacles are cast by democratic reformers as perfect
foils or lessons in “what not to do” and serve as fodder for those eager to champion their
own favorite procedural guidelines for making deliberative participation productive and
worthwhile.2

1 This is a misnomer for several reasons. Though it conjures images of the enigmatic New England town hall
meeting (Mansbridge 1983; Bryan 2004), it was not intended, like those forums, to bring together the residents
of a small town to deliberate and decide about matters of direct local concern. Instead, these were forums for
voters to tell their elected representatives about their preferences and, perhaps more importantly in this
example, their fears about a matter of national policy. While the term is misleading in these ways, its use is
likely a result of its ability to capture a popular conception of meaningful democratic participation which has
long been romanticized and idealized.
2 For examples see, James Fishkin’s New York Times Op Ed August 16, 2009 (Fishkin 2009b) and Lawrence
Susskind’s blog entry for August 11, 2009 (Susskind 2009).
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They also serve to remind us, however, of a central truth about democracy, which
has often been downplayed or sidelined by deliberative democrats: that democracy is in very
large measure concerned with the persistence and irrationality of human conflict. Even more
importantly they remind us that conflict, especially when enacted in face-to-face discursive
forms, is extremely difficult to do with good results. Though the scope of everyday citizen
involvement in democratic procedures is a matter of continual debate, citizens surely require
resources, capacities, skills and dispositions that enable them to cope with conflict. How
and where do they develop such capacities? Participatory and deliberative democrats have
long claimed the developmental potential of participation and deliberation. Despite having
ancient origins and forming a reoccurring normative justification for participatory and
deliberative processes, these developmental assumptions remain underscrutinized. If we
take the role of conflict in democracy seriously, how do we expect citizens to manage it?
What skills, dispositions, and relations should they have in order to best cope with its
presence and effects? Furthermore, do their experiences of face-to-face discursive
interaction in conflictual settings improve their civic capacities to do so? In other words,
does deliberation make better citizens? These are the normative and empirical questions I
address in this study.
In this chapter, I begin by discussing the relationship between theories of
participatory and deliberative democracy, arguing that educative assumptions are most
compelling where these theories overlap. Next, I show how educative assumptions, by
which I mean beliefs that deliberative participation will improve a citizen’s civic capacities,
are widely present in the canon of deliberative theory that has emerged in recent decades.
Yet because these frequently mentioned “better citizen” claims are often considered
secondary in importance to more instrumental “better decision” claims, they have received
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relatively limited analytical attention from theorists. I argue that such attention is needed
because “better citizen” claims form a recurring normative justification for why a practical
deliberative turn3 is needed in the design and implementation of democratic institutions.
Next I turn to the existing empirical literature that has investigated these claims. I argue that
though it has generated important insights about deliberation’s effects on citizens, this
literature is limited by the way it conceptualizes educative effects and by the empirical
contexts upon which it tends to focus. As a result, though we find some evidence to
support better citizen claims, the research has not been able to adequately convince the
skeptics of nor vindicate the believers in deliberation’s educative potential. I conclude by
suggesting two steps that can respond to these weaknesses and in doing so advance our
understanding of how deliberation does or does not make better citizens. First, future work
on this question should begin with a clearer articulation of the kinds of changes that are
expected and the mechanisms of the process theorized to produce them. Second, it should
generate a map of the deliberative field that highlights the process design features considered
most favorable to better citizen effects in order to identify more and less appropriate
empirical contexts to explore deliberation’s educative potential.
In Chapter 2, I do just that, arguing that educative claims are best parsed into three
categories of efficacy, interests, and relationships. I aim to show that claims about deliberation’s
potential to 1) strengthen citizens’ subjective and objective sense of their deliberative
competence (self-efficacy and skills), 2) help citizens develop enlightened preferences that
incorporate their own interests and the interests of others (interest clarification), and 3)

3 The term “deliberative turn” has most often been used to refer to the articulation of a theory of deliberative
democracy by several political theorists throughout the 1990s (see references in Dryzek 2000; Chambers 2003)
which marked a challenge to and shift away from aggregative or minimalist conceptualizations of democracy.
There have also arguably been both practical and empirical deliberative turns which have followed in part in
response to these theoretical developments.
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develop civic bonds between citizens (relationship building) encapsulate the range of “better
citizen” claims advanced by participatory and deliberative theorists. Next, I sort the
deliberative field according to 1) collective decision making, 2) issue scope, and 3)
participative intensity in order to identify empirical contexts ripe for study of educative
effects. One such context is community mediation, a process of facilitated negotiation for
addressing small scale citizen disputes between neighbors and/or intimates convened by
staff and volunteers of non-profit Community Dispute Resolution organizations (CDRs). I
study this case empirically through in-depth interviewing and observation at two CDRs in
Toronto. In the remainder of the chapter, I explain the reasons for these choices and
present an introduction to the community mediation process in this context as I
encountered it through observation of training workshops and actual mediation sessions,
focus group and individual interviews with staff and volunteer mediators, and interviews
with mediation participants.
In Chapters 3, 4, and 5, I present participants’ accounts about the educative effects
of their community mediation experience with respect to each of the educative categories I
identified in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, I focus on efficacy and argue that there are reasons to
rethink efficacy expectations in several ways. First, many participants come to the mediation
process considering themselves already relatively skilled and this raises questions about the
remedial quality of efficacy expectations. Second, I find, contrary to the way efficacy claims
are articulated by theorists and practitioners, that lasting changes with respect to confidence
and skills are rare among participants, and that when they do occur they are less related to
the salience of self-determination or individual autonomy in the process than they are to the
relational dynamics between the parties. In Chapter 4, I focus on interests and again find that
participants’ interest clarification claims fall short of the educative aspirations of theorists
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and practitioners. Contrary to those expectations, in many instances the mediation process
reinforces the limits of face-to-face talk for clarifying interests rather than generating mutual
understanding between participants. Furthermore, the interest clarification claims that are
made are sometimes non-reciprocal and there is little evidence that these effects transfer
beyond the specific relational context of the mediation.
I therefore argue that educative expectations posited in terms of efficacy and
interests are limited in their description of the educative potential of the process for at least
two reasons. First, they are limited, as many skeptics have suggested, because they provide
romanticized accounts of the potential of a relatively short intervention to significantly
change citizens’ capacities. Second, and more importantly, they are limited because they are
drawn from a misleading account of democratic experience which places too much emphasis
on autonomous individual decision making and not enough on everyday interaction and
relational interdependence as central features of democratic citizenship. This suggests that
the “real” educative potential will come into focus in Chapter 5 where I turn to relationships
and indeed, as I discuss there, relationship claims are more salient for many participants.
They do not, however, conform to the model espoused by theorists and practitioners.
Contrary to the thrust of theorizing about the potential for democratic talk to strengthen
civic bonds between citizens, I find participants frequently characterize their renegotiated
relationships in terms of mistrust, indifference, and avoidance. This avoidance however is
praised by participants suggesting that it should be viewed, at least in some cases, as more
than a suboptimal result and instead as an appropriate ideal in itself.
In Chapter 6, I summarize my overall findings concerning deliberation’s educative
effects in the context of the Toronto CDRs. I present the limitations of the study and
discuss its implications for the field of community mediation specifically and the theory and
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practice of deliberation more generally. I argue that my study of community mediation’s
educative potential provides reasons to be skeptical about, though not wholly dismissive of,
deliberation’s educative claims as they are currently formulated, but also that standard
conceptions of what constitutes “better citizens” are in need of reinterrogation. I suggest
that this requires two major adjustments to the theory and practice of deliberation. First, I
argue that the normative justifications for deliberation should be more heavily rooted in
“better decision” claims and that better citizen claims should be invoked with greater reserve.
Second, I argue that better citizen claims must be adapted to incorporate an alternate ideal of
civic relations which is rooted in avoidance. I find that deliberation enables citizens to
establish and sustain avoidant relationships and argue that these relationships can provide
peace and make modest contributions to the cause of justice. I conclude that embracing the
normative merits of civic relations rooted in avoidance will serve to make better citizen
claims more consistent with empirical realities. In the next section, I begin by locating
standard educative assumptions at the intersection between participatory and deliberative
theories of democracy.
1.2

DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND BETTER CITIZEN CLAIMS
There is a long standing tradition of claims about the educative effects of democratic

participation, which are most clearly articulated in participatory theories of democracy. In
contemporary democracies citizens have few opportunities to exercise direct unfiltered selfgovernment, by which I mean having direct authority to reach collective decisions about
their shared problems. Realities of scale and complexity of governance preclude this as a
general approach to democratic institutional design and even make it challenging to
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incorporate in more partial or piecemeal ways.4 This is to the dismay of those with
participatory commitments who believe that the value of political autonomy is central to the
very essence of democracy and should, as much as possible, be prioritized in the design of
democratic systems. Participatory democrats express their commitment to political
autonomy as self-government in two key ways. First, by endorsing the use, as much as
possible, of collective decision making processes that give citizens the opportunity to be
directly involved in governing themselves by empowering them to make binding decisions
about the shared problems they face. Second, they do so by seeking to establish collective
decision making processes that develop citizen capacities and competencies to be selfgoverning, that is to make these processes self-reinforcing through their educative effects.
This potential, for citizens to be improved through their participation such that
participatory processes are self-reinforcing is a core assumption for participatory democrats
(Hayden et al [1962] 2005; Kaufman 1969; Kaufman 1960; Pateman 1970) who draw on
earlier claims put forward by ancient and modern political theorists (such as Aristotle,
Rousseau, Mill).5 Participatory democrats place considerable weight on deliberation as a
method of citizen engagement. While some have associated “participatory democracy” with
the political activism of direct action (Hayden et al [1962] 2005), and partisan mobilization
(Mutz 2006), the core of a participatory conception of democracy underscores the need for
direct citizen involvement, not simply as demonstrators in the streets, nor as guides or
advisors to political officials, but as individuals directly empowered to make collective
decisions regarding their shared concerns (Kaufman 1960; Arnstein 1969). Although
participatory democrats have sometimes called for reforms consistent with aggregative

4 Mark Warren has called these piecemeal reforms “retrofitting” and notes that these initiatives themselves
suffer from democratic deficits (Warren 2009).
5 For a review of the history of such claims see (Mansbridge 1999a).
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approaches to democracy such as referenda (Barber 2004, 281), they more often focus on
opportunities for relatively small groups to make collective decisions through face-to-face
communication along the lines of the oft romanticized “town hall meeting” (Mansbridge
1983; Bryan 2004). In theory, it is in these discursive settings, where citizens are expected to
explore their interests and engage in problem-solving, that the educative goals of
participation are best realized.
As a result, although the heyday of the participatory movements of the 1960s and
1970s has passed, the educative claims at the core of the theory have been kept salient by the
so called “deliberative turn” in democratic theory (Chambers 2003; Dryzek 2000). Like
participatory democrats, deliberative democrats place significant weight on political
autonomy and the transformative potential of democratic processes. Rather than focus on
direct citizen self-government as an end in itself however, they emphasize the need for
reasoned decisions that can be accepted by all. They argue that, under conditions of
disagreement, decisions are most legitimate when they are based on reasons that are
developed and articulated through discursive processes and recognized by all who are
affected (Habermas 1987; 1990; Cohen 1989; 1996; Rawls 1993; Gutmann and Thompson
1996). Although the theoretical project of deliberative democracy at its core does not
require lay participation, indeed some focus on the question of elite and representative
deliberation (Bessette 1997; Steiner et al. 2004), much of the theory suggests the involvement
of lay citizens in decision oriented deliberative processes (Gutmann and Thompson 1996;
Fishkin 1995; Fung and Wright 2003; Leib 2005).6 Although lasting individual effects are
secondary to the goal of reasoned decisions for deliberative democrats, allusions to these
individual effects are nevertheless widely present in their work. This is owing in part to the
Leib provides an explicit argument for his focus on mass instead of elite deliberation. He describes himself as
a “populist deliberative democrat” to make this distinction clear (2005, 35).
6
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legacy of their participatory predecessors.7 Moreover, despite the tensions between and
different foci of participatory and deliberative conceptions of democracy (Cohen and Fung
2004; Fung 2007a), it is where they overlap that claims about the lasting educative potential
of democratic participation are most common and compelling.8 These two conceptions
overlap in the case of participatory deliberative processes, which I define as those that
incorporate face-to-face discussion amongst lay citizens with efforts to reach collective
decisions concerning shared problems.
Below I aim to show that, despite being longstanding and widely present in the
maturing and highly variegated deliberative democracy literature, these educative claims
remain theoretically underscrutinized. In particular, the shift in deliberative theory to
acknowledge the persistence of conflict, jettison consensus as the aspirational ideal, and to
admit selfish and emotional expressions as permissible and valuable for the goals of political
autonomy and equality, has implications for the theoretical underpinning of educative claims
which have not been fully articulated. In part as a result of these theoretical limitations, the
growing empirical literature on deliberation has not tended to focus on the concepts or
contexts that are most appropriate to educative theories of deliberative participation. This
absence of theoretical and empirical scrutiny of core assumptions must be addressed, not
only to fill in gaps in our empirical knowledge, but because the normative justifications for
participatory deliberative processes currently rest in no trivial part on these assumptions.

The idea that reasoned consensus can be approached through deliberation relies on the assumption that
individual understandings of preferences are altered in lasting ways and this has direct bearing on the primary
goals of deliberative democracy. However, a broader set of claims concerning the range of civic capacities that
are developed as a result of deliberative experiences originate from participatory theory.
8 Fishkin agrees that “the educative function is most compelling for the face-to-face variants” of participatory
democracy (2009a, 78).
7
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1.2.1

Deliberative Democracy and Educative Assumptions
The claims advanced by theorists of deliberative democracy can be divided into two

general categories. First, and most important for most theorists of deliberative democracy, is
the concern with producing better collective decisions. They claim deliberative decisions are
“better” because they result from discursive processes of reason giving and mutual
justification between all those subject to those decisions, and this renders them more
legitimate (Habermas 1987; 1990; Elster 1986; Cohen 1989). Second, and of secondary
importance in this early theorizing, is the concern with producing better citizens. Here
“better” refers to a range of lasting changes that individuals undergo as a result of their
deliberative experience(s) that make them more capable citizens. In this , I aim to show that
this desire to make better citizens is widely shared by and normatively significant for
deliberative theorists.
Though they acknowledge their debt to republican theorists from Aristotle to Arendt
that stress self-government and public deliberation as ends in themselves and expressions of
the “good life”, much early theorizing about deliberative democracy concentrates on the
foundations of its legitimacy claims (Cohen 1989; Elster 1986; Cohen 1997a; Gutmann and
Thompson 1996; Bohman 1998; Estlund 1997).9 Embedded in these arguments however,
are assumptions about how the process is individually transformative. For example, an early
articulator of the deliberative conception of democratic legitimacy, Bernard Manin, stresses
generally that political deliberations are “processes of education and training in themselves”
and that the instrumental outcome is likely to follow in part because of the “educative effect
of repeated deliberation” (Manin, Stein, and Mansbridge 1987, 354, 363).

9 Much of these early debates about deliberative democracy’s legitimacy claims concern whether they have
procedural or epistemic bases. For a recent effort to reconcile this tension into a philosophical framework of
“epistemic proceduralism” (to which I will return in Chapter 6), see Estlund (2007).
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Most often stressed in these accounts is the expectation that through discursive
interaction and as a result of reason giving, participants will come to conceptualize their
preferences differently. Specifically, “the need to advance reasons that persuade others will
help to shape the motivations that people bring to the deliberative procedure” (Cohen 1997a,
76). This expectation is based on the view that selfish arguments are illegitimate in a debate
framed in terms of public good. Though this may begin as mere lip service to the common
good, there is an assumption that over time psychologically this becomes difficult to do
without in fact acquiring these other-regarding preferences (Elster 1997, 12). Therefore, even
the primary claim about how ideal deliberation leads to more legitimate decisions
incorporates expectations about individual transformation that have implications beyond the
particular decision at hand. This implies that a public-spirited orientation may be a more
general lasting effect of the process of discursive preference formation under ideal
deliberative procedures because these procedures are expected to “shape the identity and
interests of citizens in ways that contribute to an attachment to the common good” (Cohen
1997a, 79; see also Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 11).
The opportunity to engage in discursive preference formation is also expected by
deliberative theorists to contribute to the development of autonomy. According to Warren,
autonomy refers to a “capacity of judgment”, which enables the formation of preferences
through examination and evaluation of “wants, needs, desires, values, roles, and
commitments” instead of “manipulation, brainwashing, unthinking obedience, or reflexive
acceptance of ascribed roles” (Warren 1992, 11-12; see also Warren 1996). Relatedly, in a
summation of Rawls, Cohen writes that “democratic politics should be ordered in ways that
provide a basis for self-respect, that encourage the development of a sense of political
competence, and that contribute to the formation of a sense of justice” (Cohen 1997a, 69;
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citing Rawls 1971, 473-4). And Rawls himself states that democratic politics ought to
involve public deliberation oriented towards the public good in part because this “lays the
foundations of civic friendship and [shapes] the ethos of political culture” (Rawls 1971, 234).
Therefore, in addition to its potential to make participants more public-spirited, deliberation
is also suggested to have lasting effects on participants’ autonomy and on the nature of their
relations with other citizens.
These assumptions become more explicit when deliberative democrats have sought
to apply their theories to real world collective decision making processes. Gutmann and
Thompson’s classic contribution to deliberative theory explicitly stresses that deliberation
will leave many moral disagreements unresolved, but they maintain that its value stems
largely from its ability to “help citizens treat one another with mutual respect as they deal
with the disagreements that invariably remain” (1996, 9). This mutual respect is sustained by
civic virtues of civic integrity and civic magnanimity (1996, 81-85). Though they note that
these civic virtues require explicit teaching in the schools, Gutmann and Thompson also
consider deliberation itself to be educative and stress the importance of deliberative decision
making both inside and outside politics due to its educative function. They argue that
citizens need to engage in deliberative decision making in the workplace and when at leisure
in order to “cultivate the virtues of deliberation” and to “develop either the interest or the
skill that would enable them to deliberate effectively in politics,” concluding that “the
discussion that takes place in these settings not only is a rehearsal for political action, but
also is itself a part of citizenship in deliberative democracy” (1996, 359). Other concrete
proposals for institutional reform of the American political system intended to fix its
“legitimacy deficit” have also suggested that citizen deliberation would “contribute to the
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kind of civic virtue communitarians and republicans alike think necessary for the proper
functioning of a democracy” (Leib 2005, 4, 83; see also Ackerman and Fishkin 2005).
Autonomy, a sense of political competence, attachment to the common good, the
foundations of civic friendship, and mutual respect are all lofty educative claims embedded
in these early articulations of deliberative theory. They are no doubt part of the reason that
deliberative democracy has come under considerable attack from critics who have found it
naïve, utopian and even dangerous (Shapiro 1999; Przeworski 1998; 1999; Sunstein 2003;
Knight and Johnson 1997; Sanders 1997; Fish 1999; Young 1999; 2001). Some of these
critics have narrowed in on deliberative theory’s educative claims, including increased
autonomy and an expanded sense of community, casting them as central normative
justifications of the theory they are criticizing (Sanders 1997). By now several retrospective
reviews (Bohman 1998; Mansbridge et al. 2010; Bachtiger et al. 2010) have noted how
deliberative theory has shifted, adapted and broadened to respond, at least in certain
formulations, to these critiques by acknowledging a legitimate role for expressions of selfinterest, recognizing the value of a wide range of discursive forms including emotional
appeals, storytelling, rhetoric, narrative; and clarifying the synergies between deliberative and
non-deliberative decision procedures like voting, adjudicating, and bargaining (Dryzek 2000;
Mansbridge 2006; Thompson 2008; Polletta 2008). This “coming of age” of deliberative
theory10 has certainly not eclipsed the presence of educative claims, they remain bubbling at
the surface; yet it has served to complicate the nature of these claims in some instances.
For example, in their corrective to the “classic ideal” of deliberation which carves
out a broad space for the legitimate expression of self-interest in deliberation, Mansbridge
and colleagues provide added theoretical complexity to the now familiar claim that
10

This phrase comes from Bohman (1998).
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participation in deliberation will change preferences for the better (2010). They make a
distinction between opinion change and transformation with regard to interests, with the
latter being the more significant, even if less likely, sort of individual change. While opinion
change results from exposure to new information, discovery of logical mistakes in one’s
thinking, or adoption of a long-range view, “transformations in the direction of the common
good” are produced by perspective taking, the development of new or strengthened
understandings of justice, or strengthened ties to a newly formed or pre-existing communal
entity (2010, 78). Deliberation is educative only when it produces these latter kinds of
changes and such outcomes are considered among “the most valuable features of
deliberation” though they are expected to be much rarer than more straightforward changes
in opinion (2010, 79).11
Emphasis on the normative importance of these deeper transformations has also
been a feature of Seyla Benhabib’s recent work (2004; 2006; 2007; 2008). Benhabib develops
the concept of “democratic iterations” to refer to “the complex processes of public
argument, deliberation and exchange through which universal rights claims and principles
are contested and contextualized, invoked and revoked, posited and positioned, throughout
legal and political institutions, as well as in the associations of civil society” (2004, 179).
Oriented towards debates about legal cosmopolitanism and transnational migration patterns,
Benhabib aims to reconcile the tensions between universal human rights claims and the right
to self-government of individual polities. Drawing on Derrida’s concept of “iteration” she
argues that the very meaning of rights claims are transformed through their repetition and

11

As I will elaborate below, much of the empirical work on deliberation’s effects has emerged from the public
opinion tradition and has therefore focused on testing more surface level opinion change instead of focusing
on the transformative processes emphasized by normative theorists.
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contestation in the public sphere.12 On this view, deliberative processes not only offer a
legitimate way to manage conflicts generated by competing rights claims, in so doing they
can also transform political identities and the quality and composition of the political
community itself. In other words, when citizens learn through these iterations to be more
inclusive and cosmopolitan, they are transformed into “better citizens”.13
A second point of emphasis in more recent deliberative theory has stressed that, in
addition to generating attachment to shared understandings of the good, deliberation can be
considered educative when it clarifies previously obscured conflicts and promotes further
contestation. The recent works mentioned above each feature this emphasis. According to
Mansbridge and her collaborators, the clarification of conflict becomes a normatively
defensible outcome of deliberation once the legitimate place for a properly constrained selfinterest is affirmed (2010). And, ongoing contestation is also central to the transformative
potential of democratic iterations as outlined by Benhabib. This recent emphasis on conflict
and contestation is motivated in part by a desire to address the criticisms of agonists who
argue that deliberative theory fails to recognize the basic nature of politics as a contest
between adversaries (Mouffe 2000).
In a similarly motivated response, John Dryzek recasts deliberative democracy in
part as the engagement of discourses in a public sphere (2000; 2005).14 According to Dryzek,
discourses underlie identities, but they are “amenable to reflection” and can change as a

12 For a compelling critique of Benhabib’s reading of Derrida, see (Thomassen 2010). Thomassen is skeptical of
Benhabib’s attempt to limit the effects of iterability. He argues instead that the positive potential of iterations
can only be embraced in combination with their risks. See also Honig in (Benhabib 2006).
13 According to Benhabib, this learning is mutual. Majorities learn to adjust their interpretation of universals to
admit previously overlooked particulars, and minorities learn to adjust their particular claims in ways that attach
to universals (2004, 57).
14 Dryzek uses the term “discursive democracy” to distinguish his theory from earlier articulations of
deliberative democracy. According to this ideal, the public sphere can be more open to contestation because it
is semi-detached from state institutions. In this way it can influence governmental actors without needing to
succumb to the same decision-making pressures that apply to deliberation tied to sovereign authority.
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result of deliberative processes of persuasion (2005, 225). Dryzek is skeptical about
agonism’s ability to convert enemies into adversaries and presents deliberation as a process
of social learning that can better channel contestation and conflict in productive directions.
The occurrence of this social learning therefore depends on continued engagement and
contestation of discourses- meaning that the surfacing of conflict is considered educative. It
does so when it prompts the reshaping of identities (2005, 235) and reconstructs
relationships (2005, 225) in the direction of greater inclusion, or at least more “civilized
engagement” (2005, 221).15 As these examples illustrate, deliberative theorists continue to
rely in part on educative assumptions to justify their theories even as they render those
theories more complex. Overall, though “better citizen” outcomes are rarely if ever
positioned as a primary purpose or goal in theories of deliberative democracy, they have
nevertheless been invoked frequently from the outset and with increasing nuance to help
make the normative case for deliberative democracy.
Not surprisingly, these claims have garnered attention in the burgeoning field of
empirical research on deliberation and captured the imagination of deliberative practitioners.
As scholars have struggled to bridge the gap between normative and empirical study of
deliberation (Thompson 2008; Mutz 2008; Rosenberg 2007a; Neblo 2005; 2007; 2010;
Bachtiger et al. 2010), these claims have been given a more prominent place in the emergent
empirical research agenda. Some have insisted on the continued primacy of better collective
decisions stating that “learning about issues, gaining a sense of efficacy, or developing a
better understanding of opposing views- should be regarded as instrumental to this aim”
(Thompson 2008, 502-3), but most have posited better citizen claims as equally important
15 Note that while recent deliberative theorists assert the centrality and importance of contestation in an effort
to address the agonist critique, they continue to see conflict as an outcome that serves the eventual realization
of more inclusive identities. This is still in tension with agonism’s conception of politics as always dependent on
we/they distinctions (Mouffe 2005, 24-25).
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avenues for empirical exploration. For example, Fung and Wright’s 2003 volume of
empirical case studies notes the “schools of democracy” hypothesis as one of six questions
about process and outcomes that form their research agenda (Fung and Wright 2003, 32).16
In his 2007 edited volume advancing a research agenda for empirical scholars that is
deeply informed by deliberative theory, Rosenberg suggests that within the range of
theoretical orientations to deliberative democracy there is a consensus about its potential to
contribute to:
(a) the making of more effective and just policy decisions, (b) the building of
more united communities that embrace group and individual differences, (c) the
facilitating of more equal, caring and cooperative social relations, and (d) the
fostering of greater levels of cognitive and social development of individual
citizens
(Rosenberg 2007a, 14-15)
The last three are all forms of better citizen claims. In the same volume Joshua Cohen,
while reflecting on the empirical chapters, observes that there is much attention placed on
evaluating decision outcomes but little empirical study of the “intrinsic” virtues of
deliberation. Cohen articulates these intrinsic values in the form of better citizen claims,
citing deliberation’s capacity to generate mutual respect and a sense of community. They
account for the “intuitive attractions of deliberative democracy” he says and their purpose is
to establish that “deliberative democracy is a compelling ideal” while other claims merely
serve to “strengthen the case by showing the fit with justice and with effectiveness of policy”
(2007, 229).
In her survey of the social and political psychology research findings relevant to
deliberative democracy, Tali Mendelberg outlines eight goals of deliberation that merit
further study. They include increased engagement, tolerance, understanding of preferences,
identification of common interests, empowerment, and social capital. Though she notes
16

Despite this however, the empirical case studies in this volume do not address educative questions.

18
Pincock- Chapter 1
improved political decision making and greater legitimacy for the constitutional order as well,
her list is heavily dominated by educative goals (2002, 153). Even those explicitly focused on
the potential for citizen deliberation to influence policy decisions have noted its potential,
bolstered by anecdotal evidence, to empower citizens politically and psychologically in their
list of possible effects (Goodin and Dryzek 2006). These examples illustrate that efforts to
map out an empirical research agenda for deliberative theory have raised the prominence of
better citizen claims.
In the practical field as well, deliberative practitioners adopt explicitly participatory
orientations to their projects and articulate better decision and better citizen goals with coequal weight. Take for example the mission statement of the Deliberative Democracy
Consortium where both are advanced together:
Central to our work is the conviction that the outcomes of deliberation result in
qualitatively better, more lasting decisions on policy matters. Participation in
such forums is central to democratic renewal. Essentially, our view is that
democratic deliberation is a powerful, transformational experience for everyone
involved--citizens and leaders alike--which can result in attitudinal shifts toward
the institutions and practice of democracy overall... [The] Consortium has
embarked on an ambitious research agenda that will build knowledge around the
actual impact of deliberation upon civic attitudes and behavior, and the
sustainability of follow-on efforts. Our hypothesis in this work is that, with
expanded application, increased frequency and greater visibility, deliberative
democracy can invigorate and rekindle the civic virtues of trust, participation
and responsibility.17
As these statements imply, a growing body of empirical literature has emerged and
contributed much to our understanding about deliberation including its educative potential.18
As I will argue below however, this literature continues to have blind spots concerning the
way that it specifies and operationalizes educative effects and the kinds of deliberative

http://www.deliberativedemocracy.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=77&Itemid=271, last accessed January 21,
2010.
18 For a good overview of existing empirical research see Abelson and Gauvin (2006).
17
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venues where it seeks them out. As a result it does not yet fully respond to the calls of
scholars concerned with generating more fruitful collaboration between normative and
empirical study of deliberation.
1.3

DELIBERATION’S EDUCATIVE EFFECTS: THE EMPIRICS
While educative claims are recurrent in the literature, they are rarely specified in ways

that lend themselves easily to empirical study. The claims reviewed above can be divided
into two broad categories, those that relate to individual changes in the attitudes and
behaviors of participants (see d in Rosenberg’s list) and those that relate to changes in the
social relations between citizens in a political community (see b and c in Rosenberg’s list). In
trying to operationalize these various claims, empirical scholars have largely focused on the
first set of categories relating to individual change. This is not surprising given that many
such scholars are working in the political behavior and public opinion field which has
traditionally taken the individual as its unit of analysis. Aside from a focus on the individual
however, these scholars have actually developed an “opinion track” in the deliberation
research agenda that attends to related but different concerns from those initially articulated
by deliberative democrats.
While deliberative democracy developed as a theory concerned with the problem of
moral disagreement (Gutmann and Thompson 1996) and the need to make legitimate
collective decisions under conditions of deep pluralism (Cohen 1997b; Rosenberg 2007a),
the opinion track has been more focused on the symptoms of this problem. Noting low
interest and participation in electoral politics on the part of the citizenry (and the American
citizenry in particular), it begins from the problem presented by the “limitations of public
opinion as we find it in mass society” (Fishkin 2009a, 7), claiming that “the debate over the
process of opinion formation forms the foundation for discussions of deliberation” (Jacobs,
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Cook, and Delli Carpini 2009, 5). This frame draws on the findings of several decades of
public opinion research that paints a picture of a rationally ignorant or uninformed public
(Downs 1957; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), who express meaningless doorstep opinions
and non-attitudes (Converse 1964; see also Bishop 2005), or form their opinions through
irrational and short sighted processes (Schumpeter 1942), that are reinforced through
homogenous networks (Mutz 2006), and highly susceptible to a constant onslaught of elite
manipulation tactics (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000). Concerned with these realities, the opinion
track turns to deliberation as a way of generating meaningful public opinion that can serve as
a reliable indicator to political representatives entrusted to carry out the public will. This
emphasis on opinion formation situates the opinion track at a distance from the strand of
deliberative theory focused on binding collective decisions and even further from the
participatory strand of deliberative theory which seeks to empower citizens directly to make
such binding decisions. This divergence has implications for better citizen claims. While not
all empirical research has been conducted on the “opinion track”, as my review below aims
to show, this perspective has greatly shaped the body of existing empirical research and
resulted in notable blind spots with respect to the what and where of educative effects.
1.3.1

What are deliberation’s educative effects? Studies of opinion quality
Following from the influence of opinion track approaches to deliberation, much

empirical work is focused on opinion change and largely overlooks more foundational claims
about the effect deliberation can have on a broader set of civic and political capacities.
Instead, empirical scholars in this track are concerned with testing the effect of deliberation
on opinion quality meaning the extent to which opinions are more informed, consistent, and
durable following deliberative experiences. They have found that citizens learn information
as a result of deliberation (Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell 2002; Barabas 2004; Rose 2009),
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including information that is disfavorable to their pre-deliberative opinions (Fishkin 2009a,
139; Hansen 2004, 135), and that changes in their opinions are related to these information
gains. Changes in voting intentions have also been shown to follow from information gains
and policy opinion changes that occur during deliberation (Luskin et al. 1999; Fishkin 2009a,
135-9). Disagreements exist however about the specific mechanisms responsible for
information gains and associated opinion change.
Goodin and Neimeyer find that these changes result from information sharing and
individual internal “deliberation” rather than the face-to-face discussions between
participants that follow in many deliberative processes (Goodin and Niemeyer 2003).
Others have shown that, at least in some cases, it is the “on-site” portion of these
deliberative experiences and not the briefing materials provided in advance that account for
much of the learning and opinion change (Farrar et al. 2010). These findings support the
self-reports of participants who themselves place the greatest emphasis on small group
discussions, but they do not hold up for deliberation of high salience issues (Fishkin 2009a,
120, 220n. 22). Evidence of deliberation’s effect in low salience issue contexts and on
individuals with weak opinion strength (Barabas 2004) suggests, to the delight of opinion
track scholars, that those most vulnerable to the doorstep opinion phenomenon (Converse
1964) benefit the most from deliberation. The potential, however, for deliberation to
generate more informed opinions when they are strongly held or on “hot button” issues
(arguably when they are most needed), is called into question by this research.
In addition to information gains, opinion track scholars have explored the quality of
post-deliberative opinions by measuring their consistency (Lindeman 2002) and durability.
Consistency has been measured in numerous ways including net opinion change, ideological
consistency, “single-peakedness”, and social influence. Net opinion change among group
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members in a particular direction, while controversial from a political standpoint, suggests
that individual opinion changes are non-random. Aggregate changes are also encouraging for
opinion track scholars concerned with capturing considered public opinion in ways that can
inform political representatives. There is repeated evidence of net opinion change in some
deliberative contexts (Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell 2002; Fishkin and Luskin 2005; Neblo
2010) suggesting that post-deliberative opinions are more consistent. Those examining
consistency in ideological terms by looking at the match between issue opinions and broader
ideological commitments, have found mixed results raising doubts that deliberation increases
opinion quality (Sturgis, Roberts, and Allum 2005). According to some, exposure to
counterarguments does not yield more ideologically consistent results in the aggregate
because those changing for the “right” reasons cancel out those changing for the “wrong”
reasons (Jackman and Sniderman 2006).19
In another approach, studies assess “single-peakedness”, meaning the extent to
which participants agree about the structure of preference ordering such that the probability
of voting cycles is reduced and the meaning of majority rule is preserved (Riker 1982). Like
the link between information gains and opinion change, increased proximity to “singlepeakedness” is most pronounced with low salience issues and among those who gain the
most information (Fishkin and Luskin 2005; List et al. 2007). Other scholars have sought to
uncover the mechanisms of social influence behind deliberative opinion change. They find
some evidence that it is respect for one’s interlocutor as opposed to friendship, familiarity,
personality, race, or gender that account for opinion changes (Neblo 2010). Finally,
increased opinion quality has been measured for its durability in terms of its ability to resist
elite manipulation. For example, Druckman and Nelson find that cross cutting small group
For an opposed perspective suggesting that opinion quality can be gauged by a weakening of the relationship
between ideology and post-deliberative opinions, see Neblo (2010) and fn. 24 below.
19
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discussions dampen the effects of elite manipulation (measured through exposure to op-ed
articles) on individual opinions (2003). Relatedly, Chong and Druckman find evidence to
suggest that exposure to competing elite frames encourages deliberation, but that resulting
opinions are ultimately shaped according to the strength and availability of those frames far
more than their validity or relationship to evidence (2007, 652).
Overall, this growing body of research has produced mixed results that suggest
reasons for both skepticism and optimism. As a result, it has not managed to resolve
questions about the effect of deliberation on opinion quality. Though it appears clear that
citizens can learn factual information in deliberative settings and that opinion changes are
related to this learning, this opinion change may be primarily an individual and internal
process. While some may be happy with such results regardless of the phase of the process
that produces them, such a finding would fundamentally challenge the emphasis placed on
discursive interaction by deliberative theorists.
To the extent that opinion change can be shown to be an interactive process, there
are mixed results concerning its likelihood to result from social pressure versus reason-giving.
At best, aggregate opinion change may be a wash between these different processes, raising
doubts about the normative appeal of face-to-face deliberative processes. Indeed, a long
standing research agenda in social psychology on small group discussion suggests there is not
much reason to accept the assumption that deliberation encourages citizens “to approach
the discussion with a mind open to change” or that the changes which are observed actually
result from “exchange of relevant and sound reasons” as opposed to “social pressures,
unthinking commitments to social identities, or power” (Mendelberg 2002, 181). This largely
experimental research, bolstered by studies of real world organizations and juries, suggests
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that observed opinion change most often results from social processes of conformity and
domination (Sunstein 2003; Sunstein 2009; Sanders 1997).
Some more recent deliberation research also finds that the greatest opinion changes
result in groups where the balance shifts towards consensus (with 2/3 or more in agreement)
(Barabas 2004) suggesting a kind of bandwagon effect. Others find confirmation of the
polarization of groups resulting from unbalanced argument pools and social comparison
effects (Schkade, Sunstein, and Hastie 2006). Advocates of deliberation have argued that
these findings are precisely the reasons why particular features of deliberative processes
(such as balanced information, representative participation, and skilled moderation of
discussions) are crucial in order for opinion quality to improve. Indeed if the research on
opinion quality reveals anything it is the importance of setting and context (for example:
experimental vs. real world, formal vs. informal, citizen jury vs. deliberative poll) to the
research findings.
As I will discuss in section 1.3.3, these concerns point to the need to pay close
attention to the structure and design of the different processes being called deliberation in
order to assess 1) how well they align with the regulative ideals articulated by normative
scholars, and 2) what mechanisms of the process are theorized to produce particular
outcomes. While some notable research has begun to attend to the “black box” of
deliberation itself, yielding both optimistic (Siu 2008) and pessimistic (Rosenberg 2007b)
appraisals of the quality of real world deliberation, more is needed to convincingly tie
deliberative experiences to changes in opinion quality and to demonstrate that such changes
approach the ideals of deliberative theory. Most importantly however, this sustained focus
on opinion quality, though a major concern for opinion track scholars, is fairly peripheral to
the core educative claims advanced by other deliberative theorists. To be sure, in some

25
Pincock- Chapter 1
respects these studies of opinion change are related to the transformations deliberative
theory describes since they examine how individual preferences (most often in the form of
policy opinions) change as a result of deliberation. Their focus however is on the
relationship between factual information and opinions and the “quality” of opinions in terms
of their consistency and durability. Recall that this is not the sort of transformation
deliberative scholars are primarily concerned with because it does not analyze the content of
these opinions for their relationship to self-regarding or other regarding interests
(Mansbridge et al. 2010). With respect to opinions or preferences, that is the sort of more
ambitious transformation at the core of “better citizen” claims advanced by theories of
deliberative democracy. Furthermore, studies of opinion quality do not examine changes in
the attitudes or behaviors of participants that are associated with the capacities required for
citizenship.
1.3.2

What are deliberation’s educative effects? Studies of civic capacities
While these studies of opinion quality have dominated the empirical literature, others

have attended to attitudes and behaviors that are closer to the core educative claims of
deliberative theory. A whole host of measures of “political capital” have been applied in
order to capture deliberation’s effects on political attitudes (Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini
2009).20 These measures come from a long tradition of political behavior research that has
most often conceptualized political attitudes as independent variables in order to explain
political participation and especially voting behavior (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954;
Campbell, Converse, and Miller 1960). They include citizens’ attitudes towards themselves

20 Though Jacobs et al present the concept of “discursive capital” in their early chapters, they do not return to it
in their empirical chapters. This is unfortunate because, as I will elaborate, one key limitation of this literature
is its failure to identify educative effects that are particular to deliberative participation. The concept of
“discursive capital” has promise to be just that kind of measure but Jacobs et al do not develop it further (see
Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini 2009, 3-4, 26).
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and politics (internal political efficacy, interest in politics, political attention, partisan and
ideological strength), towards government (external political efficacy,21 trust in government),
and towards other citizens (empathy, political tolerance, social trust, sociotropism/public
spiritedness). These attitudes are considered important because of their expected effect on
political and civic participation, another measure of “better citizens” often introduced by
empirical scholars. In some cases, researchers have combined many of these discrete
measures into one index and found evidence of a causal relationship between participation in
deliberation and increased political capital (Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini 2009, 101).22
Others have disaggregated these attitudes and examined deliberation’s effect on one or more
separately.
1.3.2a Civic capacities: citizens’ attitudes towards themselves, politics, and government
With respect to citizens’ attitudes towards themselves and politics, there is evidence
that deliberative participation increases political interest (Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell 2002).
Studies also find statistically significant evidence to suggest that deliberation can strengthen
the internal political efficacy of participants (Fishkin 2009a, 141; Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell
2002), and racial minorities in particular (Nabatchi and Stanisevski 2008). Others have
presumed this effect based on observed changes in voting following jury deliberations
(Gastil, Deess, and Weiser 2002). Self-reports from other deliberative processes also provide
21 Internal political efficacy is a measure of a citizen’s beliefs about their own political competence while
external political efficacy is a measure of a citizen’s beliefs about government responsiveness to their
participation (see Balch 1974; Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990; Niemi, Craig, and Mattei 1991; Morrell 2003;
Morrell 2005).
22 Unfortunately, Jacobs et al’s recent study, which in many ways represents a giant step forward for the
systematic empirical study of deliberation, aggregates different categories of educative effects in ways that
conceals the particular causal mechanisms associated with each. Therefore, despite its impressive breadth and
important theoretical and empirical contributions to the study of deliberative democracy, this book illustrates
the broader limitations of existing empirical research to address the question of educative effects. This is true as
well in the aggregated way that deliberation is conceptualized and measured by Jacobs et al. Though their
survey provides excellent measures about the frequency of face-to-face organized deliberation, and this in itself
is an extremely valuable contribution to the field, it is not good ground from which to explain the mechanisms
by which civic effects occur because it overlooks the very important variation between design features of these
processes and the need to link educative claims more directly to those features.
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anecdotal evidence of the effect of deliberative participation on internal political efficacy
(Gastil and Dillard 1999; Doble et al. 1996; Smith 1999). Several systematic assessments
however have not found evidence of statistically significant positive relationships between
deliberative participation and internal political efficacy (Gastil 2004; Morrell 2005; Nabatchi
2007; 2010). In response to these negative findings and to social psychological theories of
self-efficacy (Bandura 1997), Morrell has developed a more situation specific measure of
efficacy that captures participants’ assessments of their deliberative competence in particular and
found evidence that face-to-face deliberative decision making can strengthen efficacy
understood in this way (2005). As I will elaborate below, Morrell’s insight illustrates a
limitation in the way educative effects have been conceptualized in much of the empirical
literature on deliberation. Though his approach has promise, it is far more the norm to use
standard measures developed in the political behavior literature to measure deliberation’s
educative effects. The few efforts to capture deliberation’s discrete effect on attitudes
towards government have followed in this track and demonstrated statistically significant
effects on external political efficacy (Nabatchi 2010), and political trust (Fishkin and Luskin
2002), which hold up over time.
1.3.2b Civic capacities: citizens’ attitudes towards others
Assessments of deliberation’s effects on participants’ attitudes towards other citizens have
been approached in several different ways23 but those focused on the way participants
conceptualize their interests are most responsive to classic deliberative theory’s claim that
deliberation will generate public spiritedness and attachment to the common good. General
23

Some have used measures of social trust and political tolerance but in larger indices that conceal the direct
effects on these attitudes specifically (Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini 2009). Another indicator of citizens’
attitudes towards others is captured by political empathy, a capacity theorists argue is crucial to democratic
practice (Morrell 2007; Morrell 2010). Though empirical research has tentatively confirmed that this is a
valuable deliberative capacity (Mutz 2002), initial tests exploring deliberation’s effects on empathy have come
up insignificant (Fishkin and Luskin 2002).
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measures of what has been called “sociotropism” (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981) and
operationalized by the question “when voting, people should always put the interests of the
public as a whole before those of themselves and their family”, have been shown to increase
as a result of deliberation (Fishkin and Luskin 2002). But other efforts have focused instead
on assessing the change in content of opinions for indications of greater public-spiritedness.
Despite the evidence from experimental small group discussion research that gives reasons
to be skeptical that deliberation can “generate empathy and diminish narrow self interest”
(Mendelberg 2002, 181), quasi-experimental deliberation research does show changes in the
content of opinions that suggest broadening of interests to encapsulate the fate of others
(Fishkin 2009a, 142).
Assessments about the content of opinions and one’s understanding (or lack of
understanding) of the interests that underlie those opinions is a difficult thing to access
empirically. Empirical scholars have generally not theorized about this in depth,24 but
Mansbridge has developed an analytically helpful way to approach the content of interests
empirically (Mansbridge 1983, 24-28). In particular, her case study research reminds us that
there are several ways deliberation might be expected to shift participants’ understandings of
their interests aside from a movement in the direction of common interests. While her field
work demonstrates that shifts towards common interests can occur with positive effect, it
also reminds us that such shifts are not always normatively appealing as classic deliberative
theory implies. Mansbridge and her collaborators have shown that stronger attachment to
24

See Neblo 2010 for an exceptional effort in this regard. He argues that reduced influence of age, gender, race,
political knowledge, negative affect/prejudice, and ideology on post deliberative opinions compared to their
influence on pre deliberative opinions all provide confirmation, in various ways, that deliberation has
broadened participants’ conceptions of their interests. While he finds moderate support for his hypotheses,
they are a questionable way of operationalizing the transformative claims of deliberative theorists. In particular
the assumption that the reduced relevance of ideology on post deliberative opinions is evidence of a frame shift
from private to public interests is rather curious(Neblo 2010, 4).
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self or sectional group interests can be a necessary and productive outcome of deliberation
(Mansbridge 1983; Karpowitz and Mansbridge 2005). Despite the richness and value
provided by these few case studies, in general the empirical research remains thin with
respect to deliberation’s effects on participants’ attitudes towards others and on their
understanding of their interests in particular.
1.3.2c

Civic capacities: citizens’ political and civic participation
Another common way empirical research has conceptualized better citizen claims is

to look for evidence of changes in participants’ political behavior, specifically their
participation, as a result of deliberation. Though some survey research indicates that
exposure to different perspectives in informal discursive settings actually has a negative
effect on rates of political participation (Mutz 2006), those who have studied the relationship
in more organized deliberative settings have found the opposite. Gastil and colleagues find a
relationship between the experience of jury duty and increased electoral participation (2002).
Fishkin reports consistent evidence across a number of quasi-experiments suggesting a
modest relationship between deliberation and standard measures of political participation
including working on an election campaign, contacting government officials, donating to a
political party, talking about politics, and voting (Fishkin 2009a, 143).
In their survey of the American public, Jacobs and colleagues find a similar
relationship between citizens who report participation within the last year in an organized
face-to-face meeting to discuss a public issue and increased levels of electoral participation
(voting and campaign work) and elite contacting (boycotting a product, signing a petition,
contacting an official or a media outlet about a political issue) (2009, 104-7). They also find
a positive relationship between deliberation operationalized this way and forms of civic
participation such as community service, community organizing and problem solving (2009,
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108-9). Though the causal link is difficult to establish with certainty and concerns about
endogeneity always linger, these research designs control adequately for selection effects
through random sampling, control groups, and other statistical techniques designed to
disentangle the reciprocal relationships between participation in deliberation and other forms
of civic and political participation. The different patterns of results between organized and
informal forms of deliberation again suggest the need to attend carefully to the design and
structure of the deliberative process under study and the specific mechanisms that are
theorized to produce particular changes.
1.3.2d The limitations and promise of the civic capacities research
Though this research on civic capacities and political capital provides some minimal
support for the educative claims of deliberative theorists and conceptualizes “better citizen”
claims more faithfully than opinion quality research, in some ways it too is limited by blind
spots in its categorization of these effects. This is because it tends to overlook the more
radical implications of the educative claims located at the intersection of participatory and
deliberative theory. Deliberative theorists have suggested that these experiences not only
teach citizens to be “better” but to be better in a different way, to develop their deliberative
and participatory capacities specifically, quite aside from simply influencing their engagement
with electoral politics. This calls for a different way of conceptualizing the kinds of civic and
political capacities that are desirable. In his comparative review of cross national
perspectives about the attitudes and behaviors that make a “good citizen” for example, Jon
Pammet includes the distinctly deliberative capacity to “try to understand the reasoning of
people with other opinions” in his index (2009). But, as this review has shown, standard
measures of political capital and behavior often do not capture these kinds of changes.
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Attending to the most promising elements of existing research and noting those
elements most conspicuously absent from it, illuminates several avenues for future study of
deliberation’s educative effects. For example, the notion of situation specific efficacy holds
promise and merits further development. Attention to public spiritedness is directly linked
to the transformative claims of deliberative theory and in its more nuanced formulation,
which gives a place to self-interest, it is ripe for further empirical exploration. Attention to
civic participation and community service is a promising proxy for the more radical changes
embedded in deliberative theory’s educative claims and though it has rarely been used, it may
offer a way to capture “better citizen” effects at the behavioral level. Finally, I noted at the
outset that despite the prominence of relational framing of “better citizen” claims by
deliberative theorists, empirical research has focused almost exclusively on individual effects;
this review has borne out that claim. Though a handful of studies have looked at the ability
of deliberative processes to generate mutual understanding and acceptance of difference
(Walsh 2007), for the most part “better citizen” claims framed at the level of social relations
between citizens have remained the purview of theoretical speculation. This too then is an
avenue in need of further empirical attention.
To sum up, the existing literature about deliberation’s effects presents decidedly
mixed findings about its educative potential. The implications of this mixed record however,
are difficult to assess because so much of this research conceptualizes educative effects in
ways that are heavily swayed by “opinion track” approaches to deliberation and leave aside
the undertheorized and underscrutinized claims at the core of deliberative theory’s supposed
educative potential. In my presentation so far of the categories of educative effects
addressed by the empirical research, I have treated as unproblematic the tendency of this
literature to group a wide range of discursive processes under the heading of “deliberation”
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without distinguishing between different structures and designs and their likely consequences.
The conflicting empirical results however have repeatedly pointed to the need to make such
differences explicit. I now turn to this in an effort to show that aside from limitations to
existing empirical study of the what of educative effects, there are significant problems
introduced by the where as well.
1.3.3

Where are deliberation’s educative effects? Empirical contexts and venues
Many surveys of empirical research have noted the important differences between

various ways deliberation has been conceptualized and the range of empirical contexts where
it is being studied (Bachtiger et al. 2010; Neblo 2007). While some have addressed this
variety by drawing a hard line between what is and what is not appropriately considered
democratic deliberation (Cohen 2007; Thompson 2008), others have attempted to make
sense of this variety by mapping a range of discursive forms in a wider deliberative system
(Mansbridge 1999b; Hendriks 2006), or by developing typologies to distinguish between
various deliberative and/or participatory processes (Fung 2006; 2007b; Morrell 2005). For
social scientists interested in investigating the processes and outcomes of deliberation many
options exist, but the broadest distinction is between “deliberation” organized by social
scientists (experimental and quasi experimental research) and deliberation organized by “real
people”.25 I review each in turn and discuss the strengths and limitations of each approach
25

A third category, that of naturally occurring “deliberation” (informal talk) could be added to this list. Studies
of informal talk focus on the extent, quality, and effects of the more or less spontaneous political conversations
occurring within already existing social networks. Most often captured through survey research (Mutz 2006;
Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini 2009) but also through focus groups (Perrin 2006), and participant observation
(Walsh 2003; Eliasoph 1998), they are relevant to theories of deliberative democracy, most obviously through
their connection to Habermasian conceptions of the public sphere (Habermas 1962) and as manifestations of
the informal processes of opinion formation that precede formalized processes of will formation in his later
theory (Habermas 1996). Theorists have further expanded our conceptions of informal political talk by arguing
that “everyday talk” which may not have immediate political significance in terms of policy opinions, deserves a
place in our conceptions of the broader “deliberative system” (Mansbridge 1999b). Though some have argued
that such talk lacks the conceptual criteria necessary to be considered deliberation proper, most notably
because it is not decision-oriented (Thompson 2008), others concerned with adapting normative theory to
empirically falsifiable hypotheses contend that the claims of deliberative democrats once properly disaggregated
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from the perspective of educative effects.26 While I believe both can make important
contributions to bridging the gap between the theoretical and empirical study of deliberation,
I argue that with respect to educative effects especially, careful study of “real world” venues
should take priority.
1.3.3a

“Deliberation” organized by social scientists: experimental research
Deliberation is commonly studied through experimental research designs, which

have many methodological advantages. Though some experimental researchers engage in
serious concept stretching of deliberation (Bachtiger et al. 2010),27 others have made a
concerted effort to simulate the conditions of deliberation in the real world and/or
according to the regulative ideals espoused by deliberative theorists (Morrell 2005; Neblo
2007). These experiments generally assemble participants in small groups for discussion
about a public policy issue taking measures before and after and/or from a relevant control
group. Because these discussions are organized for the express purposes of social science,
researchers have a high capacity to organize and structure the discussion as they wish in
order to isolate the effects of interest to deliberative theory. They have usually opted for
fairly simple designs, with no briefing materials on the issues or moderators for the

can be fruitfully tested in this context (Mutz 2006; Mutz 2008). While empirical and normative scholars will no
doubt continue to debate the operational definition of deliberation and its relationship to the normative
standards articulated in the theory, settings of informal talk are not the most appropriate for exploring
educative claims specifically. Given their ambitiousness, it is in contexts of more formalized deliberation, where
structures are in place to support educative aims, that such claims can even begin to approach plausibility.
26
Because my aim here is to review empirical research most relevant to the study of educative effects on
everyday citizens, I overlook venues of elite deliberation that have also been the subject of fruitful empirical
study (Steiner et al. 2004; Bessette 1997).
27
For example, empirical studies have claimed to be measuring effects of deliberation through experimental
settings that look nothing like any kind of actual deliberation. Experiments where participants engage in no
conversation at all (McCubbins and Rodriguez 2006), or “converse” only with a survey administrator (Jackman
and Sniderman 2006) are held up as tests of deliberation’s effects. Though, as I noted in fn. 25, these scholars
are right to put emphasis on the importance of everyday conversations to the deliberative system, a survey
instrument is a dubious simulator of this practice. Furthermore such “bare bones” treatments, while they may
provide some relevant insights about the design and implementation of more complex deliberative institutions,
do not themselves simulate conditions appropriate to the generation of educative effects.
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discussion, in order to maintain experimental parsimony and to be able to confidently isolate
the effects of the experiment to a discrete treatment. They have however used multiexperimental designs for comparative leverage to measure the importance of discussion
topic, discussion structure, and decision procedure.
While these designs include the group dynamic and decision orientation necessary to
approximate organized deliberation in the real world, they also lack some important features.
First, participants are often drawn disproportionately or entirely from the college student
population raising questions about the generalizability of findings. More importantly, the
discussions often have no significant consequences for participants and this is likely to alter
the way participants engage with the process in ways that are important for its outcomes.
While efforts have been made to simulate real stakes for participants as much as possible,
there are clearly limits on how well experimental conditions can replicate real world
conditions. As I will argue below, the presence of “real stakes” for participants is likely to
matter in particular for educative claims, and therefore experimental research assessing
educative effects ought to, at the very least, be coupled with study of real world
deliberation.28
Some social scientists have organized deliberation in a quasi-experimental format,
attempting to get the best of both worlds by maximizing their capacity to control various
conditions while also observing deliberation in the “real world”. Fishkin and his
collaborators are the most notable example of this approach having pioneered and
trademarked their unique Deliberative Poll design. The design, in Fishkin’s words is as
follows:

To be sure deliberation is not guaranteed to be high stakes simply because it is occurring in the real world.
However real world settings of deliberation at least provide the potential for such stakes to be present.

28
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Take a random sample of the electorate and transport those people from all over
the country to a single place. Immerse the sample in the issues, with carefully
balanced briefing materials, with intensive discussion in small groups, and with
the chance to question competing experts and politicians. At the end of several
days of working through the issues face to face, poll the participants in detail.
The resulting survey offers a representation of the considered judgments of the
public- the views the entire country would come to if it had the same experience.
(Fishkin 1995, 162)29
The methodological benefits of the Deliberative Poll are numerous. Aside from the
characteristics they share with all experimental designs, the ability to collect pre/post data on
a variety of measures, to assemble a relevant control group and to manipulate the treatment
design, Deliberative Polls use random sampling to select participants and have been quite
successful at attracting samples that are representative of the relevant population (most often
the British or American public). While random sampling allows Fishkin to avoid selection
biases in his results, some have criticized the design for its failure to simulate naturally
occurring deliberation. But oriented to the opinion track, Fishkin is concerned with
capturing a measure of “considered public opinion”. He therefore designs Deliberative Polls
as intentionally counterfactual experiments and is not troubled by accusations that they do
not replicate typical deliberative conditions. Indeed, like other deliberative researchers,
Fishkin seeks to simulate “ideal deliberative conditions” and show how outcomes differ in
such cases from other instances of political talk and or participation.30 Although the dual
motive of experimental research and democratic reform proposal produces problems in
isolating the effects of a complex and multifaceted treatment, more complex design and
measurement procedures might in the future be able to overcome some of those difficulties
(see Farrar et al. 2010 for an initial foray). The more important limitation, from the
As cited in Fung (2007b, 172).
Much of the impasse between normative and empirical scholars of deliberation is related to this issue and the
tension between the desire to observe deliberation that approaches the “ideal” vs. the desire to observe
“deliberation” as it occurs naturally (see Thompson 2008; Mutz 2008; Neblo 2007).
29

30
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perspective of educative effects, is shared by many in the next category of “real world”
deliberation and it concerns the way in which “ideal conditions” are understood and
implemented. As I elaborate below, such considerations reveal the multiple purposes, aside
from social science motives, for organizing deliberative venues, the important process and
design variations that accompany them, and the implications those have for studying
educative effects.
1.3.3b Deliberation organized by “real people”
Observers have noted the growing presence of a “public deliberation movement”
(Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini 2009; Gastil and Keith 2005; Lee 2008) in recent decades
consisting of numerous organizations that routinely design and implement deliberative
venues throughout the United States and in a number of other advanced democracies. These
venues, in combination with long standing participatory deliberative institutions like juries
and the New England Town Meeting, as well as those established more recently by
governments and agencies experimenting with avenues for wider citizen participation,
provide a wide range of possibilities for the study of real world organized deliberation
among citizens. Despite the methodological challenges associated with this enterprise, it is
imperative that empirical study of deliberation attend to these real world contexts as they are
likely to be fruitful settings to assess the claims of deliberative theory (Levine, Fung, and
Gastil 2005). Though they all share basic features in common (everyday citizens in face-toface discussions about matters of shared concern), they exist for a number of different
purposes and take many different forms, which no doubt have serious implications for the
outcomes they can be expected to produce. Efforts to categorize and typologize these
various processes reveal that those receiving the greatest empirical attention in the literature
are not best suited to generate educative effects. On the other hand, those venues that do
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present more appropriate settings to explore educative claims have not often been studied
with these questions in mind nor has much careful thought been given to categorizing these
venues in ways that help identify the mechanisms theorized to produce educative effects.
Most attempts to categorize and typologize the participatory deliberative field
identify a number of missions, goals, or purposes that are articulated by organizers and
practitioners (Fung 2007b; Ryfe 2002; Button and Mattson 1999; Gastil 2000). Presumably
any effort to measure outcomes should attend to the intended purpose(s) of the process
from the organizers’ perspective. Not surprisingly given the non-instrumental nature of
educative claims, these are rarely if ever identified as a primary goal of these processes.
Terminology in this case, as is so often the case in this field, may be confusing. Much
discussion has focused on the extent to which deliberative forums have influence on public
policy, and efforts to categorize them often turn heavily on this variable. The fact that many
deliberative forums take place without any direct connections to the policy process has
caused several observers to categorize them as “educative forums” that are focused
exclusively on the goal of educating citizens. But a closer look reveals that “educative” is
used here to refer primarily to information gains and opinion change instead of a wider set
of democratic skills and dispositions (Fung 2007b; Button and Mattson 1999). Though
some have included the cultivation of “civic habits” within their descriptions of these
“educative forums”, they continue to conflate these categories with measures of opinion
quality (Gastil 2000; Ryfe 2002).
But presenting educative goals in this way, as the low end on a “policy impact”
spectrum is misleading. Not only does it incorrectly reduce or conflate educative effects
with opinion quality, it also produces a typology of deliberative venues based on a variable of
little consequence from the perspective of educative claims. This variable is especially
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problematic because many deliberative organizations have shifted over time to place
increasing emphasis on their capacity to influence policy decisions in response to criticism
that they are “just talk,” making such categorizations open to contestation (Polleta 2008).
Take for example the account offered by the non-profit Everyday Democracy (formerly the
Study Circles Resource Center) about “how our work has grown”:
In the early years, we focused on developing a better kind of public dialogue,
drawing on the ways people talk in their everyday lives. Then, we championed
the idea that public talk is for everyone, and helped communities organize to bring
all kinds of people into the conversation. Now we’re helping people connect
public dialogue to real solutions.31
A related but clearer variable from the perspective of educative claims is whether or
not participants are asked to reach a collective decision (Morrell 2005). The psychological
conditions produced by such parameters, particularly when it is binding on the group
members in some meaningful way, are the ones conducive to educative effects on
deliberative skills and dispositions.32 Yet much of the empirical research of deliberation is
not focused on venues of deliberative decision making. In fact, much of the research cited
above is based on the study of deliberative venues that seek to explicitly eliminate the
process of face-to-face collective decision making in order to keep measures of “considered
public opinion” pure from the social pressures associated with face-to-face dynamics
(Fishkin 1995, 185; Fishkin 2009a, 88, 133). Although Fishkin has been most explicit about
this intention in his Deliberative Poll design, many other deliberative forums are designed to
conclude without a face-to-face collective decision being reached. The forums organized by
AmericaSpeaks (e.g. Americans Discuss Social Security), and supported by the Kettering
http://www.everyday-democracy.org//en/Page.AboutUs.aspx, last accessed March 20, 2011.
Much argument has ensued over the definition of democratic deliberation and whether or not it requires an
instance of collective decision making, need merely to be “decision oriented” or can be any form of discussion
about shared concerns. Chambers has made the important insight that though the presence of a decision is not
a definitional constraint, it will alter the psychological conditions of the deliberative experience and is therefore
relevant to the outcomes that might be expected to follow (2009).
31

32
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Foundation (National Issues Forum), and Paul J. Aicher Foundation (formerly the Topsfield
Foundation, e.g. Everyday Democracy) are all examples. Though some, like the Citizen
Juries process pioneered by Ned Crosby, do conclude with a face-to-face collective decision,
the outcomes have not had meaningful consequences for the participants or anyone else for
that matter (Crosby and Nethercut 2005, 115). Despite the absence of this important
condition, these venues are those most frequently discussed in the empirical literature. These
processes have important design variations in their own right and the highly decentralized
implementation structure in some cases is bound to produces even more diversity.33 Yet
they are alike because they all lack a group decision that is binding in some meaningful way
on the participants.
This may be for good reason. It is certainly not clear that a small group of citizens,
no matter how representative they may be of the general population, and no matter how
informed or considered their judgments have become, should legitimately be authorized to
make binding decisions on behalf of their fellow citizens (Fung 2007b, 165). Furthermore,
there is good reason to be wary about the legitimacy of group decisions made in face-to-face
settings even when the group members are representing themselves only. Jane Mansbridge
most famously observed the tensions between unitary and adversary modes of democracy
and the different purposes that face-to-face decision making can serve in these different
contexts (1983). Indeed she stressed that, in contexts of conflict, face-to-face collective
decision making can be a very risky business. Consistent with the insights of her now classic
study, a more recent empirical review concludes that:

33 See for example Walsh (2007) for the compelling argument that civic dialogue programs on the topic of race
and race relations, like those convened with the assistance of Everyday Democracy (Study Circles Resource
Center) comprise a unique category of “public talk” initiatives that are different from other deliberative forums
because they are not oriented towards decision making.

40
Pincock- Chapter 1
More than anything, the point to emerge from existing research is that the
conditions of deliberation can matter a great deal to its success. ... Other times,
deliberation is likely to fail. This outcome is especially likely when strong social
pressures or identities exist, conflict is deep, and the matter at hand centers on
values rather than facts.
(Mendelberg 2002, 181)
But this misses the very conditions that deliberative theory emerged to address (deep
conflicts over values) and filters out the conditions central to the participatory theories that
generated educative claims in the first place. Focusing on deliberative processes that avoid
the occasion for face-to-face collective decision making and are dedicated to different
purposes, as much empirical research has done, means that when educative effects are
studied, the findings are not well grounded in these original theories and are therefore not
particularly illuminating tests of them.
The methodological challenges of capturing the subtle psychological processes
associated with educative claims and isolating them to causal mechanisms connected with
deliberative experiences (Mansbridge 1999a), provide good reasons for looking in contexts
where the conditions are theoretically most favorable to producing such changes. If such
changes are not found in these contexts, where the conditions seem most favorable, then we
must remain quite skeptical that they could occur anywhere. Alternately, if such changes are
found here, these settings are best suited to teach us about the causal mechanisms that make
them possible. Though some have argued that the “blunt instruments of social science”
make it more fruitful to study this question in experimental settings (Mansbridge 1999a, 291),
I argue that the study of real world contexts is needed, at the very least to complement
experimental research, because of the difficulties of simulating collective decision making
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experiences that have meaningful consequences for participants through experimental
design.34
Fortunately, there are many deliberative venues where face-to-face collective decision
making is central to the process design and they have been the object of some empirical
study. Some research focuses on well established participatory deliberative institutions like
juries (Gastil, Deess, and Weiser 2002; Gastil 2008) and the New England Town Hall
Meeting (Mansbridge 1983; Bryan 2004). A more recent body of research focuses on recent
instances of “empowered participatory governance” (Fung and Wright 2003) like, for
example, participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre (Baiocchi 2001) and community policing in
Chicago (Fung 2004). Citizens Assemblies in British Columbia and Ontario, Canada that
have been temporarily convened and given the power to determine referendum options
concerning electoral reform have also garnered significant attention (Warren and Pearse
2008; Rose 2009). But research on these venues has rarely focused systematically on the
question of educative effects. Furthermore, this review has aimed to show that little
attention has been given to categorizing deliberative venues in ways that help identify the
conditions expected to produce educative effects. My preliminary account here suggests that
face-to-face and binding collective decision making is an important condition but this has
clearly been too blunt a measure for sorting through the wide range of processes that
currently exist. With the exception of the efforts of Archon Fung (Fung 2007b), I am aware
of no attempts to develop typologies that are, at least in part, intended to clarify the
educative potential of different deliberative venues.35 Such an effort is necessary, as I hope
For a reasonable attempt to overcome this limitation of experimental design see (Morrell 2005).
For another quite sophisticated effort to typologize public engagement mechanisms see Rowe and Frewer
(2005). They define effectiveness narrowly in terms of “information flow” and as a result their typology sheds
little direct light on the mechanisms most likely to produce educative effects that go beyond the exchange and
processing of information.
34
35
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to have shown by this review, to advance our empirical understanding of this under
scrutinized but frequently mentioned normative justification for participatory deliberative
processes.
To sum up, much of the mixed findings concerning deliberation’s educative effects
can be explained by the wide variety of contexts and venues that are being studied and
compared. I have argued that real world deliberative venues ought to take a central focus in
the growing empirical research agenda. This is particularly important for the study of
deliberation’s educative effects because the conditions expected to generate high educative
potential are not easy to simulate through experimental design. Real world deliberative
venues however exist in numerous forms, many of which are not ideal for the exploration of
educative effects because they also lack real stakes for participants. I suggest that to the
extent that the existing empirical literature does focus on real world venues, it most often
does so in contexts that are not best suited to generate educative effects. Given the
methodological challenges of isolating deliberation’s educative effects, which have been
noted previously (Mansbridge 1999a), contexts believed to have high educative potential
should take priority. This requires a mapping of the deliberative field with these effects, and
the process design features most conducive to them, in mind.
1.4

CONCLUSION
For centuries democratic theorists have claimed that democratic participation is a

developmental experience with the potential to cultivate desirable skills and dispositions
among citizens. In the contemporary period, these “better citizen” claims have been most
frequently advanced by advocates of participatory and deliberative democracy and have
formed a reoccurring justification for why reform of existing democratic institutions ought
to incorporate more deliberative participation from citizens. These claims vie for priority
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with more instrumental “better decision” claims and, particularly in the theories of
deliberative democracy that have been developed in recent decades, are often overshadowed
by them. As a result, though the assumption of deliberation’s educative potential is widely
shared, it is theoretically and empirically underscrutinized. This is particularly problematic
given the “heavy lifting”, undercover as it may sometimes be, that such assumptions perform
in the normative justifications offered by the theorists and practitioners of deliberation.
Though a growing empirical literature aims to investigate deliberative theory, its
attention to “better citizen” claims is hampered by several limitations. First, the
conceptualization of educative effects has been heavily influenced by an opinion quality
approach that fails to investigate the deeper set of transformative assumptions embedded in
the theory. Second, the enormous variety of deliberative venues and empirical contexts in
which the question has been examined, without careful attention to variations in their
process design and structure, make generalizations about deliberation’s educative potential
difficult. As a result, though evidence exists to support the contention that deliberation can
improve opinion quality and strengthen civic capacities in some cases, these effects are not
well connected to the normative theories from which better citizen claims originate. As a
result, skeptics remain unconvinced by better citizen claims and advocates have little ground
upon which to account for when, how, and why such potential can be realized.
I have argued that these limitations can be addressed in two ways that can help to
bridge the normative/empirical divide that currently exists within the field of deliberative
democracy research and replace optimistic assumptions with empirically grounded insights
about the educative potential that can realistically be attributed to deliberative processes.
First, a set of analytical categories for describing and parsing the core educative claims made
about participatory deliberative processes is needed, and these categories must be linked
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directly to the concerns of normative theorists who make better citizens claims. Second, a
map of the deliberative field is needed that pays attention to the differences between various
deliberative processes and the importance of those differences for educative claims
specifically in order to locate the most appropriate real-world contexts for exploring
educative claims empirically. I proceed with these two steps in Chapter 2.
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Chapter 2
The Educative Potential of Community Mediation
Case Selection, Methods, and Field Sites
2.1

INTRODUCTION
In the last chapter I argued that educative claims, though widely present, are under

specified and under examined normative justifications for both participatory and deliberative
theories of democracy. I showed that this is one reason why so much empirical deliberation
research mischaracterizes these effects, focusing instead on related but different purposes.36
In both cases, the difficulty arises in part from the non-instrumental nature of “better
citizen” claims and the fact that they vie for primacy with “better decision” claims in both
the theoretical and practical spheres. Educative assumptions are therefore in need of greater
analytical and empirical attention that aims to bridge the frequently observed gap between
normative theory and social science in this area of study in ways that can advance our
understanding of the educative potential of deliberation.
I argue that two things can advance us in this direction. First, as the review in the
preceding chapter has shown, we need greater analytical clarity concerning “better citizen”
claims. Below I draw on participatory theory to respond to this need by proposing that
educative claims can be productively parsed into the three categories of efficacy, interests, and
relationships. Second, I argue that a map of the deliberative field based on the conditions that
matter most for educative potential is needed to select suitable empirical contexts for study.
Categorizing deliberative venues according to the three conditions of collective decisions, scope,
Another reason for this may be the extent to which these effects are normatively laden making them difficult
to operationalize in terms conducive to positivist social science. The educative assumptions of participatory and
deliberative democrats are grounded in particular commitments about the way “better citizens” should think and
act. These sorts of normative commitments are problematic for empirical scholars who, though often
motivated by normative concerns, wish to insulate their study of political phenomena from explicit normative
agendas.

36
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and intensity, I draw attention to those where educative claims are most compelling. I argue
that educative effects are most likely in participatory deliberative venues where collective
decisions are binding and made through face-to-face procedures that increase deliberative
engagement between participants, where the scope of the subject matter is highly localized
and/or personalized such that participants are highly invested, and where the participation
itself is intense because the number of participants is small and the process is sustained. With
this clearer articulation of educative outcomes and a map to organize the field, I turn to
identify a suitable real world context in which to explore them empirically. I identify
community mediation as an often overlooked but highly suitable participatory deliberative
venue to explore these claims. In the remainder of the chapter I introduce community
mediation, the methods I employ to study it, and the context in which I study it.
2.2

CATEGORIES OF EDUCATIVE EFFECTS: EFFICACY, INTERESTS, RELATIONSHIPS
Long before the “deliberative turn” in political theory and its subsequent equivalent

in empirical political science, participatory democrats, as I noted from the outset, made
explicit claims about the educative power of face-to-face discursive processes of collective
decision making.37 I argue that three general categories of educative effects can be discerned
in their work, that these categories resonate with the assumptions of deliberative democrats,
and that they provide an analytically useful starting point for theoretically grounded empirical
study of the educative potential of participatory deliberative processes. In the previous
chapter, I noted that educative claims have been articulated at both the individual level and
the social level. The former describes changes to the attitudes and behaviors of citizens and
the latter describes changes to the social dynamics between citizens. I showed that though
changes in social relations are consistently articulated by theorists, they are rarely taken up in
See Mansbridge (1999a) for the argument that the waning of the participatory democracy movement is in
part a result of the lack of reliable empirical evidence of its “better citizen” claims.
37
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empirical research. This underscores the need for a set of analytical categories that
encompass the full range of claims, at both levels. The three categories I identify, efficacy,
interests, and relationships, address this need.
The first category, efficacy, encompasses individual level changes to participants’
subjective sense of their deliberative competence as well as their objective competence,
understood as the acquisition and refinement of their deliberative skills. The second category,
interests, includes changes to participants’ understandings of their own and others’ needs and
desires. Interest claims also suggest that deliberation can change general dispositions towards
these needs and desires and the extent to which they are self or other regarding. The
interests category straddles the individual and social levels. While it is an individual level
effect it also concerns the way individuals relate to each other and in particular how they
understand and relate to the interests of others, as they come to understand them through
deliberation. The final category, relationships, comprises changes at the social level to
participants’ dynamics of interaction with each other and other citizens, and their effect on
the nature of relevant political community or communities. I elaborate briefly on each
category below.
Democratic theorists positing participation’s developmental effects as far back as
Mill have expected impacts on participants’ psychological dispositions and agency to follow
from participation. This was most clearly articulated in terms of efficacy by Carole Pateman in
her classic work on participatory democracy (Pateman 1970). Drawing on empirical research
in social psychology and political sociology, Pateman argues that participation leaves
individuals more psychologically equipped to undertake further participation (1970, 45).
Social psychological theories suggest that one key source of self-efficacy beliefs are “enactive
mastery experiences” or instances where individuals experience themselves as capable of
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select tasks (Bandura 1997, 79). This is consistent with the expectation that participatory
experiences can increase self-efficacy beliefs. But, as Morrell has noted, social psychological
theory suggests that self-efficacy is a context specific phenomenon (2005). He has argued
convincingly that the universal measure of political efficacy used by many political scientists
does not capture the more context specific concept of “deliberative competence.” Therefore
the kind of efficacy effects that should be expected to follow more directly from
participatory deliberative experiences must relate to the capacities required for face-to-face
discursive, and sometimes conflictual, interactions. Aside from influencing individuals’
subjective judgments of their own competence, participatory democrats also stress objective
changes in terms of skills acquisition and development. Frequent references are made to
“democratic skills” as an area of development resulting from deliberative participation
though these are rarely specified or detailed. They too need to be refined within particular
deliberative contexts (see Chapter 3), but generally they refer to the communication and
problem solving skills that are practiced directly in participatory deliberative settings.
Turning to interests, these claims also have a long history, which Mansbridge has
traced back to Mill, Tocqueville and Dewey (Mansbridge 1999a). The expectation, shared by
many contemporary deliberative theorists, has been that participatory deliberative processes
help participants to clarify their interests by attuning them to those they share in common
with others. This broadening of interests is equated with a greater “public-spiritedness”
among citizens and often described as a concern for the common good. This means both
that citizens come to understand their interests with respect to the issue at hand in more
other-regarding ways, and that they develop a general disposition to keep doing so in future.
But drawing on other participatory theorists sensitive to power inequalities (Bachrach 1975),
Mansbridge claims that a process of collective decision making that attunes participants to

49
Pincock-Chapter 2
their selfish interests is also possible and valuable, even if those conflict with the interests of
others. Gaining a clearer understanding of conflicting interests is especially important for
citizens who are harmed when the interests of the most powerful are misrepresented as the
common interests of all. This clarification process, whether it makes common or conflicting
interests more salient, and whether it cultivates a disposition of public spiritedness or
opposition will equip citizens to be better representatives of their own “enlightened
preferences” understood as the things they “would prefer if they had access to all
information including information about the others involved” (Mansbridge 2006, 108) and
what they would choose “if they had had a chance to live out the consequences of each
choice before actually making a decision” (Mansbridge 1983, 25).
Benjamin Barber’s participatory treatise elaborates most explicitly on the way
participatory deliberative processes, or in his terms occasions for “strong democratic talk”,
are expected to have lasting impacts on the relationships between citizens (Barber 2004).
Strong democratic talk according to Barber enables citizens to explore mutuality and
establish affiliation and affection (2004, 182-90). He argues that they can generate relations
between citizens that are situated in the middle ground between friends and strangers,
suggesting they should be described by the metaphor of neighbors. The civic bond between
these “citizen-neighbors” is grounded in empathy and mutual respect which he argues can
both be strengthened and reinforced through the affective dynamics of participatory
deliberative processes. In articulating this potential to generate a political community that
balances the tensions between unity and autonomy, Barber’s claims resonate with the
aspirations of deliberative democrats to improve the social relations between citizens under
circumstances of deep pluralism (Rosenberg 2007a).
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These three general categories provide a way of conceptualizing “better citizen”
claims that are grounded in the normative theories of both participatory and deliberative
democrats, and parsed in an analytically useful way for the purposes of empirical
investigation. To clarify, my intention in parsing educative effects into the categories of
efficacy, interests, and relationships and treating them separately in the next three chapters is
for analytical purposes; it is not to suggest that they are entirely independent of each other.
In the overall summary of educative effects provided in Chapter 6, I will discuss the
evidence concerning their interdependence further. At this point, and in the analysis
presented in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, I treat them as distinct in order to artificially simplify the
empirical task ahead. In addition, the general categories are presented here with minimal
specification. I have suggested above that details need to be clarified as they pertain to
particular deliberative contexts. After introducing community mediation as the empirical case
for this study, I will turn to each category in more depth in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 and provide
this contextualized account for each category. First, I present a set of continuums that help
to locate the kinds of participatory deliberative venues where the educative processes
outlined above are most likely to occur.
2.3

MAPPING THE DELIBERATIVE FIELD FOR EDUCATIVE PURPOSES
Given the tremendous variety within the ever expanding deliberative field, what kind

of participatory deliberative processes are best suited to generate educative effects
understood in terms of the categories outlined above? Archon Fung has generated several
helpful typologies of the deliberative field (Fung 2006; 2007b; 2007a), with a variety of
theoretical and practical concerns in mind. In his most comprehensive typology he notes
that “participatory democrats have long claimed that deliberative arenas function as schools
of democracy” and that “the extent to which participation imbues democratic skills and

51
Pincock-Chapter 2
habits has received far more conceptual attention than empirical scrutiny” (2007b, 169). His
typology suggests various hypotheses about the likely outcomes of various deliberative
processes, and with respect to educative effects he stresses that such impacts are most likely
to occur where deliberation has “tangible consequences” for participants because this will
generate the “psychic energy” necessary to produce them (169, 165). He articulates this in
terms of “stakes”, a combination of the scope and nature of the subject under discussion
and the extent of participant empowerment. He also argues that the amount of participation
(which he conceptualizes in terms of recurrence) will matter for the educative potential.
Though Fung presents brief case studies to support his claims, in keeping with the general
trend I have identified so far (and by Fung himself as well), the empirical evidence to
support them is notably thin. Nevertheless, the intuitive insights he makes are compelling
and provide guidance to empirical scholars seeking to investigate these questions more
systematically. I expand on his insights to present a set of continuums, along which
deliberative venues vary, that I argue are most likely to matter for their educative potential.
I have noted from the outset that educative claims are most theoretically compelling
for processes that are both participatory and deliberative, meaning they involve everyday
citizens in a discursive exchange about shared concerns. In the previous chapter, I also
identified the presence of a face-to-face and binding collective decision as a condition that
matters for educative expectations. This is because, as Fung notes, these factors alter the
psychological conditions of the participatory deliberative experience in ways that are
predicted to engage participants in the manner needed for educative expectations to be
realized. Rather than continuing to rely on this blunt binary, however, I disaggregate this
into two continuums, which can be visualized as the axes of a two dimensional space (see
Figure 2.1). The vertical axis represents the “face-to-face” continuum, which distinguishes
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between various collective decision making procedures. At one extreme I place anonymous
procedures such as ballot voting, in the mid-range I place less anonymous procedures such
as voice voting, and at the opposite extreme are face-to-face consensus based decision
making procedures (not anonymous). Deliberative polls (Fishkin 2009a) and the Citizens’
Assemblies in British Columbia and Ontario (Warren and Pearse 2008) are examples of
venues where secret ballot voting is used for final decisions. Citizen juries (Crosby and
Nethercut 2005) and the New England Town Hall Meeting (Mansbridge 1983; Bryan 2004)
are examples of venues where decisions are made, whenever possible, through face-to-face
procedures.38 It is the processes that are located towards the high end of the face-to-face
continuum (consensus) that are more likely to generate educative effects because they
maximize the need for engagement between participants.
The horizontal axis represents the “empowerment” continuum which charts the
extent to which decisions are likely to have meaningful consequences for the participants (in
other words their “bindingness”). At one extreme are processes that are not binding. In
these contexts, participants and observers can only lobby or advocate for the wisdom of
their decisions to those with direct authority. In the mid-range are advisory decisions where
those with direct authority have pledged to take the decisions of the deliberation under
advisement but are not actually bound to do so. Deliberative polls, Citizen juries and many
other initiatives of the public deliberation movement are located between advocacy and
advisory on this axis. There are also provisionally binding decisions, for example those of
the British Columbia and Ontario Citizens’ Assemblies that determine referendum options
but whose decisions do not take effect beyond that unless they are endorsed by a super-

As the arrows in Figure 2.1 are intended to indicate, secret ballot procedures are used in these venues as well,
particularly when disagreements persist. The default decision procedure, however, is face-to-face oriented.
38
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majority of the voting public.39 Finally, at the opposite extreme there are fully binding
decisions where the participants make decisions that are going to have direct and meaningful
consequences on themselves and others.40 The New England Town Hall Meeting is an
example of this level of empowerment. Again, it is towards this end of the spectrum that
educative effects are more likely because they raise the stakes in ways that can be expected to
generate deeper and more committed engagement with the process.
Figure 2.1: Collective Decisions
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39 In both cases the recommendations of the Citizens’ Assemblies were not endorsed by the required
percentage of the voting public (Rose 2009).
40 It is worth noting that one deliberative venue which has often taken the focus of empirical deliberation
research- the jury, is difficult to situate on this axis. Though jury decisions are binding, their consequences are
not particularly meaningful for the deliberators themselves and in this sense jury deliberations are somewhat of
an anomaly. We might say that in some indirect sense jury decisions are binding upon all citizens of a polity- in
that they represent the implementation of laws to which all are bound. They are however a fairly unique form
of collective decision making when compared to most deliberative venues because they are concerned with
rendering judgment on the actions of others that will have more immediate and meaningful consequences for
those others than for the deliberators themselves. In the terms developed by Richard Primus, instead of
thinking of them as institutions of self-government, we should consider them institutions of “othergovernment” (1996). This makes them difficult to situate on the collective decision axis as I have presented it
here, but it also clarifies that they are not likely to generate the same kind of investment on the part of
participants as deliberative venues that do have more immediate consequences for the deliberators themselves
thus reducing their educative potential (see also Leib 2005, 89-115).

54
Pincock-Chapter 2
It is not always appropriate for participatory deliberative processes to be empowered
and this reminds us that deliberative venues also vary in terms of the scope of the issue being
discussed. The scope of the issue, which can range from matters of global policy to the
personal affairs of very few people, is not simply relevant because of its likely relationship to
“bindingness”. It can also have its own independent influence on the extent to which
participants are engaged with the deliberative process. All other things being equal, the more
the issues under discussion touch on the immediate everyday lives of participants the more
they are likely to care about the process and engage in ways that generate educative potential.
This suggests that educative effects are more likely in settings where issues under discussions
are smaller in scale, more localized, and more personal.
For reasons already discussed, much of the deliberation research agenda has been
focused on venues with policy relevance whether it be at international, national or local
levels. This is clear from the exemplary venues located on the scope spectrum in Figure 2.2.
The Deliberative Poll “Europe in One Room” (Fishkin 2009a), is an example of
supranational scope, while its national prototype the National Issues Convention on the
British Election (Luskin et al. 1999), the Americans Discuss Social Security convened by
AmericSpeaks (Lukensmeyer, Goldman, and Brigham 2005; Barabas 2004), and the National
Issues Forums convened by Kettering Foundation on topics of national concern (Melville,
Willingham, and Dedrick 2005),41 are examples of national scope. Participatory budgeting in
Porto Alegre (Baiocchi 2001) and the Town Hall Meetings throughout New England
(Mansbridge 1983; Bryan 2004) are local in scope. An explicit concern with the educative
potential of face-to-face deliberation however, need not confine itself to matters of policy.
National Issue Forums (NIF) has a grassroots organization structure and as result the Forums, though
starting with issues of national concern such as abortion, education, and health care, are often tailored to
community context. For this reason I locate the NIF between the national and local points on the scope
spectrum.

41
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Semi-private settings and content can also take the focus of deliberative processes, like
workplace or organizational decision making, and neighborhood or family dispute
management. In fact, these issues may provide the best ground upon which to explore
educative claims because they are “closest to home” for participants and therefore likely to
prompt the high level of psychic engagement needed to generate educative effects.
Figure 2.2: Scope
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A. Europe in One Room (EU Deliberative Poll)
B. National Issues Convention (1997 British Election)
C. Americans Discuss Social Security (AmericaSpeaks)
D. National Issues Forums (Kettering Foundation)
E. Citizens’ Assemblies (British Columbia, Ontario)
F. Participatory Budgeting (Porto Alegre)
G. Town Hall Meeting (New England Towns)

A final variable expected to matter for “better citizen” claims is the intensity of the
deliberative experience. Intensity varies according to the length of the process and the
number of participants. The longer the process and the fewer the participants, the more any
particular individual will speak and be spoken to by fellow participants, provided there are
facilitating structures to encourage relatively equal participation. The smaller the number of
the participants, all other things being equal, the more intense we can expect the deliberative
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experience to be because as the numbers decrease the active participation of each member
will increase.
In terms of the length of the process, I confine my notion of deliberative venues in
this discussion to those containing a clear beginning, middle and end. Though the
cumulative impacts of repeated, open ended, and ongoing deliberation across a lifetime are
surely important to the educative claims advanced by theorists, they make it difficult to
isolate the causal mechanisms at play empirically. Furthermore, even in instances of
temporally contained deliberation, length can be understood in terms of both duration and
recurrence. In the former case, the total amount of time spent deliberating is the relevant
variable, while in the latter, repetition of meetings over time is most important. Fung stresses
recurrence, and to be sure deliberative venues that convene the same participants in iterated
interaction can be expected to have more pronounced educative effects due to the increased
opportunities for development and practice (2007b, 169).
To some extent, however, the same methodological difficulties that make ongoing
open ended deliberation complicated to study also apply to iterative deliberative experiences.
Though it makes sense to expect its educative potential to increase, the more drawn out the
process becomes, the more difficult it becomes to isolate any observed effects to that
process. For this reason, I focus on instances of deliberation that can be more or less
described as “single instance”. Though they may still involve multiple meetings or episodes,
they must involve consistent participation of the same people and be convened within a
relatively short span in order for potential educative effects to be convincingly isolated to the
deliberative experience. Such effects may indeed be small, but they are assumed to be related
to the more long term cumulative changes expected of repeated experiences. For these
reasons, I conceptualize length in terms of duration. All things being equal the longer a
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participatory deliberative processes lasts, the more intense it is likely to be and this is
expected to increase its educative potential.
Deliberative venues can be difficult to characterize in terms of intensity because the
number of participants is sometimes a fluid figure. It is relatively straightforward for
processes like the New England Town Hall Meeting, or Citizen’s Juries where participants
usually deliberate in the full group the entire time. In the former case attendance varies in
different towns but on average it is about 100 people.42 In such a large group the majority of
participants remain silent leaving the bulk of the participation to few.43 Citizen Juries
assemble a much smaller number of participants (12-15 people) for a relatively more intense
experience. In contrast to this, venues like Deliberative Polls and Citizens’ Assemblies
assemble over 100 participants but dedicate part of the time to small group discussions. In a
similar but even more ambitious design, the 21st Century Town Hall Meeting convenes
between 500-5000 participants, but they spend most of their time in small groups of about
10. This is represented in Figure 2.3 with arrows that symbolize the fluidity of participant
numbers in these examples. With respect to duration deliberative venues may last a few
hours over the course of one day like the New England Town Hall meeting process,44 or
over several days like Citizens juries and Deliberative polls. In contrast, the British
Columbia Citizens’ Assemblies met for twelve weekends over the course of ten months,
exceeding by far the duration of most deliberative venues.

42 Mansbridge reports 90 in attendance at the 1970 “Selby” Town Hall meeting (1983). Bryan’s longitudinal
study of 1435 town hall meetings in Vermont finds mean attendance to be 114 and median attendance to be
107 (2004, 64). Bryan also makes the additional point that a more important figure, for the context of the town
hall meeting, is the proportion of registered voters in attendance which averages 20.5% with a sample ranging
from 1 to 72.3% (65).
43 Mansbridge reports that between 30-50% of participants at the 1970 Selby Town Hall meeting spoke during
the meeting (Mansbridge 1983, 49).
44 The New England Town Hall meeting is of course an annual event but from year to year the participants will
differ. Therefore, for the questions of interest here they are best characterized according to a single meeting.

58
Pincock-Chapter 2
Figure 2.3: Intensity
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The result of this mapping suggests that we turn our attention to participatory
deliberative venues where collective decisions are binding and made through face-to-face
procedures to increase deliberative engagement between participants, where the scope of the
subject matter is highly localized and/or personalized such that participants are highly
invested, and where the participation itself is intense because the number of participants is
small and the process is relatively sustained. This points in the direction of venues we may
not have expected, and that are not often the focus of political scientists.
Some scholars convinced of the educative potential of participatory deliberative
processes but stymied by the difficulty of demonstrating them with the “blunt instruments
of social science” have suggested that efforts to explore these questions empirically must be
conducted in experimental settings where pre/post and control group design can
convincingly isolate the effects to a participatory deliberative “treatment” (Mansbridge 1999a,
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291). Yet the elements of this “treatment”, as the preceding mapping exercise has illustrated
will be exceedingly difficult to simulate in experimental settings due to the necessity that they
have meaningful consequences for participants. While experimental researchers have no
doubt developed techniques for attempting to overcome them, these limitations provide
good reason to combine their efforts with the study of real world participatory deliberative
venues.45
A case study approach focusing on a real world venue that is located in or near the
“highest educative potential” region for all three categories is capable of generating crucial
insights concerning the question of deliberation’s educative effects. If educative effects
cannot be found there, where conditions are most favorable, these venues provide good
reason to be skeptical that any participatory deliberative venues can generate these impacts.
On the other hand, any effects that are found will provide good ground upon which to
describe the mechanisms necessary for producing them in other contexts. Selecting a
deliberative venue according to this skeptical orientation appears warranted in light of the
empirical elusivity of these widely sought after effects. I argue that community mediation is
one such venue. In the remainder of this chapter I introduce the community mediation
process as one that fits the conditions outlined above, present the methodological approach
I take to examining its educative potential, and provide an initial introduction to the context
where I study it.
2.4

MAPPING COMMUNITY MEDIATION IN THE DELIBERATIVE FIELD
Community dispute resolution organizations (CDRs) are non-profit agencies that

offer free or sliding scale conflict resolution services, especially mediation (often called

Though I choose to focus on real world deliberative venues, another implication of my argument is that
experimental researchers interested in educative claims should seek to incorporate appropriate conditions of
collective decisions, scope, and intensity in their design of deliberative treatments.

45
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community mediation), to address citizen disputes. Their services are usually offered by
trained volunteers while the organizations themselves are run by paid staff. Since the 1970s,
the number of such organizations in North America is estimated to have grown from under
10 to a peak of over 500 in 2002. Current estimates suggest that recent reductions in
foundation funding and state-wide support, and the recent economic downturn have
reduced the number of organizations to between 300 and 400 (Hollingshead and Corbett
forthcoming).46 Community mediation applies participatory deliberative principles to microlevel disputes among small numbers of citizens (usually two). Conflicts between neighbors,
roommates, landlords and tenants, consumers and merchants, and among family members
or intimates are the sorts of matters dealt with through community mediation.47 Citizens in
conflict meet face-to-face to participate voluntarily48 in the mediation process, which is a
facilitated deliberation that allows for the exploration of issues and the generation of
potential solutions to the conflict. Mediators have no formal decision making power,
therefore, participants in mediation are responsible for the agreements they reach. Although
the exact role of the mediator is a contested issue in mediation circles, generally the mediator
focuses on process and avoids getting involved in the content of the conflict. In short, the
mediation process stresses norms of volunteerism, self-determination, and non-violence.
Not surprisingly, given the deliberative and participatory characteristics of the
community mediation process, many mediation theorists and practitioners have historically
and recently sought explicitly to have educative effects on participants. The emergence of

46 According to Hollingshead and Corbett, the organizational membership rolls of the National Association for
Community Mediation (NAFCM) are approximately 300. They note however that membership rolls do not
provide an accurate total and Justin Corbett, NAFCM’s Executive Director, estimates the total number of
organizations is closer to 400 (March 2011 correspondence on file with the author).
47 Emphasis has traditionally been placed on disputes between neighbors but the cases I have examined suggest
that some CDRs are addressing conflicts between family members and intimate just as often.
48 There are some jurisdictions where mediation is mandated by law for civil disputes but CDRs are not
normally responsible for convening mandatory mediation.
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the first community dispute resolution organizations (CDRs) in the United States in the
1970s coincides with the birth of the academic field of conflict resolution and alternate
dispute resolution (ADR).49 In this formative period, organizations offering mediation
services to citizens in conflict developed along two distinct tracks, one sponsored by the
formal justice system (court-based model), and one having more grassroots origins
(community empowerment model). Although such a simple binary is incapable of capturing
the complexity of the organizational field, many accounts of community mediation’s history
have noted this basic distinction between those centers who conceived their mission in
instrumental and efficiency related terms (relieve congestion of the courts) and those who
articulated non-instrumental educative goals in the tradition of participatory democracy
(strengthening of social networks, building of community capacity, and highlighting of
shared problems) (Wahrhaftig 1982; McGillis 1997; Shonholtz 2000).50 In fact, the
community mediation “movement” is explicitly connected by some to the wave of social
movements that established alternative participatory institutions in the US in the 1960s and
1970s as a practical examples of participatory democratic theory (Coy and Hedeen 2005).51
The “community empowerment” organizational model, though less prominent in the
field, has persisted and lends significant symbolic resources to those trumpeting mediation’s
value (Harrington and Merry 1988). Mediation advocates who continue in this tradition
emphasize the capacity of the mediation process to enhance participants’ democratic
capacities (Weinstein 2001; Shonholtz 2000; Bradley and Smith 2000; Wahrhaftig 2004).

See Bingham, Nabatchi, and O’Leary (2005) for a framework that places ADR within the spectrum of “new”
forms of participatory governance.
50 For this reason I do not focus my study on court-based mediation programs, but orient myself instead to
those mediation programs at the community empowerment end of the spectrum.
51 For research evaluating the extent to which CDRs are currently living up to their participatory roots at the
organizational level see (Gazley, Chang, and Bingham 2006; Gazley, Chang, and Bingham 2010). Unfortunately,
their research does not address the ability of CDRs to realize participatory aims through effects on individuals
who use their mediation services.
49
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More recently, the educative potential of mediation has been emphasized by those
advocating for a model of “transformative mediation” most heavily associated with Bush
and Folger’s 1994 book The Promise of Mediation and their subsequent founding of the
Institute for the Study of Conflict Transformation in 1999.52 Proponents of this approach
argue that through instances of “empowerment” and “recognition”, the mediation process
can contribute to the moral development of individuals by making them feel more
efficacious, become more other-regarding, and adopt a relational worldview (Bush and
Folger 1994; Bush and Folger 2005; Della Noce, Bush, and Folger 2002).53 Despite the
prominence of such non-instrumental claims, empirical research on the effects of
community mediation is overwhelmingly focused on instrumental measures of success
(Lowry 1993, 96). As one review of the research remarks, “the prevalent measures of
community mediation fail to capture many of the field’s broader goals, leaving some larger
questions unanswered” (Hedeen 2004, 125). While many CDRs continue to operate in the
tradition of the ‘community empowerment’ model and/or with transformative ambitions,
they have little systematic research to bolster their claims, adjust their expectations, or
improve their practice (Hollingshead and Corbett forthcoming). Thus, the case of
community mediation mirrors the field of democratic theory and practice more broadly in
that it lacks empirical confirmation of important normative justifications.
Furthermore, the community mediation process is situated at the appropriate end of
each of the continuums relevant to educative potential that I sketched in the previous
section. With respect to collective decisions, the community mediation process is designed to
See http://www.transformativemediation.org/ .
Though Bush and Folger identify the primary goal of transformative mediation to be “transformation of the
parties’ conflict interaction” and suggest that changing individual parties should not be a mediator’s focus, they
acknowledge that the process may indeed have lasting individual impacts on the parties (2005: 233). Their
emphasis is therefore placed at the relational end of the “better citizen” continuum though they acknowledge
the potential for individual level changes as well.
52
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have a specific problem solving orientation and to provide a structure in which participants
can make agreements, often in writing, about the issues they are currently facing.
Participants enter into agreements (or decide not to enter into agreements) in face-to-face
setting and through a consensus building process that requires the participation and support
of all who are present.54 They are therefore located at the high end of the “face-to-face”
continuum. The participants are also “empowered” in the community mediation process in
the sense that the decisions they make are final and not dependent on an outside authority to
endorse, enforce, or implement them. In this sense the agreements participants reach are
immediately binding on them. Though they are not necessarily legally enforceable, the
decisions made in community mediation will have immediate meaningful consequences for
the lives of the participants, whether they choose to comply with the decisions they make,
Figure 2.4: Community Mediation and Collective Decisions
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54 The community mediation process therefore differs from other approaches often used in labourmanagement or formal legal contexts (civil litigation, divorce) where a “shuttle mediation” approach is often
used and parties rarely if ever meet in face-to-face settings.
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breach the agreements they entered into, or conclude the process without reaching an
agreement. Therefore, as Figure 2.4 illustrates, the process belongs at the high end of the
“empowerment” continuum as well.
With respect to scope, community mediation deals with highly localized and
personalized issues often of immediate concern to as few as two people.55 This process is
designed to manage interpersonal conflicts that arise in neighborhood, family, workplace,
and other settings. For this reason, they have rarely been the focus of political theorists
describing deliberative venues.56 But it is precisely because community mediation is located
at the micro end of the scope continuum, as Figure 2.5 illustrates, that it is likely to have high
educative potential. Because of the personal investment participants have in the issues under
discussion and the conflict context in which such discussions are convened, community
mediation is an example of “hot deliberation”, which is expected to produce greater
investment of energy and resources on the part of participants (Fung 2007b, 165). These
Figure 2.5: Community Mediation and Scope
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See Appendix I, Table 2.3 for examples of the kinds of issues that come up in community mediation.
For a notable exception see (Schlosberg 1995; cited in Dryzek 2000, 49). While I argue that these distinct
features make community mediation a deliberative venue that is ripe for empirical study of educative effects,
they also make it imperative that generalizing to the broader set of deliberative venues, where the focus is
usually on more public issues, be done with care.
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conditions are posited to be conducive to educative outcomes.
With respect to intensity, community mediation most often includes as few as two
people in the presence of one or two mediators to discuss matters of shared concern. They
may sometimes involve groups of three or more but rarely convene more than five people at
a time.57 While direct participation will obviously vary from person to person, and the larger
the number the easier to remain withdrawn as a participant, the small number of participants
in community mediation makes it a relatively intense deliberative experience. In terms of
length, a typical community mediation session lasts three hours.58 Most cases are closed after
one session but it is not uncommon for the process to reconvene for a second or even third
session that span over several months.59 Community mediation is therefore comparable in
terms of length to many other deliberative venues and shorter than some others, discussed
Figure 2.6: Community Mediation and Intensity
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Of the 19 community mediation cases that I examined, 13 convened 2 people, 4 convened 3-5 people, and 2
convened 5-7 people, 0 convened more than 7 people. While these small numbers are sure to generate a certain
degree of participatory intensity, they will not produce the number of distinct perspectives that might follow
from a larger group. This trade off must be kept in mind when generalizing from this case.
58 Exact time duration of the mediation cases I examined are not available but it is standard practice at the
CDRs I studied to schedule mediation sessions for three hours. I did not hear reports of sessions that deviated
significantly in length from this during interviews with practitioners or participants.
59 Of the 19 community mediation cases I examined, 7 involved more than 1 joint session. None of the cases
involved more than four sessions. With the exception of one case that involved multiple sessions spanning over
two years, cases with multiple sessions took place within a 1-3 month time period.
57
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above. It is therefore located in Figure 2.6 in the lower right quadrant below the “highest
educative potential” space of the intensity map. Due to its small number of participants,
however, it remains a highly intense experience relative to other deliberative processes. As
Figures 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 demonstrate, community mediation is a participatory deliberative
process located in or close to the “high potential” space of all three mapping categories and
therefore a good case for exploring educative claims empirically.
Finally, in addition to having all the conditions suited to high educative potential,
community mediation is a fruitful empirical context due to the central importance it places
on the mediators themselves. Participatory deliberative processes are often convened by
moderators, facilitators, or trainers who may exercise considerable influence over process,
agenda, and outcome. Such influence may be necessary in order for desired educative effects
to occur because of what is already known about the limits of citizens’ capacity to conform
to democratic ideals (Rosenberg 2007b, 359). While empirical research on participatory
deliberative processes focuses little on the role of facilitators, community mediation provides
a case where their role is made explicit. Mediation theory and practice places significant
emphasis on how mediator skills and techniques can contribute to outcomes for participants
in ways that are relevant to but overlooked in a wide range of deliberative processes. The
theory and practice of community mediation is based on the view that mediators can and
should exert control over process in ways that are productive for the parties while respecting
the parties control over the content of the mediation, so as to reinforce the norm of autonomy
(Nabatchi, Bingham, and Moon 2010; Moore 2003).60 Process control however, may involve
a high degree of management of participant communication thus assigning significant

While a continuum certainly exists in the broader mediation field concerning mediator levels of
“directiveness”, community mediation is consistently associated with lower levels of mediator involvement in
the content of the mediation.
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influence to the mediator in ways that can compromise participant autonomy.61 Community
mediation is therefore a case that can contribute to our understanding of the relationship
between moderator techniques and the mechanisms that generate or limit educative
outcomes and the tensions these techniques present for democratic norms in the deliberative
process. Such insights can help to advance deliberative theory, which has up to now given
minimal attention to the role of moderators in helping or hurting real world deliberation’s
chances of approaching the regulative ideals theorists describe. As I show in the next
section, mediation theorists and practitioners have a well developed way of describing the
role of mediators in the participatory deliberative process and linking this to educative goals.
Before presenting the methods I use to explore community mediation’s educative effects, I
show how the educative goals articulated by mediation theorists fit with the categories of
efficacy, interests, and relationships I outlined at the beginning of this chapter.
2.5

COMMUNITY MEDIATION AND EDUCATIVE CLAIMS
Though mediation theorists and practitioners employ a different terminology, their

educative assumptions align with the categories of efficacy, interests, and relationships that I
outlined previously. This can be seen through earlier debates between advocates of the
community empowerment model of mediation and their critics and through more recent
debates between advocates of “transformative mediation” and their critics. Community
mediation advocates believe that mediation participants will experience empowerment in the
mediation process, meaning that they will develop skills and dispositions that increase their
efficacy. They also hope to facilitate recognition on the part of participants so that they gain a

61 For further discussion of this point see section 2.7. There, I provide a basic overview of the mediator
approaches and strategies I observed and heard about at my field sites and I return to these in Chapter 6. It is
important to note however, that this is not the central focus of my research design and there are therefore
limits on the extent to which I am able to comment on the role of mediators in the generation of educative
effects.
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better understanding of their own and others’ interests. They describe the mediation process
as transformative with respect to the relationships participants have with each other and with
others more generally.
2.5.1 “Empowerment” and Efficacy
By providing a process where participants decide for themselves what resolution (if
any) is most appropriate for them, mediation is expected to reinforce participant autonomy
and increase participant efficacy. The importance of self-determination to mediation is often
stressed, even in basic training materials (for example Beer 1997). It is this principle that has
caused mediation advocates to relate community mediation to broader democratic goals and
principles (Weinstein 2001; Shonholtz 2000; Bradley and Smith 2000). Furthermore, the
emphasis on autonomy-related norms of self-determination, non-violence, and volunteerism
in the mediation process are predicted by these advocates to have lasting effects on
mediation participants. The language of ‘empowerment’ is often used to suggest that the
experience of mediation will boost participant’s feelings of efficacy and influence their
attitudes and behavior in areas of their lives not directly related to the mediated conflict
(Shonholtz 1984; Schwerin 1995).
Critics observing the tension that can arise between “better decision” and “better
citizen” goals in practice however, have argued that in many practical contexts, the emphasis
on reaching settlement in mediation compromises its ability to increase efficacy (Bush and
Folger 1994; Nader 1993). In fact, such critics argue, in their desire to move the parties
towards agreement mediators provide a process that is coercive.62 Most notable here is
Laura Nader’s argument that the mediation process reinforces norms of harmony that
pressure parties into settlement even when they have good reasons (often structural) to
62

For a review of coercion in mediation and its distinction from coercion “into” mediation see (Hedeen 2001).
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remain in conflict. This is usually accomplished through an emphasis on feelings and
interpersonal dynamics in a conflict (Dubow and McEwen 1993, 152; Fitzpatrick 1993, 458,
460) and the suggestion on the part of mediators that ‘taking responsibility for your conflict’
means settling it. This may actually result, contrary to educative aspirations, in decreasing
participants’ sense of empowerment and efficacy. Despite a long standing debate about the
impact of mediation on participant efficacy,63 little empirical evidence has been presented to
support either side, especially evidence drawn from the perspectives of participants
themselves.64
2.5.2

“Recognition” and Interests
In the field of mediation theory and practice, educative claims concerning the

interests of participants have been widely debated and discussed. In fact, the mediation
process provides an excellent venue in which to investigate the increasingly nuanced interest
clarification claims that have been articulated over time by deliberative theorists. With the
emergence of “transformative mediation” in the 1990s, the claims now familiar to us from
the “classic” deliberation literature, that the process can help participants to shift their
understandings of their interests in a more other regarding or public spirited direction, have
been re-emphasized. Similar to the debate in broader deliberation circles, Bush and Folger’s
critics have questioned the value of a mediation process that suppresses self-regarding
interests (Milner 1996). Bush and Folger’s approach (Bush and Folger 1994; Bush and
Folger 2005), is provocative in part because the negotiation theory upon which much
63 For an effort, drawing on Habermas and Foucault, to reconcile these two extremes and to suggest that
community mediation makes limited personal empowerment possible, see Agusti-Panareda (2005).
64 For a promising exception, see Nabatchi, Bingham, and Moon (2010), which presents compelling empirical
evidence, based on the survey responses of mediation participants, that the goals of transformative mediation
are realized in practice. Despite their important contribution to the dearth of empirical evidence about
mediation’s educative effects, the scope of Nabatchi et al’s study is limited in several ways. First, it is conducted
in a workplace rather than community context and therefore provides limited insight about the educative
potential of community mediation. Second, they draw on mediation exit surveys completed by participants
which offer little insight about the lasting effects of the mediation experience on participants.
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mediation practice is based (Fisher, Ury, and Patton 1983) emphasizes a process of
individual interest clarification in the management of conflict. According to this view
interest-based negotiation, in contrast to positional bargaining, will often reveal options that
meet the individual interests of both parties to a conflict.65 Proponents of interest-based
negotiation do not hope, as Bush and Folger do, that participants will re-articulate their
interests in other regarding ways. Instead they maintain that previously perceived conflicts
can be overcome through a discursive process of interest disclosure and creative
brainstorming. The possibility for agreement remains even if participants remain wedded to
self-regarding interests.
Influenced by participatory democrats concerned with social inequalities (Bachrach
1975), community empowerment framers have stressed that mediation can clarify interests
by offering participants the opportunity to identify the root causes of their conflicts
(Shonholtz 1984; Shonholtz 2000; Wahrhaftig 1982; Wahrhaftig 2004). ‘Root causes’ refer
to the larger social conflicts that often inform private interpersonal conflicts. Identifying
‘root causes’ requires the clarification of interests an individual has in a broad social conflict,
which is by definition an interest they share with some social group (defined by ethnicity,
race, class, gender, geography, religion, age, among others). Community empowerment
practitioners claim that only a deliberative process for managing conflict is capable of
clarifying these micro and macro level interests at play in a given conflict. In response,
critics have been skeptical of mediation’s potential for clarifying interests at either level. At
the micro level, they argue that without due process and substantive protections there are no
means within the mediation process to ensure that a participant’s interests with respect to a

65 Notably, deliberative theorists have recently drawn on Fisher and Ury and other negotiation theorists in
order to articulate their conception of interest clarification and to expand their conception of the regulative
ideal of deliberation (Mansbridge et al. 2010; Mansbridge 2009).
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particular conflict will be clarified or protected. At the macro level, they argue, the private
and informal setting of community mediation enforces the individualization of disputes
which downplays their relationships to broader social conflicts (Hofrichter 1982; Nader
1993; Abel 1982). In contrast to the formal law, which maintains a public record of all
disputes and can track how they impact various social groups, mediation is expected to
conceal the relationship between micro and macro level interests.
Mediation advocates and critics are therefore not only concerned with the type of
interests that are made salient through mediation, they also make arguments about the scope
of interests. The four stories Bush and Folger use to describe the mediation movement in
the first chapter of their book are instructive for highlighting these debates (2005:7-39).
Concerning interest type, Bush and Folger favor the ‘transformation story’ which suggests
that mediation can clarify interests by generating more other regarding commitments among
participants. They contrast this to the ‘satisfaction story’, which is more consonant with the
Fisher and Ury’s notion of interest clarification and suggests self-regarding interests are
clarified through the process.66 With respect to interest scope, the ‘social justice story’ that can
be attributed to ‘community empowerment’ thinkers like Shonholtz (1984; 2000) and
Wahrhaftig (1982; 2004), suggests a broadening of the scope while mediation critics like
Nader (1993), Abel (1982), and Hofrichter (1982) present the ‘oppression story’ about
mediation, suggesting it accomplishes the exact opposite by narrowing the scope of the
conflict in ways that reinforce and maintain social and structural inequalities. Though
mediation theorists and practitioners have presented a complex set of interest clarification

Bush and Folger also argue that the satisfaction story places too much emphasis on settlement to the
detriment of other goals of mediation. The satisfaction story is in many ways consonant with the “court based”
model of mediation I identified in my own review of community mediation’s history. Bush and Folger however,
do not limit themselves to the history of community mediation only and aim instead to provide an overview of
the entire field of practice.
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claims, little systematic empirical research has explored the extent to which these
expectations are realized through the mediation process.
2.5.3 “Transformation” and Relationships
Though Bush and Folger have made the focus on human relationships most explicit
recently, mediation advocates have long emphasized the role the process could play in
shifting the dynamics of interaction between participants and within a community more
broadly. A 1982 evaluation of a pioneer community mediation program, the San Francisco
Community Boards (SFCB), outlined twenty-five possible positive effects of a “community
based conflict resolution system” (see Shonholtz 1993, 226).67 Among these are several
concerning relationships between participants and broader ‘community building’ effects. The
list suggests that community mediation “builds common understanding about appropriate
behavior”, “builds understanding of and respect for different lifestyles”, “builds a sense of
relatedness to others in the community”, and “counteracts alienation and isolation” (226).
Like deliberative theorists, SFCB founder Raymond Shonholtz links the importance of these
aspirations to the circumstances of deep pluralism, suggesting that “increasing ethnic and
racial diversity of urban communities, and the growing tensions within them” make such
effects more significant and more pressing (227). Though subsequent evaluation studies of
the SFCB did not show changes in residents’ attachment to their neighborhood as a result of
the program (Dubow and McEwen 1993, 166), these relational claims continue to form a
core normative justification for community mediation.
This relational focus is also apparent in the account offered by Bush and Folger
about the model of “transformative mediation” they espouse (1994, 2005). In their

The effects are arranged in a table divided into three tiers of effects, primary being most immediate to the
process with secondary and tertiary effects being more temporally removed. The relational effects mentioned
here are located among the secondary and tertiary effects.
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approach, the mediation process is intended to shift the dynamics of conflict interaction
from a vicious to a virtuous circle of conflict transformation. According to Bush and Folger,
when the mediation process is working as it should, “the [conflict] interaction as a whole
begins to transform and regenerate. It changes back from a negative, destructive, and
demonizing interaction to one that becomes positive, constructive, connecting, and
humanizing, even while conflict and disagreement are still continuing” (2005, 56). Bush and
Folger’s claims appear more contained to the immediate interaction between parties in
conflict than the “community building” claims of Shonholtz and others. They are, however,
explicitly situated in a broader theoretical framework that stresses the centrality of social
interaction to human life. Drawing on social psychological, political, and moral theory, they
espouse a view of human nature that requires a balance between individual autonomy and
social connectedness. They advocate a model of mediation they believe can support people
to engage in social interaction and to “turn conflict itself into an opportunity to deepen and
enhance interaction, personal strength, and interpersonal understanding” (256).
The mediation field is highly varied and no one approach or set of outcomes can
capture it in its entirety. As I noted above, this is true even for the subfield of community
mediation within the broader field of mediation practice. Nevertheless, as I have aimed to
show here, in the wider mediation field and in the community context especially, educative
claims are frequently articulated in ways that match the categories of efficacy, interests, and
relationships that I drew from participatory theory. This is not at all surprising given the
influence of participatory democracy on community mediation in its formative years, but it
serves to further underscore community mediation’s value as an empirical case from the
perspective of democratic theory. Furthermore, because of their practical focus, mediation
advocates have sometimes articulated these claims in ways that are quite specific and
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nuanced and that can advance our thinking about the causal mechanisms of deliberation’s
educative potential. This is true in part because of the central role of the mediator in the
process, and the need to articulate the overall mechanism of the process in practical terms
for the purpose of training and mentoring mediators to fulfill their role consistent with
mediation’s principles and values. Having introduced community mediation as an
appropriate and, in many ways, ideal empirical case for the exploration of deliberation’s
better citizen claims, I will next explain the methods I employ in examining community
mediation’s educative effects.
2.6

METHODS
Up to this point, I have presented several aspects of my approach to the empirical

study of deliberation’s educative potential. First, I have chosen a real world case study
approach as opposed to an experimental design approach. I have done so on the grounds
that a deliberative experience is quite complex, making it difficult to simulate in experimental
design, in particular due to the relationship that is theorized to exist between real stakes of
the process and its educative potential. Thinking about the features of collective decisions, scope,
and intensity as continuums upon which deliberative venues vary, we can locate different
cases for potential further study and get a better sense of how what we find in one case does
or does not relate to others. This is important in a field where single case study research is
often conducted with limited attention to the way findings may or may not transfer to other
deliberative contexts. I have argued for a critical case selection design that targets a
deliberative venue where educative outcomes seem most likely to occur (Flyvbjerg 2006;
George and Bennet 2005). Detailed study of this single case can either provide strong
support for the dismissal of educative assumptions and/or exemplary evidence of how and
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why educative outcomes are produced. In either event, this single case, both despite and
because of its particularities, can generate insights relevant to the wider deliberative field.
Having selected community mediation as such a case, the next question concerns
how to actually measure its potential to generate educative effects. By conceptualizing
educative effects in terms of efficacy, interests, and relationships, I have tried to respond to calls
to “pay close attention to what past theorists actually said when they described what they
saw and how they understood it” (Mansbridge 1999a, 320). My contention is that these
categories provide a better theoretical footing to pursue our empirical investigation of
educative assumptions than has most previous research. But these categories make ever
more plain the fact that “research on this topic has the intrinsic difficulties of trying to
measure small and subtle psychological effects” (319). Because much of these effects cannot
be observed directly, and those that might could only be done so with great difficulty,
research must rely on the accounts of the participants themselves about their thoughts and
actions. Political behavior research has long operated in this way through its reliance on
survey data about attitudes and behaviors. Indeed it seems to make perfect intuitive sense
that if we want to know what people think, feel, and act, we should simply ask them. This is
complicated however, by the fact that we know people’s perceptions of themselves do not
always match the perceptions that others have of them and further by the fact that we have
good reasons to think people cannot always provide an account of their own thought
processes or the sources of those processes (Nisbett and Ross 1980; Nisbett and Wilson
1977).
Survey researchers attempt to address these problems by limiting the explanatory
burden they place on people themselves. Rather than asking people to describe the
relationship between their experiences, thoughts, and actions, they opt to ask simpler
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questions of large numbers of people and to identify relationships between various attitudes,
behaviors, and events with the use of statistical techniques. For those experimental
researchers who rely on survey instruments, pre/post and control group designs serve to
increase confidence that the outcomes people report can be isolated to the experience in
question. The reports are usually brief, closed-ended, and framed in the researcher’s terms. I
opt instead for a different approach that seeks out, mainly through in-depth interviewing,
detailed accounts from community mediation practitioners and participants themselves
about their own experiences. With respect to practitioners, I draw on their training and
experience to refine my understanding of the basic features of the community mediation
process as it is applied in a real world context, especially the features relevant to their
educative aims. With respect to participants, I listen carefully to their accounts of the
community mediation experience and its lasting effects on them.
Such an approach does place a greater explanatory burden on the people themselves,
and for that reason it must be done with care and attention to the ways that people are not
always well equipped to shoulder this burden. First, this does not mean that I naïvely accept
participants’ accounts. As Soss notes, “making it a priority to encounter participants’
understandings on their own terms is not the same as accepting participants’ descriptions of
their understandings” (2006, 133). My contention, however, is that in light of the limitations
of self-reports for exploring these kinds of questions, there is value in gathering more
detailed, self-directed narrative accounts from participants about the relationships between
their experiences, thoughts, and actions (Walsh 2007, 9; Monroe 2004, 267-285).
Furthermore, in depth interviewing provides its own resources for managing the
methodological challenges associated with self reports. Specifically, it allows the researcher
to probe in much greater depth the meaning participants ascribe to particular words, actions,

77
Pincock-Chapter 2
and experiences and places a priority on exploring the different ways participants may
interpret the interviewer’s questions and the different things they might mean even when
using similar words (Soss 2006, 132). My interview style combines open ended questioning
in the early parts of the interview designed to harness the revelatory power of people’s own
narratives with more structured questioning later on to probe, in more directive ways, into
the educative categories of interest. Therefore, in adopting this approach, I intentionally
engage in interpretation of participants’ accounts and aim to present, as transparently as
possible, the reasons for the interpretations I adopt.
As a result of my approach, this research is best suited to address the way
participants make sense of their experiences with community mediation, and to show how
they understand and makes sense of its effects. Such an approach must admit certain blind
spots, as it cannot entirely overcome the blind spots of the participants themselves in the
account it provides. At the same time, however, it opens up its own areas for insight that are
missed through other methods. First, due to the subjective and internal processes implicated
by educative assumptions, participants’ accounts are absolutely crucial to our understanding
because they simply cannot be accessed in any other way. Given the subtlety of the effects
we are seeking, if participants prove capable of articulating these in their own words, this
should not be treated lightly or easily dismissed. Second, these in-depth accounts provide
rich descriptions of the deliberative process and experience itself. This provides the
opportunity to fill in the “black box” of the process left by much existing research and begin
to identify, from the perspective of participants, the causal mechanisms that may account for
the presences or absence of various educative outcomes. Gaining access to these in-depth
accounts requires however, largely for practical reasons, that I focus on the community
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mediation process in one particular geographic and organizational context. I selected two
CDR organizations in Toronto for this purpose.
2.6.1

Field sites: why Toronto?
The CDRs I study in this project are St. Stephen’s Community House Conflict

Resolution Service (CRS), located in the Kensington Market neighborhood near Toronto’s
city center, and Conflict Mediation Services of Downsview (CMSD), located in the Jane and
Finch neighborhood in Toronto’s north end. Toronto, as home to these CDRs, has several
advantages as a site to conduct this research. Unlike many cities, Toronto is home to two
well-established68 CDRs who share similar organizational structure, missions, and
approaches to mediation that are in line with the ‘community empowerment’ tradition of
community mediation. Like the early community empowerment framers of community
mediation described above, the Toronto CDRs do not take cases that have already entered
the formal justice system and seek instead to intervene earlier in conflicts and to address
conflicts that are not likely to come to the courts. They rely on self-referrals, and referrals
from police, public and cooperative housing staff, and other early interveners in
neighborhood conflicts. These qualities are notable because they increase the salience of
educative aims and potential relative to other CDRs who have a more court-based and
efficiency focused missions.
As I described above, it is from this ‘community-empowerment’ approach that the
educative claims of community mediation have their genesis, and this is also where they
continue to be advanced most prominently today. It is no coincidence that these
organizations are located in Canada. Observers of the history of community mediation have
noted that CDRs in the US have tended over time to become more closely affiliated with the
68

CRS was established in 1985 and CMSD was established in 1987.
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courts (Hedeen and Coy 2000; Hedeen 2003; Coy and Hedeen 2005; Morrill and McKee
1993), but this trajectory has not been mirrored in Canada where there is a more lasting
presence of the community empowerment model CDR. 69 This suggests that Canada, and
Toronto especially, is a good place to study the educative potential of community mediation.
Following the same “most likely” case logic used to select community mediation as a
deliberative venue within the overall deliberative field, CRS and CMSD are CDRs within the
community mediation field that are relatively likely to generate insight about the process’s
educative potential.
Toronto presents an additional methodological advantage because these desirable
qualities are shared in common by two organizations located in the same city. In fact, more
than simply sharing a similar ‘community empowerment’ orientation to community
mediation, CRS and CMSD are both leading members of a recently formed coalition of
CDRs in Ontario that has established a common definition of community mediation, which
emphasizes transformation, empowerment, and recognition while highlighting values of
social justice, equality and inclusivity.70 Because of this consensus and the considerable
cooperation between the organizations with respect to case processing and training work, I
aggregate my findings across the two field sites into one relatively consistent narrative about
the educative expectations and outcomes of the “Toronto model” of community
mediation.71 The inclusion of two organizations in the study is not intended to provide
comparative leverage in the research design but rather as a strategy for increasing the
number of observations included in the case study (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). The
This view has been confirmed through discussions among mediation practitioners about Canadian
community mediation organizations and how they differ from their American counterparts conducted by email
on the National Association for Community Mediation’s listserv (emails on file with the author).
70 Ontario Community Mediation Coalition Terms of Reference and Standards for Training Ontario Community Mediation
Services Volunteers, on file with the author.
71 I remain sensitive to the impact of variation across organizations and report on this where relevant
throughout.
69
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opportunity to increase the number of observations while keeping contextual factors
(geography, organizational model) relatively constant is crucial because CDRs, especially
those with a ‘community empowerment’ orientation, have relatively small case loads.72
Before presenting the main characteristics of the “Toronto model” of community mediation,
I describe the tools I used to access and generate the data I draw on for the project.73
2.6.2

Tool and Steps: Observation and Interviews
The data were accessed in two steps that both involve mainly interviews

supplemented with some observation. Step one interviews and observation served to build
an understanding of 1) the mediation process as it takes place at the Toronto CDRs, and 2)
the views of practitioners about the educative potential of the process. In step two they
served to build an understanding of the views of mediation participants about the effects of
the process on them. During step one, I conducted participant observation of introductory
mediation trainings at each CDR.74 These workshops take place over three days (24 training
hours total) and are required for those wishing to become volunteer mediators. They
provide a basic overview of the model of mediation used at the Toronto CDRs and the basic
steps expected of mediators in delivering the service. Training workshops also include a
number of role play exercises where mediations are simulated and experienced trainers
model techniques for trainees. In order to better relate the educative claims of interest to the
everyday practice of community mediation, I also interviewed CDR volunteers and staff at

72 From July 2006-July 2007, CRS convened 11 mediations and CMSD convened 20 mediations in their
respective community programs. Though the total number of cases for both organizations exceed these
numbers greatly (a case may involve initial intake calls and/or case development meetings), mediations actually
take place in only a small proportion of cases.
73 I use the terms “access and generate” instead of “collect” data because these seem to be more appropriate
terms for the interpretive enterprise my observation and interview techniques require (Yanow and SchwartzShea 2006, xix).
74 To protect the confidentiality of participants, I will sometimes refer to the Toronto CDRs as CDR1 and
CDR2.
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both organizations. Through focus group and individual interviews (n= 41),75 I listened to
the views of program staff and volunteer mediators about the goals and effects of the
community mediation process. Table 2.1 provides a summary of the staff and volunteer
interviews.76
Table 2.1: Interviews with CDR Volunteers and Staff
Interviews
Focus Group Participants (Volunteers)
Individual Participants (Volunteers)
Individual Participants (Staff)
TOTAL

CDR1
16
6
2
24

CDR2
12
3
2
17

Total
28
9
4
41

Interview questions asked about the mediation process at the Toronto CDRs, its relationship
to the goals and mission of the CDRs, and whether and how the mediation process has
lasting effects on participants. These interviews, along with the participant observation of
training workshops, helped me to understand the approach to mediation taken at the
Toronto CDRs and the views of staff and volunteers about the educative mechanisms and
effects of the process.
My analysis of these data began with a set of pre-determined codes such as “the
mediation process”, “efficacy”, “interests”, and “relationships”. I then proceeded
inductively to identify additional themes in the interviews and subthemes within each of the
pre-determined codes, generating additional coding categories as a result. For example,
practitioners emphasized themes of “self-determination” and “therapeutic” in their
descriptions of the mediation process, and themes of “confidence”, “self-reliance”, and
75 I conducted individual interviews with staff that had direct and supervisory responsibilities for the
community mediation programs at CDR1 (n=2) and CDR2 (n=2). All volunteer mediators at both CDRs
(n=99) were contacted by email and phone and invited to participate in a focus group interview (2 focus groups
were scheduled for each CDR). Those who indicated a willingness to be interviewed but were unable to attend
the focus group sessions were interviewed individually. See Table 2.1 for details. Of a total of 55 volunteers at
CDR1, 22 (40%) participated in either a focus group or individual interview. Of a total of 44 volunteers at
CDR2 15 (34%) participated in either a focus group or individual interview, for an overall response rate of 37%.
76 For a complete list of participants by pseudonym, CDR, and interview context (focus group vs. individual)
see Appendix I.
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“capacity” in relation to efficacy, which became additional coding categories. My goal with
this analysis was to interpret the way practitioners at the Toronto CDRs understand the
mediation process and its educative effects by tracking recurring themes in their accounts. I
therefore do not present the results of this analysis in quantitative form but instead provide a
descriptive summary of dominant themes illustrated by select interview excerpts. Some of
this analysis is included below in my description of the “Toronto model” of community
mediation. The rest is included in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, where I present my interpretations of
staff and volunteer perspectives as they relate to efficacy, interests, and relationships. I also
incorporated insights from this analysis into the design of my interview questions for
mediation participants in step two.
In step two, I conducted individual interviews with mediation participants (n = 31)
within one year of the conclusion of their mediation.77 All individuals who participated in a
mediation at CMSD or CRS that concluded between July 1, 2006 and July 1, 2007 were
invited to participate in an interview, and 43% of those contacted did so.78 Table 2.2
provides details about the participants and the mediation cases included in step two

Conducting pre-process interviews with participants was not feasible due to constraints presented by central
features of CDR case intake process and principles. Time pressure to move the case into mediation and
commitment to maintain participant confidentiality make accessing participants prior to the process challenging.
Furthermore, CDRs often struggle to convince potential clients to attend the voluntary mediation process and
are therefore hesitant to allow any additional intervention which might inconvenience parties or in any way
motivate them to decline to participate in mediation.
78 72 potential participants were contacted first by mail and then by phone and invited to schedule a face-toface interview. Of 72 potential participants, 13 were not reachable, 8 declined interviews, 20 agreed to but did
not ultimately schedule or attend an interview, and 31 participated in an in person interview with the author
(for a response rate of 43%). The breakdown of participants across field sites is as follows. From a total
potential sample of 72, 45 participated in mediation at CDR1 and 18 were interviewed (40% response rate)
while 27 participated at CDR2 and 13 were interviewed (48% response rate). Two additional interviews were
conducted in January 2009 with participants from mediation cases I observed in July 2008 (both at CDR2) for a
total of 33 mediation participant interviews. Two participant interviews were excluded from the analysis
because the process they experienced departed significantly from mediation. With this exclusion, the total
number of mediation participant interviews included in the analysis is 31. For further details about participants
and mediation cases, see Appendix I.
77
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interviews. As the table shows, interview participants came in fairly equal proportions from
each CDR.79 Rows four through eight include information about the mediation cases in
Table 2.2: Mediation Participants and Cases
Interviews
TOTAL PARTICIPANTS

CDR1
16

CDR2
15

Total
31

Mediation Cases
Neighbor
Intimate
TOTAL MEDIATION CASES

CDR1
6
4
10

CDR2
6
3
9

Total
12
7
19

which interview participants were involved. The total number of mediation cases is smaller
than the total number of interviews because I sometimes interviewed more than one
participant from the same case. As the table shows, more than half of the mediation cases
involve neighborhood conflicts and the remaining cases involve conflicts between intimates
(family members, friends, romantic partners etc.).80
Interviews lasted between 30 minutes and 3 hours with most interviews lasting
approximately 75 minutes. Interview questions asked for open ended accounts of the
mediation experience and its effects, as well as more focused questions designed to elicit
comments about the theoretical mechanisms of interest. I coded transcribed interview data
using the three pre-established coding categories of “efficacy”, “interests”, and
“relationships” and the related sub-codes I generated in step one (e.g. for “efficacy” these
are “confidence”, “reliance”, “capacity”). I also generated additional coding categories based
on themes in the participant interviews that did not fit with existing codes. For example,
“avoidance” is a common theme in participant accounts of their relationships with conflict
partners following the mediation and became a coding category. As a supplement to
79 For comparisons of those who were interviewed to those who refused interviews, see Appendix I. As I
discuss in more detail there, there is a slight over-representation of female participants in the interview sample.
80 For more detailed descriptions of the mediation cases described in my interviews, see Appendix I.
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interviews with mediation participants, I also observed two mediation cases including case
development meetings81 and the mediation session itself. These observations helped me to
understand the way the mediation process described by workshop trainers, staff, volunteers
and participants unfolds in actual practice.82
The goal of this analysis is to be able to characterize the overall educative effect of
mediation on each participant. This approach takes seriously the value of participant
perspectives about the effects of the process on them. While they do not serve as objective
measures of participant behavior after mediation, the questions of interest here are strongly
related to subjective perception, and can therefore be productively explored by asking the
participants themselves about their experiences with and since mediation. I present the
results of this analysis in Chapters 3 (efficacy), 4 (interests), and 5 (relationships), with an
overview of the results in Chapter 6. In each chapter I present the frequencies for various
reported outcomes as well as descriptions of dominant themes illustrated by select interview
excerpts.
2.7

THE “TORONTO MODEL” OF COMMUNITY MEDIATION
Before concluding this chapter, I briefly present the main features of the Toronto

Model of community mediation as described to me by staff and volunteers and as I observed
in training workshops and actual mediation sessions at St. Stephen’s Conflict Resolution
Service (CRS) and Conflict Mediations Services of Downsview (CMSD).83 Practitioner

81 At the Toronto CDRs, case development meetings are convened several days or more prior to the mediation
session. At these meetings, which typically last about 2 hours, the volunteer mediators assigned to the case
meet individually with each party to the conflict to get some background on their experience of the conflict and
to describe the mediation process to them. See Section 2.7 “The Toronto Model of Community Mediation” for
more details.
82 Observation of more mediation cases would have been ideal but, due to confidentiality concerns and
logistical constraints, more observation was not possible.
83 Where relevant, I note the differences I observed between the two CDRs, but I generally found such
differences to be fairly minimal. For the most part therefore, throughout this section and the remaining
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descriptions and my direct observations reveal an approach to mediation that provides a
good opportunity to examine deliberation’s non-instrumental goals. Toronto CDR
practitioners call their approach “transformative”84 and their descriptions synthesize the
principle of self-determination with therapeutic concerns. The following comment from a
CDR staff member illustrates this dual concern by highlighting that the process allows
parties to talk about their feelings (therapeutic) and have control over outcomes (selfdetermination):
And so this is an ideal opportunity for people to come together to share
information, especially about their feelings, that will be helpful for others to
understand them and to hear about others, to better understand about them. In
order for them to get together to create outcomes that are reflective of your own
interests and your needs. So it’s the people involved that will create the
outcomes, so you have that choice in creating what the future can be. So that’s
powerful for people to know and hear, they can have the control. (Gary)85
Toronto CDR practitioners talk about these commitments both in instrumental and noninstrumental ways. Echoing the mantra of the mediation field more broadly, they emphasize
the instrumental motivations behind their commitment to self-determination, believing that
better and longer lasting agreements result from a process that places decision making power
solely in the hands of those directly affected by the outcomes. Practitioners also describe

chapters I treat the “Toronto CDRs” more or less as one field site and characterize the views of the Toronto
practitioners holistically without reference to their particular CDR affiliation.
84 The use of the terminology “transformative mediation” here is not entirely congruent with the approach by
the same name advocated by Bush and Folger (1994, 2005). Though they use similar terminology and share
some principles and values, as I elaborate below, in the Toronto Model mediators typically structure
communication between the parties to a much greater extent than Bush and Folger call for in their
transformative approach to mediation practice. Though some Toronto mediators are familiar with Bush and
Folger’s approach, staff and trainers do not claim to be replicating it. In fact, the language of transformation
used in the Toronto context implies even more ambitious and far reaching developmental goals than those
stressed by Bush and Folger, who most often focus on “transforming” the conflict interaction and place less
emphasis on lasting individual or relational changes. For evidence in another context of the lack of agreement
among practitioners for the names of approaches used, see (Charkoudian et al. 2009).
85 I have used pseudonyms to protect the confidentiality of participants. I have tried to select names that reflect
the ethnic diversity of the participants. I have also made minor changes to interview excerpts to remove “ums”
and other speech patterns that inhibit flow and understanding. In every instance I have made my best effort to
preserve the speaker’s intended meaning. Ellipses indicate that I have edited a more substantial section of the
transcript in order to present participants’ comments more parsimoniously.
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their commitment to therapeutic practice in instrumental ways, believing that efforts to
process the emotional content of conflict in a psychologically healing way contributes to
more stable and long-lasting agreements between parties.
They place more emphasis however, on the pedagogical and developmental agenda
behind their commitment to self-determination and therapeutic concerns in their approach
to mediation. In subsequent chapters, I will elaborate further on practitioners’ commitment
to educative goals with respect to the principle of self-determination (Chapter 3) and
therapeutic concerns (Chapter 4). In brief, Gloria’s comment below is illustrative of the
priority placed on educative goals and shows how these are explicitly linked to what is
described as a “transformative” approach to mediation.
We deal with what is called transformative mediation. ... The target of
transformative mediation is not to get our solution. The goal is to have the
parties feel a difference in the process [and] feel a difference between themselves.
That they come here and they go out at least better than they were, you know in
their relationship, in their feelings, that they feel at least they feel, somebody
heard me you know. Something that makes a transformation inside them of
some sort. ... Skills give them this power. So that’s why we empower the parties
and we’re making them think you know what, you don’t need somebody else to
resolve the conflict for you. You are able to resolve your conflict, you have the
power to do it. It’s in your hands. (Gloria, CDR Volunteer)
Although they incorporate a greater therapeutic emphasis, these educative goals mirror those
espoused by advocates of participatory deliberative processes more generally.
Having outlined the basic principles that inform mediation practice at the Toronto
CDR’s, I now turn to identify the main features of the process itself. Like many community
mediation programs, the Toronto CDRs use a “co-mediation” model, meaning that two
volunteer mediators are assigned to every case. When possible, efforts are made at
“matching” the volunteer mediators to the parties in terms of age, gender, race, ethnicity,
religion etc., and having two mediators helps to create a balance between mediator and
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participant characteristics.86 Unlike many community mediation programs however, the
Toronto CDR process includes “case development meetings”. The mediators convene case
development meetings separately with each party to the conflict several days in advance of
the mediation at their homes, or in a neutral location such as a coffees shop or at the CDR
office. These meetings typically last about an hour and during that time the parties will
explain their perspective of the conflict to the mediators. Mediators listen to understand,
explain the mediation process, and determine the appropriateness of mediation for the
circumstances.87
While most CDRs proceed directly from initial intake calls to a mediation session,
these case development meetings are used by the Toronto CDRs as an opportunity to build
trust and rapport with the mediators and to prepare parties for the mediation experience.
You start to coach people ... So getting people to look outside of oneself and to
consider others and how you frame [it] so that two mediators working together
is also a model for people to reflect on how two people can cooperate ... And so
you engage as a cooperative team, working together with one person in the case
development. It has some kind of psychological effect to influence people and
to, think outside of their box. (Gary, CDR Staff)
And there we get the whole story from these people, there’s a lot of venting that
goes on, there’s a lot of explaining why people are right and why are they
vindicated in their beliefs. ... So we try to sort of put that sort of stuff aside and
say that’s great, ok, ... we believe you. We’re moving people then as much as we
can in the direction of, ... this sort of accountability, mutual problem solving
state of mind and that happens to some extent on intake but often that’s what
happens in those private meetings, that’s the state of mind we hope to get them
in, to some extent at least in mediation. (Paul, CDR Staff)

Mediators are assigned to a case following initial intake calls with each of the parties involved. Potential
cases come to the attention of a CDR when they are contacted by a referral source or one of the parties directly.
Initial calls are made to all involved parties to explain the service and get a preliminary sense of the issues
involved. If all parties are interested in proceeding, mediators are assigned to the case and they will then make
contact with each party.
87 Along with accounts of the purpose and process of case development meetings I heard during interviews
with CDR staff, volunteers, and mediation participants themselves, I observed a total of 7 case development
meetings. 3 were associated with a case I observed that did not proceed to mediation and 4 were associated
with the two cases I did observe through to mediation (for details about the mediations I observed, see Table
2.4 in Appendix I).
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This additional stage in the Toronto model, and its purpose as expressed by CDR staff
members above, underscores the commitment of the Toronto CDRs to the educative goals
of the mediation process.88
Toronto CDR training materials break down the mediation process proper into three
discrete phases and staff and volunteers refer to them by name when describing the process.
“Phase one” begins with an opening statement from the mediators that introduces the
process, and stresses principles of voluntariness, self-determination, confidentiality, and
neutrality of mediators. Parties are then invited one at a time to present their account of the
conflict to the mediators. During this phase, parties are discouraged from addressing each
other directly and asked not to interrupt each other’s accounts. Mediators periodically
restate and summarize their statements to confirm understanding. While one party speaks to
the mediator, the other is asked to listen quietly and wait for their turn to speak. Once both
parties have spoken and confirmed that mediator summaries are accurate, mediators move
to “phase two” of the process.89
During phase two, mediators ask questions of the parties about past, present, and
future and invite them to address each other when giving their answers. Mediators structure
this phase as a process of guided reflective or active listening between the parties. The party
who is not speaking is asked to summarize and restate the response of the speaker and the

The presence and stated purpose of case development meetings at the Toronto CDRs underscore the
centrality of their educative aspirations. My specific concern in this study is with the educative effects of
deliberation and I therefore focus my interviews and analysis on the effects of subsequent mediation sessions
where parties interact directly. See Chapter 6 for a follow up discussion on the challenge of isolating the
educative effects of the mediation process to these face-to-face sessions.
89 At CRS mediators typically call for a break at this point in order to prepare questions for phase two. CMSD
mediators are not instructed to call a break between phases one and two.
88
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speaker is then asked to confirm that they feel understood by the listener. When the
mediators feel it is appropriate, they move to “phase three” of the process.90
Phase three involves brainstorming solutions about specific issues that require
resolution between the parties. If the parties wish, the mediators will assist them to record a
written agreement outlining the specific behaviors each commit to undertake following the
mediation. Though in practice mediations sometimes deviate from this formula, the
Toronto model is generally one where, compared to other models of mediation, mediators
exert relatively low influence over the content of the mediation and relatively high influence
over the process. This is most evident in the descriptions of the mediator guided reflective
listening that takes place during phase two of the Toronto model, which requires mediators
to structure the communication between parties in fairly pronounced ways.
Toronto mediators regularly stress the importance of this process control to their
educative goals and many describe “phase two” as the most “transformative” part of
mediation. In this stage of the process, participants are expected to acquire or develop
listening skills, express their own interests and understand the interests of others, and restore
or improve their relationship. Yet Toronto mediators also stress the tension they encounter
between these educative goals, the techniques they are taught to achieve them, and their
overriding commitment to party self-determination. Their accounts of phase two of the
process underscore this tension in two key ways. First, mediators acknowledge that parties
are not always open to their educative agenda, particularly its therapeutic elements, and
sometimes want to focus on an immediate solution rather than the relationship dimension of
Another minor variation exists between the three phase model at CRS compared to CMSD. At CMSD
mediators are trained to assist parties in indentifying a list of issues in need of resolution following phase one.
They then conduct phase two reflective listening and phase three brainstorming focused on one particular issue
at a time cycling back between two and three as needed until each issue has been addressed. At CRS, mediators
are trained to cover all the issues in phase two reflective listening before moving on to brainstorm solutions
about all issues in phase three.
90
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the conflict. Many mediators describe their willingness in such cases to deviate from the
structure of the Toronto model for the sake of instrumental outcomes and in order to
respect party self-determination.
Perhaps more interestingly however, even when parties are willing to engage in talk
about feelings as phase two calls for, some mediators express discomfort with the ‘formulaic’
or ‘by the book’ format of guided reflective listening and prefer to seek similar ends without
giving so much direction to the parties. The following comments from a volunteer mediator
illustrate this discomfort with the process control prescribed by the Toronto model, while at
the same time acknowledging its centrality to educative goals.
It would be somewhat more rare in my process to have them do a lot of
restating to each other. Which is interesting to me because that is, in some ways
that’s the main method of transformation that exists in community mediation. I
think it’s there for a reason so why don’t I use it? It might be that it feels
somewhat less like a conversation and more something that I’m imposing on
them to do. So I will get a sense from the way the conversation unfolds as to
whether they are really listening to each other, hearing each other. If I feel like
that’s really not happening that’s when I would do the restating. If I get the
sense that they are listening and, and dialoguing then I don’t see there is much
of a need, to require me to do that. (Jim, CDR Volunteer)
Indeed, the concerns Jim has about imposing on the parties are legitimate according to some
mediation theorists. The prescription to impose guidelines or instructions for
communication is what distinguishes the Toronto model from the Transformative model
espoused by Bush and Folger, who view this type of process control as too heavy handed
and therefore as a violation of the principle of self-determination (2005, 233; Folger and
Bush 1996).
This tension between educative goals and the principle of self-determination, raises
important questions about the role of moderators in participatory deliberative processes. If
the core of participatory deliberative processes is participant autonomy and educative goals
aim to reinforce this sense of autonomy, how do moderators encourage and facilitate this
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process without at the same time violating their own principles and aims? Toronto
mediators encounter this question regularly in their practice and this has implications for the
experience of mediation participants and the effects they attribute to mediation. This
tension, along with the basic features as I have described above, make the Toronto model of
community mediation an instructive context to explore educative aims and outcomes in
depth. In Chapter 6, following my review of participant perspectives on their mediation
experience and its effects, I will return to these questions about the role that moderators play
in helping and hindering deliberation’s educative potential.
2.8

CONCLUSION
Above, I have introduced three analytical categories for parsing deliberation’s better

citizen claims. I argue, drawing from participatory theorists, that conceptualizing these claims
in terms of efficacy, interests, and relationships helps to advance our conceptual thinking about a
set of often undertheorized but regularly expressed normative justifications for participatory
deliberative processes. Next, I presented a map of the deliberative field that helps to sort
deliberative venues according to their educative potential. I suggest that mapping these
venues according to collective decisions, scope, and intensity helps to locate appropriate empirical
contexts where educative claims can be explored in depth. I have argued that such a map
points to contexts that have not typically been the focus of deliberative research but that are
nevertheless ideally suited to the empirical exploration of deliberation’s better citizen claims.
I have introduced one such context, community mediation, and argued that because it meets
the conditions of a “most likely” case, it will contribute to our general understanding of
deliberation’s educative potential.
As I will discuss in the following chapters, because I find limited confirmation of
deliberation’s educative claims in this context, at least in the form they take in the theoretical
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literature, this case raises questions about the educative assumptions embedded in
deliberative and participatory theory. Further, because it possesses conditions that theory
predicts give it high educative potential, the sorts of lasting effects I do find are instructive to
the wider field of deliberative theory and practice. Although research in other contexts is
surely needed to explore further the role of process and design features that are particular to
community mediation, it is a case that generates insights for the wider deliberative field. I
presented my methodological approach, which draws heavily on practitioners’ and especially
participants’ narratives of their experience and supplements these, as much as possible, with
my own observations of the process. I explained my choice of the Toronto CDRs as a
setting to seek out these narratives by presenting their theoretical and methodological
advantages as field sites for this research. I concluded with an overview of the “Toronto
model” of community mediation as explained to me by CDR staff, volunteers, and as I
observed in training workshops and actual mediation sessions. In these accounts and
observations I find further confirmation of the suitability of the Toronto CDRs as a site to
study deliberation’s educative potential. In the chapters that follow I examine practitioner
and participant narratives in order to assess community mediation’s educative effects in
terms of efficacy (Chapter 3), interests (Chapter 4), and relationships (Chapter 5).
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Chapter 3
Community Mediation & Efficacy
Trying to Build the Skillful Citizen
3.1

INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, I focus on efficacy, the first of three categories for conceptualizing

deliberation’s educative effects that I proposed in Chapter 2. As I described there, efficacy
expectations suggest that changes to participants’ subjective (i.e., self-efficacy) and objective
(i.e., skills) deliberative competence result from deliberative participation. Carole Pateman is
best known for advancing this understanding of participation’s educative effects. In her
classic work Participation and Democratic Theory, she argues that “the major function of
participation in the theory of participatory democracy is ... an educative one, educative in the
very widest sense, including both the psychological aspect and the gaining of practice in
democratic skills and procedures” (Pateman 1970, 42). Pateman referred to this
“psychological aspect” as a sense of political efficacy, a concept developed by social
psychologists and adapted by scholars of political behavior. Mediation advocates have made
similar claims about the lasting effects of mediation, more often using the language of
“empowerment” to describe a similar set of expectations (Shonholtz 1984; Schwerin 1995;
Bush and Folger 1994; 2005).
In Chapter 1, I critiqued the use of standard measures of political efficacy in the
empirical study of deliberation’s educative effects. These measures focus on traditional
forms of political participation and do not capture the claims, advanced by participatory
theorists, that focus on deliberative competence specifically. Conceptualizing the kind of
efficacy effects that are theorized to follow more directly from participatory deliberative
experiences requires a focus on the capacities required for face-to-face discursive, and often
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conflictual, interactions. As I discussed in Chapter 2, community mediation is a deliberative
venue well suited to the exploration of these kinds of effects, especially as it is practiced at
the Toronto CDRs. I therefore seek to develop a conception of efficacy and skills
appropriate to deliberative participation through an analysis of mediator efficacy expectations
at the Toronto CDRs. I find that practitioner efficacy expectations can be broken down into
three components. I call these confidence, self-reliance, and capacity expectations
respectively. According to practitioners’ confidence expectations, the mediation experience
can strengthen participants’ sense of general confidence to engage in conflict interactions
with others. According to their self-reliance expectations, the mediation experience can
increase participants’ willingness to solve problems independently without turning to police,
the courts, or social services. According to their capacity expectations, mediation
participants can acquire concrete listening and assertion skills and apply them in the future.
My analysis of participant efficacy claims however, raises considerable doubts about
these efficacy expectations. First, in many cases no such effects are described by participants
in their post process interviews. Though some participants do in fact make convincing
efficacy claims, my interviews suggest that lasting changes of this kind should be viewed as
an exceptiona,l rather than typical, outcome.91 Second, many participants come to mediation
considering themselves “pre-skilled”, suggesting that the often implied notion that the
process turns “conflict dunces” into “conflict experts” is misguided. This is not simply
because it overestimates the educative potential of the process, but also because it
misrepresents the typical orientation participants have at its outset. Pre-existing efficacy
claims seem to influence outcomes in two opposing ways. In some cases, they appear to

91 While this is not in itself surprising, and practitioners themselves even seem to consider educative effects as
best but rare outcomes, empirical evidence of just how rare and limited they are raises questions about pinning
the normative justification for these processes to such educative aspirations.
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prevent participants from considering the mediation as an educative experience, and in
others, to actually prepare and prime them to experience it exactly as such. So, while preexisting efficacy claims alone have little predictive power in terms of educative outcomes,
their frequency challenges the notion that the mediation process is a remedial experience in
the way that practitioners’ efficacy expectations often suggest.
Third, in the cases where participants do describe changes linked to their experience
in mediation, these are less related to the salience of self-determination in the process than
they are to the relational dynamics between the parties. In the subset of cases where
participants do make efficacy claims based on their mediation experience, these are often
focused on communication and dynamics of interaction between them and their conflict
partners. Furthermore, many times their efficacy claims do not transfer beyond the context
of the mediated relationship. This suggests that individualized conceptions of educative
effects, like those posited in terms of efficacy, are limited in their description of the
educative potential of the process for at least two reasons. First, they overstate the educative
potential of a relatively short intervention. Second, and more importantly, they place too
much emphasis on autonomous individual decision making and not enough on everyday
interaction and relational interdependence as central features of democratic citizenship. This
suggests that we ought to attend more to the effects of deliberation in general, and
community mediation in particular, on the relationships between citizens, as I do in Chapter
5. I develop this argument about efficacy below, drawing on interviews with mediation
practitioners and participants.
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3.2

MEDIATOR EFFICACY EXPECTATIONS
For mediation practitioners at the Toronto CDRs, efficacy expectations are linked

explicitly to the principle of self-determination, and some address the broader civic
significance of this feature and its effects explicitly:
Hopelessness is one of the biggest barriers to social change and I think
hopelessness is something you often encounter in the early case development
meetings for a mediation right, people say it’s not going to be any use, my
neighbor is never going to change, this has been going on for three years,
nothing’s going to be any different. And when things actually do change, if they
do, cause sometimes they don’t, but when they do, I think that feeling of like oh
things can change, things can be different than they were, if you work at stuff
sometimes you can make things different and I think that sense of agency, that
sense of empowerment is a really important part of just being a member of civil
society and trying to make your neighborhood, your kids’ school, your city, your
country, the world, a better place. (Courtney, CDR Volunteer)
Practitioners do not use the term efficacy, but their descriptions of the process and its lasting
effects frequently reference related terms like empowerment, agency, self-esteem, and
confidence. I find these expectations break down into three subcategories, which are all
encapsulated in this illustrative comment from one CDR volunteer:
Through this process people get to be part of their own solutions and get that
internal control which strengthens you, improves your self-esteem and gives you
the power. And I think in general, we provide people with skills where they
could meet their basic needs in a proper way and the people involved, to know
that whatever I need and I feel whatever, the other person does too, how can we
fulfill those needs together, and the solution will come from us, not the
mediators, not the judge, not the police you know that’s external control, it has
to come from us. (Susanna, CDR Volunteer)
Susanna emphasizes the confidence, self-reliance, and capacity components of practitioner
efficacy expectations. She begins by highlighting the feature of self-determination (“people
get to be part of their own solutions”) and links that explicitly to increased “self-esteem”,
suggesting that participants’ subjective perceptions of themselves are influenced (i.e.,
confidence). She then suggests that participants learn skills as a direct result of their
experience in the process (“we provide people with skills”, i.e., capacity). Finally, she hints at
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the idea that participants will be left with an intention or disposition to manage problems
themselves rather than remain dependent on external authorities (“not the mediators, not the
judge, not the police”, i.e., self-reliance). I find these three distinct themes to be salient
components of practitioner efficacy expectations, and I therefore parse them into three
subcategories, which I call confidence, self-reliance, and capacity expectations. Below I
elaborate on each before going on to assess participant efficacy claims according to these
three categories.
Practitioner confidence expectations focus on one’s subjective feelings about their
ability to solve interpersonal problems and manage ongoing interactions with conflict
partners.
We want to empower, they come here and in a way they are, they feel power,
empowered to be able to solve the problems or the issues, I guess that’s the first
step. (Vivian, CDR Volunteer)
Practitioners believe that the self-determination inherent in the mediation process generate
the increased confidence for participants.
I wanted to help people instead [to] ... be able to work things through
themselves, with our assistance, and I think that just makes people stronger than
necessarily handing solutions to people. (Kate, CDR Staff)
Self-reliance expectations focus specifically on the goal that participants become selfsufficient and capable of managing conflicts independently without the involvement of third
parties.
And the other very important thing for me about mediation is that we live in a
very structured society ... We don’t take responsibilities much for our actions, ...
not as much as people used to, I believe, do that before. And I travel around
the world quite extensively and I see in less developed countries that people ...
instinctively talk to each other when they have a conflict. They don’t go to
courts, they don’t go to shrinks you know to try to unload what’s inside of them
and so on, and in that sense mediation is again a good thing because people talk,
people communicate, people say what’s on their minds finally without asking the
third or fourth party to help them. And we all tend to do that more and more
and more. (Nikola, CDR Volunteer)
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Though they stress absolute self-reliance, these expectations are not entirely dichotomous,
and an ongoing role for the mediation service is not ruled out as a stepping stone towards
ultimate self-reliance.
The goal is not to get a resolution, it’s to give people skills to deal with things on
their own so they don’t need us in the future. But if they do, need us, we’re here
to assist them. And everybody, just because they go through this once doesn’t
mean they won’t come again. And I don’t look at that as a negative either, I look
at that in somewhat as a sign of confidence and also a building stone for
ultimately they’ll be able to deal with things in their own way. (Gary, CDR Staff)
Throughout their descriptions about confidence and reliance expectations, mediators
make frequent reference to skills, as several of the comments above illustrate; I refer to these
as capacity expectations. By far, the majority of these capacity expectations focus on
communication skills and most often stress reflective or active listening.92 For example,
when asked about the goals of community mediation, one CDR volunteer said:
One is actually to teach the person some listening skills. I think irrespective of
what kind of conflict occurs, if you mediate actively, you are actually teaching
those participants how to listen actively whether or not it’s a petty problem or
not ... I think that should be a stated and clear goal of any mediator going into a
mediation. (Ajay, CDR Volunteer)
In addition to listening, practitioners also expect participants to learn skills that enable them
to, in Sophie’s words, “deliver a difficult message” in more productive ways. Richard also
talks about this:
If there’s going to be a change within the community the change has to come
from within the community, so people have to learn how to speak differently
and I think the transformative method is well modeled if that’s what you
ultimately want to accomplish within the community, this way of speaking
differently. (Richard, CDR Volunteer)
These expectations relate to the communication technique called “assertion”,93 which
practitioners sometimes call “I-statements”94 in their discussion of mediation’s goals.

92
93

See Katz and Lawyer (1985) for elaboration on the reflective listening technique.
See Katz and Lawyer (1985) for elaboration on the assertion statement technique.
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Mediators place different and sometimes contradictory emphasis on modeling skills
compared to overtly teaching skills in the mediation process. This can be illustrated through
their explanations of the way participants might learn “I-statements”.
You stop in the middle of mediation you try to teach it, it’s an education piece
and … you tell him, … the person how to do an I statement. (Andrea, CDR
Volunteer)
Mediators are teaching them how to use I statements. (Kate, CDR Staff)
The I statement is a big take away, but some people might be able to take that
away and emulate that in the future. (Roslynne, CDR Volunteer)
So that’s the I message and we really don’t teach it in mediation, although it
often comes in by indirection, and that’s something that people do learn, and
again we might stop and teach it if it seemed important in the moment … A lot
of it is leading by example, that’s how they learn it. (Paul, CDR Staff)
These statements show that mediator strategies for realizing their capacity expectations
include both indirect modeling and over teaching, and Paul suggests that mediators adapt
their strategies to the particular context.
Overall, practitioners believe that their confidence, self-reliance, and capacity
expectations become fully realized when there is transfer beyond the specific circumstances
of the mediation.
I would hope, but I don’t know that it’s always the case that the skills, the
learning would be transferable to other situations, that would ultimately be the
goal. (Karen, CDR Staff)
I would think it doesn’t really stop there, I mean that could, it could help with
the interactions between themselves and the one, they came to the table with.
But maybe it could also help in their communication with colleagues, family
members, I mean we hope it’s going to be transferable throughout. (Kate, CDR
Staff)
94A

basic skill often introduced in introductory communication training, “I-statements” provide a formulaic
structure intended to communicate a concern non-confrontationally by anchoring the statement around the
impact of the situation on oneself. The formula typically goes as follows: “When you [specific behavior of the
other person], I feel [emotional impact of the behavior], because [reason for the emotional impact]. So what I
would like you to do is [specific behavior change being requested].”
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Practitioners hope that, because efficacy effects are transferable in this way, they can have
broader societal repercussions. Some, like Paul below, believe contemporary society is
organized in a way that limits citizen’s opportunities to manage their own lives, and in so
doing robs them of the chance to develop their capacities to do so.
I think that the effect on society then is we have a society of people who are just
more capable of living in the world themselves and they’re less sort of a
automatons or puppets … less mob and more thoughtful citizens, you might
say. ... So we combine those two things, you get more people taking
responsibility and being accountable in ways that mean a more harmonious
world. (Paul, CDR Staff)
Therefore, by emphasizing participant self-determination and by modeling and teaching
communication techniques in the mediation process, practitioners aim to reverse the
paternal features of contemporary society and build more skillful citizens. In the next section,
I turn to mediation participant perspectives to explore the extent to which these confidence,
self-reliance, and capacity expectations are in fact realized.
3.3

PARTICIPANT EFFICACY CLAIMS
My analysis of participant efficacy claims is presented in five sections below.

Although not stressed by practitioners, a reoccurring theme in the interviews with
participants is their previous experience and skill level. I discuss these “pre-existing efficacy
claims” in the first section. In the next three sections, I discuss participant efficacy claims in
categories that correspond to the expectations of practitioners: confidence, self-reliance, and
capacity. Confidence claims are general statements of confidence in one’s ability to manage
conflict. Self-reliance claims reference an ability or intention to manage present and future
conflicts independently without the assistance of mediation services, police, courts or other
potential intermediaries. Capacity claims specify particular techniques, skills, or strategies that
are understood and applied to manage conflict situations. For each, I present the range of
efficacy outcomes described by participants drawing on subcategories I generated inductively
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through my analysis. In the final section I discuss the scope of participant efficacy claims to
emphasize the distinction between claims that are limited to the mediated relationship and
those that imply transfer beyond this context. Just over half of the participants make at least
one of the three kinds of positive efficacy claims (confidence, self-reliance, and capacity)
during their interview. These claims are often quite modest and fall short of the expectations
theorists and practitioners articulate, particularly with respect to their scope. This suggests
that a measured view about efficacy expectations is warranted. Nevertheless, they are
frequent and significant enough to call into question a fully skeptical view of deliberation’s
educative potential.
3.3.1

Pre-existing Efficacy Claims
Because mediation is voluntary, this raises questions about how the characteristics

shared in common by those who choose to participate in the mediation process relate to its
educative outcomes. Indeed, the frequency with which participants offer information about
their past training, work history and/or life experience in their interviews is striking. These
statements are often made in direct response to questions about the educative effects of the
mediation but are also at times offered as part of general descriptions of their experience. In
the first instance, they seem to be offered as evidence of a prior familiarity with the
techniques the mediation process is considered capable of teaching. In the second instance,
they are mentioned as a general description of the participants’ comfort and familiarity with
the process but remain equally relevant to its educative potential. Pre-existing efficacy claims
are made by a little more than half of the participants (52%).
These claims take several forms. In several cases, they are accounts of past training
or experience specifically in the area of mediation or conflict management, for example
through past involvement in a peer mediation program in school (Michelle), a workplace
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training delivered by one of the CDRs (Lisa), and even volunteering and interning at one of
the CDRs (Anne).95 Several participants also, or instead, reference their professional training
and experience when asked about the educative effects of the mediation. For example:
Oh God. I’ve learned so many skills in my life, I’ve been dealing with, the public
for years, I worked for [a large oil company] ... so I had to deal with, I had
someone working for me, I worked for somebody, I had to deal with all levels,
so I don’t think I’ve had any trouble communicating or dealing with people.
(Martha)
Lynn: we can solve problems with anybody ...
Heather: So there wasn’t any skills or anything like that, that came up in the
mediation process that would, you would say that are helpful?
Lynn: nothing more than what I have used five zillion times in teaching in the
last 45 years.
Some participants also reference their past or ongoing experience with counselling or
therapy. Not surprisingly, given the therapeutic elements of the Toronto model of
mediation, comparisons between mediation and therapy are made by 35% of participants.
This suggests, among other things, that some participants see the educative potential of
therapy and mediation to be related and even analogous. Christine and Norm both articulate
these similarities. Rather than a direct reference to a therapeutic experience, both Christine
and Norm (who are siblings and participants in the same mediation case) describe exposure
stemming from the influence of their father’s profession on their upbringing.
Well there’s also the sort of mindfulness about syntax about ways of speaking, I
mean I’ve always been sensitive to that, because I’m the daughter of a
psychiatrist, so you know, being scrutinized a lot about tone of voice and the
way things are said. (Christine)

95 These connections are also central to the process of self-referral. Because CDR caseloads are relatively small,
use of the service, especially when self-initiated, is often related to some direct connection between the
participant and the CDR. The CDRs also do significant outreach in their community and as a result many
participants learn about the service through police or managers of housing cooperatives when they seek to
address their conflicts through these channels. In the tradition of the “community empowerment” CDR model,
CRS and CMS-D do not take referrals to their community mediation program from the courts and as a result
they rely on these formal and informal ties to intervene in conflicts either before they reach the courts, or to
intervene in conflicts that are not likely to ever be addressed in court.
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I didn’t think of it as alien to the family culture, because my father, was a
psychotherapist, psychiatrist so this kind of you know skilled language a part of
the family culture, and the use of language, and talking about problems, or
talking about feelings, at length and depth was a part of the family culture.
(Norm)
Although it is difficult to identify with precision the comparative frequency of similar
claims amongst people generally, it seems reasonable to conclude based on their occurrence
and quality, that mediation participants are often entering the process with relatively high
levels of skill and efficacy. This is hardly surprising given that the mediation process is
voluntary, and therefore sure to include some form of “self-selection” participation bias.
Indeed, it appears that those who find themselves in the mediations convened by CDRs are
more likely to have professional and personal experiences that establish the kinds of
capabilities mediation advocates seek to build.
The prominence of these pre-existing efficacy claims, in all their varied forms, is
relevant for several reasons. While certainly not equivalent, these claims serve some of the
same purpose that pre-mediation interviews would have served had they been possible.96
Though they are certainly not objective measures of pre-mediation capabilities, they help to
place individual efficacy claims in the context of participants’ past experience. This context
helps clarify what kinds of educative expectations make sense in any particular case. For
example, such expectations will not be the same for a participant who has been formally

As I described in Chapter 2, conducting pre-process interviews with participants was not feasible due to
constraints presented by central features of CDR case intake process and principles. Time pressure to move
the case into mediation and commitment to maintain participant confidentiality make accessing participants
prior to the process challenging. Furthermore, CDRs often struggle to convince potential clients to attend the
voluntary mediation process and are therefore hesitant to allow any additional intervention which might
inconvenience parties or in any way motivate them to decline to participate in mediation.
96
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trained in or who has been practicing mediation for several years (to give an extreme
example) and a participant who does not have relevant training or experience.97
This insight relates to the argument sometimes made by skeptics of deliberation’s educative
effects that, in cases where participation is voluntary, participants are likely to be more
efficacious and skilled to begin with than those who do not participate. This suspicion
appears to be in part confirmed by the mediation participant narratives I heard.
Yet the predictive power of these pre-existing efficacy claims is limited because
efficacy claims are advanced by both those who do and do not make pre-existing efficacy
claims. In other cases, they are absent from the narratives of participants who both do and
do not make reference past experience and skills. Table 3.1 shows that there is no obvious
correlation between statements about pre-existing efficacy and subsequent efficacy claims
attributed to mediation. It shows that 58% of participants make at least one positive efficacy
claim (on the theme of confidence, self-reliance, or capacity) in their interview. It further
shows that those participants are evenly split between those who also make pre-existing
efficacy claims in their interview (26%), and those who do not (32%).
Table 3.1: Pre‐existing Efficacy and Efficacy Claims
Efficacy Claim
No Efficacy Claim
Total

Pre‐existing Efficacy
8 (26%)
8 (26%)
16 (52%)

No Pre‐existing Efficacy
10 (32%)
5 (16%)
15 (48%)

Total
18 (58%)
13 (42%)
31 (100%)

This suggests that there is no straightforward relationship between the presence of preexisting efficacy claims and the efficacy effects of mediation. Furthermore, interviews did
not probe specifically for past training and experience. Therefore, these claims illustrate the
connections that participants themselves make between past experience and mediation’s
Though it must certainly be noted that a failure to report such experience does not necessarily mean it has
not occurred- interviews did not probe explicitly for this information. Furthermore, what constitutes “relevant
experience” is an important question on its own merits and one that I will turn to below.

97
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effects on them, but they are not very useful as objective measures of the causal relationship
between the two.
In addition to the empirical reasons for doubt, there are theoretical reasons to
suspect that pre-existing efficacy claims have the potential to cut both ways in terms of their
relationship to educative effects. On the one hand, if parties enter the process more capable
than most, then the likelihood that they will experience change as a result of the mediation, a
relatively brief intervention, is quite low.98 On the other hand, while participants may get to
mediation in part due to their familiarity with relevant skills and dispositions, their
predispositions may also prime them for change. Interviews suggest that pre-existing efficacy
claims function in both ways for participants.
But even if pre-existing efficacy claims help little to predict subsequent efficacy
effects, their presence is instructive and suggests the need to reconceptualize educative
effects. Mediators’ descriptions about educative effects emphasize the view that people turn
to mediation because they have limited capacity to manage conflict themselves. It is from
this assumption that they make claims about mediation’s educative potential. Furthermore,
their expectations are based on the notion that extended conflict contributes to feelings of
low efficacy, which are reversed as a result of a successful mediation experience. Both
expectations contribute to an emphasis on self-reliance as an educative result of the
experience. Pre-existing efficacy claims challenge these assumptions by suggesting that many
participants are not only quite skilled to begin with, but also possess a general confidence in
98

Arnold Kauffman made the opposite prediction in his reflections on “Participatory democracy: ten years
later” (Kaufman 1969). Kauffman discusses the "paradox of participatory democracy" pointing out that if the
developmental aspirations of participatory democracy are accurate then at the outset incompetent and
irresponsible citizens will make bad decisions, until they are educated through their experience participating. A
steep learning curve would mean that inexperienced citizens may not show the educative effects of the process
immediately. Kauffman did not consider what appears to be the case with community mediation- that a
voluntary process attracts a more sophisticated group to begin with. This may still, for different reasons, lessen
the educative effect of participation, because participants are already near the top of the curve and therefore
have a much smaller distance to travel in terms of their “development”.
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their ability to manage conflicts. Participants are therefore not oriented towards or receptive
to the educative potential of the process emphasized by some theorists and practitioners.
Setting aside whether or not the past experiences have or have not in fact equipped parties in
the ways they believe, their claims suggest that their reasons for accessing the process are
quite different.
I do not simply mean by this that parties seek out mediation to get solutions while
mediators emphasize its transformative effects. Beyond that frequently observed disconnect,
I find that parties often view their conflict as impenetrable with the tools in what they
consider to be their already well-equipped toolkits. As a result, they often attribute the
persistence of the conflict to some barrier presented by general circumstances or
characteristics of the other party but not to their own failures or limitations. These barriers
include things like language differences, mental illness, perceived unreasonableness, or
incompatible values. Although this may not be surprising given social psychological theories
of attribution biases such as actor-observer (Jones 1971; Malle, Knobe, and Nelson 2007)99
and self-serving biases (Mezulis et al. 2004), it underscores a possible mismatch between the
experience of participants and conventional notions about efficacy and educative effects.100
In opposite cases, where efficacy claims are made alongside pre-existing efficacy
claims, past experience appears capable of generating a readiness or openness to learn from
the mediation experience. While it is rare for participants to describe a real educative agenda
for themselves in the mediation, there are indications that the same qualities that make some
more willing to manage their conflicts through a participatory deliberative process like
Malle et al’s meta analysis and recent research actually call into question the fundamental
situation/disposition distinction upon which much of the theory of attribution biases rest. They do however
continue to find actor-observer asymmetries that suggest people are more likely to attribute rational reasons for
their own behavior than they are to the behavior of others.
100 As I discuss further in Chapters 4 and 5, the reasons participants provide for accessing mediation also
present barriers to the realization of interest and relationship expectations- which rely on the possibility of
mutual understanding and affection being developed through mediation.
99
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mediation in the first place also make them more likely to engage in reflection about, be
aware of, and able to articulate the way the experience has influenced them in lasting ways.
Because of the subjective quality of self-efficacy claims, this process of reflection may be as
integral as the events of the mediation itself to the educative process.101 Thus, the
prominence of pre-existing efficacy claims already suggests there are good reasons for
reconsidering the efficacy expectations articulated by deliberative theorists and practitioners.
A final point worth noting about these claims is what they reveal about the kinds of
previous experience and ability participants believe is relevant to their mediation experience.
Of course there is little indication of this from those who do not make pre-existing efficacy
claims. But those who do talk about their pre-existing competencies consistently relate them
to interpersonal communication. For example, like Martha, Lynn, Norm and Christine
quoted above, Sylvia makes a pre-existing efficacy claim that relates directly to her
interpersonal communication skills when she says “I don’t think I had such a bad, skills,
interpersonal you know like how to deal with conflict.” Put simply, if participants’ preexisting efficacy claims are focused on dynamics of interpersonal communication, this
suggests that we can expect most subsequent efficacy claims to center around these
capacities as well. Competencies in interpersonal communication appear to be most salient
for participants following their mediation experience. These conform partially to practitioner
efficacy expectations. As I discuss below however, mediation participants place a greater
emphasis on relational dynamics and interdependence than we might anticipate based on
practitioner emphasis on self-determination.

For further discussion of mediation’s capacity to actually generate this lasting disposition towards selfreflection, rather than simply attract participants who already possess it, see Chapter 4.
101
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3.3.2

Confidence Claims
I code participant comments as “confidence claims” when they reference feelings

about possible future conflict and include descriptions of a general approach or intentions
for managing future conflict situations. This category includes a range of statements, but is
intended to capture the relative optimism or pessimism participants express concerning
specific and generalized future interactions.102 Table 3.2 provides a summary of the range of
confidence claims found in participants’ narratives. In the left most column, I include the
total number of participant narratives that contain one or more “high” confidence claims.
They are labeled “positive” because they suggest that the mediation experience has a positive
effect on participant confidence. In the middle column, I include totals for both the “low”
and “none” confidence codes. They are labeled “neutral” because, as I explain below, they
do not suggest that the mediation experience has had any effect on participant confidence.
In the right most column, I include the total number of participant narrative that contain
negative confidence claims, those suggesting that the mediation experience has actually had a
negative effect on participant confidence.
Table 3.2: Participant Confidence Claims103
Positive (32%)
High
10 (32%)

Neutral (67%)
Low
7 (22%)

Negative (3%)
None
14 (45%)

1 (3%)

In a little less than one third of participant interviews (32%), I find “high” confidence
claims that link an increased sense of confidence to the mediation experience. In a few cases,
these claims match strongly the ideal espoused by theorists and practitioners. Participants
I categorize separately, and describe in the next section as “self-reliance” claims, those comments that
specifically address intentions regarding reliance on third parties to intervene in future conflict interactions.
103 Percentages are calculated based on the total number of participant interviews (31). Totals exceed 31
because occasionally participants make multiple efficacy claims. For example, Dalia makes both a “low” and
“high” confidence claim, resulting in a total of 32 confidence claims listed in the table. The presence of
competing confidence claims in a single participant narrative is limited to this one case. Therefore, although the
categories I present are not mutually exclusive, this suggests they each capture fairly distinct outcomes.
102
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describe the mediation as a turning point from which they acquired a strengthened sense of
confidence in their own conflict competency. This conflict competency is described in ways
that is generalized and relates to an overall sense of self-confidence with potential to
positively influence behavior in a wide range of contexts. Confidence claims from Lisa and
Sara appear to fit in this mould:
Just started to deal differently with people, I just feel better about the way I
handle situations, I felt better about, just feel better about how I deal with things.
And, you know and that makes me feel better about me. (Lisa)
I learn a lot from her [the mediator], so I can do better [than] before, I can
control the situation. I can explain to the person before it’s happened badly, I
can do much better than before. (Sara)
In the other cases, positive confidence claims are less sweeping and focus specifically on
expected future interactions with the conflict partner directly involved in the mediation
experience. In these more limited cases, participants describe a strengthened confidence in
their ability to talk to their conflict partner directly when future issues arise. An example of
this is when Jeffrey says “I think we’ve got a door open now to actually invite them over”
when talking about his mediation conflict partners.
The remaining two thirds of participants are split almost evenly between those who
make no confidence related claims and those who make claims that indicate low confidence.
Those narratives where no confidence related claims are made (45%), suggest that mediation
has no effect on participant confidence. When low confidence claims are made (22%), they
register pessimism or uncertainty about future interactions or intentions to avoid those
interactions at all costs. Low confidence claims are typically made in two reoccurring
mediation contexts. First, they occur in neighbor disputes where the mediation ends with the
physical relocation of one party or deliberate avoidance on the part of all.104 Second, they are
104

I return to these cases in my discussion of relationship effects in Chapter 5.
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common in complex and long standing family disputes where substantive matters are not
resolved and relations remain strained following the mediation. In these cases however,
participants do not ‘blame’ their low confidence on their mediation experience, but instead
suggest that pre-existing low confidence has gone unchanged as a result. For example,
Lauren stresses that her low confidence in her ability to confront her siblings directly has to
do with their shared history and not what happened in the mediation specifically:
I don’t know if we’d be able to come together. I think it would just be this mess,
out of you’ve got like six people all reacting really differently. ... But it’s also the
potential for explosiveness and just you know, really ugly old shit coming up,
that can be really difficult for some people to deal with. Myself included.
(Lauren).
I therefore group the “low” and “none” confidence claims together as “neutral” to indicate
that 67% of the time, participants do not provide evidence to show mediation influenced
participant confidence. This highlights that in those rare cases where the mediation
experience does influence confidence, it almost always does so in a positive way (see Lisa,
Sara, and Jeffrey above).
That is not to rule out entirely the possibility that the mediation process itself can
actually generate negative confidence claims. The possibility of such an effect is hinted at, if
not explicitly described, by critics of participatory deliberative processes (Young 2001,
Sanders 1997). The inability for such processes to balance power or protect rights can be
quite credibly predicted to have lasting negative impacts on participant efficacy. Indeed,
Loretta’s case, while exceptional amongst the narratives I heard, illustrates clearly that a
negative mediation experience can have lasting and negative effects that are expressed
through negative confidence claims.105 She describes the lasting effect this way:
It affected me because I have bias of people, I cannot trust people the same ...
certain kind of people. When somebody’s offering me a service I doubt and I
105

Loretta’s confidence claim also touches on themes of social trust, which I will return to in Chapter 5.
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think hum… I don’t sign anything, I don’t say anything, I am very careful what I
say, I’m very careful. I don’t use my feelings. I don’t think that I have to help
because it’s not worth it. (Loretta)
Although her statement here does not make it clear what features of the mediation
experience resulted in these lasting negative feelings, in other parts of her interview Loretta
describes feeling pressured by the mediators and the other party to participate in the
mediation and to reach an agreement she did not consider to be in her best interests. This
account suggests that if participants experience the process as coercive, it can have lasting
negative effects on their sense of confidence in their ability to manage similar future
experiences - a clear example of a complete breakdown in the educative potential of
mediation.106 But of the cases I explored, Loretta’s stands out as an exception. Hers is the
only narrative containing a negative confidence claim, as is shown in the right most column
of Table 3.2. Furthermore, if her account of mediator behavior is accurate, it suggests that
negative effects on efficacy can be avoided largely through mediator training and oversight
intended to keep practice consistent with the CDR’s mission and goals.
To sum up, 13% of participants make confidence claims that suggest their mediation
experience strengthened their confidence about future conflict interactions in general, while
19% make claims that suggest their mediation experience has, in more limited ways,
increased their confidence that future interactions with their mediation partner(s) can be
managed successfully for a total of 32% of participants reporting a positive effect of
mediation on their confidence. 22% of participants express pessimism about this after
mediation and 45% make no specific claims concerning confidence at all, suggesting that

106 While I argue throughout this chapter that self-determination with respect to outcomes is less salient for
participants than it is for practitioners, this negative example underscores the reasons why self-determination is
an important feature of the process. While educative effects may not flow automatically from the process’s
commitment to self-determination as efficacy expectations imply, a departure from this commitment in the
process does have potential negative effects that appear likely to have lasting salience for participants.
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67% of participants experience no effect on their confidence as a result of mediation. Only
3% of participants attribute a negative effect on their confidence to mediation. Aside from
the direct effect of mediation on confidence, over half of participant confidence claims (both
low and high) are concerned with the particular relationship with which the mediation dealt.
As I will elaborate in section 3.3.5, this suggests that in most cases the mediated relationship
remains the most salient feature of the experience for participants and that any effect on
confidence is unlikely to be transferred or generalized by participants.107
What is most striking in the analysis of participant confidence claims however, is not
so much that they occur less frequently or strongly than efficacy expectations suggest but
that they actually downplay self-determination in favor of interdependence. Practitioners
stress that “being empowered to make decisions” is central to the expected efficacy effects
of the experience. That participants often express a measured degree of confidence about
future interactions underscores their expectation that future experiences are dependent on
the actions of others as well as to their own individual competencies. Though in a few cases
participants describe confidence in terms of individual autonomous action, the mediation
107

Furthermore in the one case where the most compelling generalized confidence claims are made Lisa
describes the mediation as a catalyst in a long history of efforts to build self-efficacy:
Lisa: I don’t give up on things as quickly.
Heather: and why would you say that is
Lisa: it's when you're asking the question about control, my mindset is different. I do have more control, it's
just the way I deal with it. It's the way I look at it. It gave me more confidence in my abilities to deal with
the situations. But then I also know it’s this parent and youth group and so many years and my whole
bedroom is self help books, and I started reading Dear Abby when I was twelve
Heather: ha ha
Lisa: You know, but I, I would say that that's a crucial, crucial thing you know cause I handled it, I handled
it differently.
And later:
Lisa: It's just that, it's just a different attitude. And I can handle things better.
Heather: and do you feel like it was the experience with mediation that changed that for you?
Lisa: I'm not going to give it all of it, because this has been like, this is an ongoing process but it definitely
was like if you want to talk about like a crucial, a crucial point, that would have been.
While the possible role of the mediation as a catalyst in this regard should be encouraging for those seeking to
have educative effects, the independent educative potential of the mediation process should not be overstated
based on this account and, as I argued in my discussion of pre-existing efficacy claims, calls into serious
question a notion of educative effects that views mediation as a remedial experience.
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experience more often makes salient their position as relational beings who are limited in
their ability to control the actions of others.
3.3.3

Reliance Claims
In addition to a sense of confidence in one’s ability to manage interactions, the

efficacy expectations of mediation practitioners stress the theme of self-reliance. They hope
the mediation process will leave participants determined and equipped to be self-reliant in
their future interactions. This is usually articulated by practitioners as a desire that people
will not need “to come back” or “use the service” again. More generally, it is a desire to see
parties capable of and intending to manage difficult interactions in the future through
independent direct communication without the involvement of mediators, police, courts or
other third parties. In participant interviews, I probed this topic in an effort to explore the
potential of the process to lead to these kinds of efficacy claims. A summary of self-reliance
claims are shown in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Participant Self‐Reliance Claims
Positive (52%)108
Self‐Reliance
Fall Back
4 (13%)
13 (42%)

Neutral (48%)
First Resort
None
4 (13%)
11 (35%)

The right most column shows that about one third of participants make no selfreliance claims, suggesting that mediation has no effect on their self-reliance. The other three
columns however, show that the remaining two thirds of the participants make some form
of reliance claim during the interview- though not all are categorized as “self-reliance”. Four
participants suggest that they will manage similar conflicts in the future through reliance on
The percentage total for “positive” self-reliance effects do not match the combined total of “self-reliance”
and “fall back” claims because Alan makes a self-reliance claim that is specific to his relationship with Lisa and
a fall back reliance claim that is more general. The presence of multiple self-reliance claims in a single
participant narrative is limited to this one case. Therefore, although the categories I present are not mutually
exclusive, this suggests they each capture fairly distinct outcomes. I adjust the total in the “positive” cell so as
not to overstate the proportion of participants who experience positive self-reliance effects. In all cases
percentages are calculated from the total number of participants (31).
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police, courts, or mediation. I call these “first resort” reliance claims because they suggest,
contrary to self-reliance expectations, that participants leave mediation intending to turn
immediately to third parties to intervene in their future conflicts. While two first resort
claims reference police and courts, the other two refer to mediation. For example, Sylvia
describes how she intends to deal with her neighbor Victor if future conflicts arise:
But there are problems you don’t have to have them in your life. You have to
find out how to get rid of them. And this is my point. I don’t have to have him
in my life. So I would ask the mediation again for that. (Sylvia)
When participants express an intention to rely on police and courts as a “first resort” for
their conflicts, this suggests unambiguously that mediation has not had the desired selfreliance effect. The same is true for first resort claims that reference mediation, like Sylvia’s.
While the mediation process may be and may continue to be instrumentally valuable in such
cases, it does not appear that it has contributed to building participant’s efficacy according to
practitioners’ educative expectations.109
At the other extreme, just four participants make reliance claims specifying that they
do not need further assistance from mediators and will manage future conflicts
independently. I call these “self-reliance” claims because they conform to the self-reliance
expectations of practitioners. Though they are rare and quite tentative, they suggest that the
mediation experience did contribute to participants’ self-reliance to some degree in a small
number of cases. For example:
And we kind of agreed, it’s like do we need another mediation, no, and even the
mediators said like well you guys are, I mean you guys can handle things.
(Jeremy)

109 Such outcomes relate to those I discuss in Chapter 5 where I focus on the effect of mediation on participant
relationships. There I discuss the habits of avoidance adopted by some mediation participants and the role of
the mediation process in facilitating such habits and relationships. Sylvia`s comments are indicative of this kind
of avoidance.
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All four self-reliance claims, like Jeremy’s, are made with reference to future interactions with
mediation conflict partners specifically. I did not find evidence of more generalized selfreliance effects in the participant narratives.
The largest proportion of reliance claims fall within a middle category, between “selfreliance” and “first resort”, that is characterized by a description of a desire, intention, or
openness to return to mediation in the future. I call these “fall back” reliance claims and
find them in 42% of the mediation participant narratives. These kinds of reliance claims are
sometimes specific to the relationship or issues already managed in mediation, and
sometimes expressed in general terms about possible future conflicts with others. While this
type of learning, about the process and its possible future value comes up frequently from
participants in response to questions about mediation’s educative effects, these are not the
favored outcomes described by mediation practitioners. Practitioners tend to view this as a
“second best” outcome, describing total self-reliance as the full realization of educative
potential. Though an intention to “fall back” on mediation is characterized as sub-optimal
by practitioners, it appears to be offered by participants as an example of constructive
learning and positive evaluation of the mediation process and service. In fact, these reliance
claims even occur in cases where the mediation experience is considered a failure overall by
the participant. Despite these judgments, participants report an openness to consider the
process for different situations they may encounter in the future. Certainly, for an
organization in the business of service delivery fall back reliance claims should be celebrated
as indicators that participants are satisfied with the service they received and prepared to
make use of it again.
Taken to their extreme fall back reliance claims might be viewed as evidence that
CDRs operate, contrary to their emphasis on self-reliance, in a way that builds greater
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demand for their services.110 This would certainly be a rational strategy from the perspective
of institutional survival, and indeed CDRs dedicate significant resources to increasing their
caseload through community outreach and cultivation of relationships with possible referrals
sources. Still, examination of the Toronto CDR caseloads reveals that very few participants
actually do become “repeat” service users by returning to mediation again after their initial
case concludes. So if participants rarely follow through on their expressed intention to fall
back on mediation in the future what is the significance of their frequent reliance claims?
These illustrative fall back reliance claims will help to answer this question:
I learned that mediation is a good thing and I shouldn’t, literally, honestly that I
wouldn’t be adverse to it at all, I would go gladly to it. I think it would be a
benefit, whereas initially I thought what the Hell, I don’t need a mediator.
(Alan)
The skills I would learn is that dealing with people in the conflict situations, first
you try to do it yourself, if you can’t do it, get help. And one of this help will be
in a mediation services. That’s what I think I learned from this. (Victor)
Heather: and what do you think if you guys try to do that without the mediators,
how confident do you feel about trying that?
Michelle: ... I think it would work out well probably in the beginning but when
we got to some of the harder issues, I don’t know how long it would last. So I
think maybe we would have to have someone present for that. (Michelle)
Fall back reliance claims like these suggest an appreciation for the mediation service
and an intention to seek it out again if necessary. Victor and Michelle’s statements in
particular imply that reliance on mediation would result only after serious efforts at direct
communication. Fall back reliance claims may also suggest that awareness about the
existence of mediation emboldens participants to manage interactions on their own in part
because they know that the “safety net” of mediator intervention is not far away.111 This
seems to be what Christine is getting at when she says:

110
111

The two instances of “first resort” claims that reference mediation noted above might also support this view.
I thank Jane Mansbridge for this insight.
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I would procrastinate less about putting it into motion. I would probably, I think
I would be one of the first people to say we need to do this. I think we need to
do this and who else is willing.
I think yes, I think we could, I think we could, I mean it would be worth trying,
it would be worth trying you know having a meeting and trying, and I think the
thing is, I think very quickly, ... I think we would quickly figure out if it wasn’t
working and if we needed to actually seek out some, some assistance from
outside. (Christine)
Particularly when participants make fall back reliance claims in combination with confidence
and capacity claims,112 there is evidence of modest efficacy effects that are attributable to the
mediation. Fall back reliance claims on their own also indicate that participants feel some
minimal sense of efficacy from simply knowing that the mediation service exists, even if, in
reality, they are very unlikely to seek out the service another time.
These findings suggest that self-reliance may not be a very helpful way to
conceptualize efficacy effects. The notion of self-reliance, as expressed by theorists and
practitioners, is strongly linked to the principle of self-determination. But because selfdetermination is not as salient a feature of the process for participants, an emphasis on selfreliance may lead to a misunderstanding of mediation’s most consistent and desirable lasting
effects. Contrary to self-reliance aspirations, these effects may in fact be expressed in part as
the intention to rely on mediation again in the future.
3.3.4

Capacity Claims
A third type of efficacy claim in participant interviews are capacity claims, those in

which participants describe specific skills they have acquired and/or applied as a result of the
mediation. Practitioners stress these kinds of effects in their narratives about mediation’s
educative potential. While participant capacity claims are of course subjective and do not
substitute for objective measures of participants’ actual capacities, they provide concrete
Participants in that category include Christine, Anne, Lisa, Michelle, Rita, and Victor. See Table 6.1 for more
details summarizing educative effects by individual participant.
112
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examples of the way participants conceptualize the educative effect of their mediation
experience. They indicate conceptual understanding of relevant techniques and skills,
although they are not necessarily indicators of practical mastery or behavioral change.
Interviews probe for experiential accounts of skills application to better assess the meaning
of capacity claims. Even when such accounts are not offered however, participants’
subjective accounts of the effect of mediation on their capacities shed light on the educative
potential of the process. Table 3.4 summarizes participant capacity claims.
71% of participant narratives are located in the “neutral” capacity claims column.
This includes those participants who make no capacity claims (“none”), and those who
explicitly respond to questions stating that they did not learn any skills (“no skills”). Though
I code interviews in their entirety looking for capacity claims, these are most often made in
response to open ended questions about learning or in response to specific a probe about
skills. These results suggest that, for the majority of participants, mediation does not have an
effect on their perceived capacity.
Table 3.4: Participant Capacity Claims
Positive (32%)113
Listening
Assertion
8 (26%)
5 (16%)

Neutral (71%)
No Skills
4 (13%)

None
18 (58%)

As the left column of Table 3.4 shows, however, about one third of participants do
make at least one kind of positive capacity claim. These claims provide evidence that, in

The percentage total for “positive” capacity effects do not match the combined total between “listening”
and “assertion” claims because three participants narratives (Christine, Lisa, Michelle) include both listening
and assertion claims. These categories are not intended to be mutually exclusive nor is it surprising that they are
correlated in some participant narratives (10% of participants make both listening and assertion claims). I
adjust the total in the “positive” cell to include the proportion of participant interviews that contain at least one
capacity claim so as not to overstate the proportion of participants who experience positive capacity effects. An
additional discrepancy in the totals is generated because Anne makes a “listening” capacity claim and a “no
skills” capacity claim in her narrative. Although Anne says she does not believe she learned skills, elsewhere she
makes a listening capacity claim in her interview. This level of ambivalence with respect to capacity claims is
unique to her interview, suggesting that the categories I present here generally capture the range of outcomes
with respect to capacity.
113
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some cases, the mediation experience positively effects participants’ perceptions of their
capacities. I find two kinds of positive capacity claims- “listening” and “assertion”, which
correspond to the themes stressed by practitioners. Listening claims, illustrated by the two
excerpts below, are the most common and are found in 26% of participant interviews.
There have been a few times where I felt that I’ve been able to do it, in a sense,
invite someone to explain or invite someone to express his or her point of view
in order to achieve a deeper understanding of what’s going on even if it’s painful
or if it’s not what I agree with but to achieve it. So, in a sense I think yeah, that
I’m able to integrate some of those techniques, at least periodically, if not all the
time. (Christine)
Maybe it’s improved my listening skills a little bit, when I’m in meetings I’ll listen
better, listen to what the other person has to say and try to wait it out, until
they’re finished before jumping into it. Or just make sure I’ve heard them
correctly, maybe ask them a couple questions to clarify it. (Alan)
Like the confidence and self-reliance claims previously described, capacity claims are
sometimes articulated in generalized terms, and sometimes in terms more specific to the
mediated relationship. Unlike those claims however, which are more commonly expressed in
specific terms, capacity claims are more likely to stress transfer into other contexts and
settings. When prompted, several participants describe particular instances of application to
other areas of their lives, as Alan does above when he expresses his belief that his behavior
at work may have changed as a result of the mediation with his ex-spouse. Capacity claims
like these suggest that the mediation experience does, in some cases, teach parties about the
technique known as reflective listening, active listening, or mirroring. Alan and Christine
describe learning to listen in a way that involves asking open ended questions, listening
carefully for response, repeating back to the other person what they have heard, and asking
for confirmation that the message has been understood. This appears to be linked to the
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parties’ experiences with “phase two” of the mediation process where mediators explicitly
ask parties to speak, paraphrase, and acknowledge understanding to each other.114
While the listening side of interpersonal communication is the most common
positive capacity claim, some participants (16%) also report learning or improving their
“assertion” skills. Assertion capacity claims describe an improved ability to manage one’s
emotions and speak to others about one’s needs in non-confrontational ways.
Low tones are more conducive. The minute I start to feel too much emotion, it’s
not the right time. (Lisa)
I think I improved my ability to articulate my needs. ... the fact that I persisted
to the point that I did was actually progress for me ... Usually I back down much
sooner. … I always have that conflict, as a woman too you know that I’m
usually the one that gives in. I don’t know if it’s as a woman or my personality.
(Beth)
Interestingly, “assertion” capacity claims, though small in number are all made by women in
mediation with family members or intimates. As Beth’s comments suggest, this may be
related to features of female moral development and dominant communication styles among
women that can make asserting one’s own needs a more challenging task (Gilligan 1982;
Tannen 1991).
Although mediators specifically mention “I-statements” when talking about teaching
assertion in mediation, participants describe their capacities in less structured terms. This is
not surprising since the mediation process is not structured to actually guide parties through
the “I-statement” formula in the way that “phase two” explicitly walks the parties through
the “reflective listening” technique. While mediators differ in their approaches, and some
may introduce the “I-statement” technique directly, interviews and observation do not reveal
this as a central feature of the step by step process typically followed. This relates to the
questions raised at the end of Section 3.2 about whether mediators indirectly model or
114

For a detailed account of the mediation process used at Toronto CDRs see Section 2.7 in Chapter 2.
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overtly teach skills during the mediation process. Exploring this question further through an
analysis of participant capacity claims can help to clarify what process mechanisms might
generate these educative effects.
Participatory theorists and practitioners expect the first two components of efficacy,
confidence and self-reliance, to follow fairly basically from a positive experience with selfdetermination. Although this is an expectation, I have argued above there is some reason to
question, it is nevertheless widely shared among practitioners. As I discussed earlier
however, mediators’ accounts about the mechanisms that generate capacity claims vacillate
between the merits of modeling and overt teaching in the mediation process. While
participant accounts cannot entirely resolve this ambiguity, examining them can shed light on
how parties experience the educative mechanisms of the process. This will help to illuminate
why some participants appear to build deliberative capacities during the process, while most
participants do not.
In a few instances, participants describe learning skills as a result of direct instruction
from mediators. For example, in the quotes below, Michelle suggests that the mediators
made direct observations about patterns of communication and suggest alternatives, whereas
Christine suggests that mediators lead participants (in this case a group of five) through role
playing exercises unrelated to the conflict and ask them to practice particular techniques.
One of the things they were telling us is that I don’t know, it’s just something
about the way we communicate like we’re not paying attention while we’re doing
it. (Michelle)
They were providing us with exercises to help with productive performance of
communication ... we were given scripts at certain points with certain key
phrases to use. I don’t know if I remember. I mean one of them might be you
know if I hear you correct, if I’m hearing you correctly, what I understand you
to be saying is this, am I, you know am I correct and, you know those kinds of
things. (Christine)
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While such overt teaching in mediation, particularly as it arose in Christine’s case in exercise
form, seems to be exceptional, other participants link their capacity claims to the
communication techniques modeled in less overt ways by mediators.
I think that’s kind of what they do, they have to listen to both sides, and sort of
sit there and go well this is what I hear Alan saying and this is what I hear Lisa
saying, what do you think? They’re doing a lot of listening throughout the whole
process. We’re all forced to listen to each other in that process. (Alan)
Modeling was going on. An immense amount of modeling was going on. (Lisa)
I seen it the way they [the mediators] are talking to us, ... So, everything I learn I
just learned from them. (Sara)
The result is that participants occasionally articulate their capacity claims, particularly in
terms of listening, in ways that imply they have learned to “be like the mediators”.
Julie: There’s been a couple of times when I’ve been at different committee
meetings, and different things that I’ve been on where I think I kind of, acted
like a mediator ...
Heather: So then do you feel like you consciously applied that from the
experience?
Julie: Probably, because of having been so fresh, you know this was just a couple
of, I’m just thinking a couple of things over last winter where you know it would
have been fresh in my mind because I was going through it. (Julie)
While participants identify these mechanisms and link them to their capacity claims,
they also openly discuss their difficulty in isolating the educative effects of their mediation
experience. For example, Evelyn says she finds the educative effects of mediation “hard to
tease out.” And when discussing the skills she has acquired Beth says “it’s very hard for me
to determine how much was due to that mediation.”115 Such skepticism is often linked in
interview narratives to pre-existing efficacy claims. Participants also attribute their capacity
claims to mediation by describing it as a “refresher.”
They were good reminders that I had done some therapy work with a former
partner a few years before and we had to do a lot of mirroring. So I had learned
In Chapter 6, I discuss the challenge of isolating the effects of the mediation experience and distinguishing
them from effects of the overall conflict experience further.
115
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about that technique then and it’s very, it’s so valuable, and it’s difficult too I
think, still it’s something that one has to continue to practice. (Christine)
Therefore capacity claims in mediation, although relatively rare, seem to result from
direction given by mediators, indirect modeling on the part of mediators, and perhaps most
importantly, by reminding parties of skills and techniques they already know.
This range of educative mechanisms is also described by participants who do not
make capacity claims. This suggests that even when participants do not experience capacity
effects, this is not from want of trying on the part of mediators. Furthermore, it shows that
participants are not obliviousness to practitioner efforts to generate capacity effects. For
example, Lynn observes, but completely rejects, mediator efforts at skill building during the
multi-session process.
So we didn’t feel we needed any training in being good neighbors.116 But that’s
what the idea of the last meeting was. (Lynn)
Her dismissiveness may not be surprising given the strength of her pre-existing efficacy
claims, which are cited in Section 3.3.1 above. Though Lynn’s vehemence is exceptional, she
is not alone in noting the failure of mediator attempts to teach skills. For example, while
Norm notes the potential for the mediation to reinforce or refresh his pre-existing skills, he
gives an uncharitable account of the mediation’s ability to build his capacity.
What remains for me is the familiar process of, you know ,if I say something,
the other person repeats back what I said, things like that, making I statements, a
deliberate, uncomplicated, communication process … Those stay with me and I
guess I’d already been acquainted with them and so it was just another
opportunity to remember those and try them out again. But also to reflect on
their limitation. (Norm)

116 The sort of umbrage taken by Lynn suggests that in some cases the disconnect between mediator and
participants expectations of the process can result in frustration. This has implications for the debate about
process control and educative aims because it suggests that mediators who pursue their educative goals by
heavily structuring participant communication risk alienating parties from the process.
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Norm suggests that the mediation did not build his capacity because, rather than illustrating
the value of these skills, it actually highlighted their limits. This stands in contrast to
Christine, quoted above, who claims that the mediation did successfully rejuvenate her preexisting grasp of listening and assertion skills. This again highlights that pre-existing efficacy
claims do not necessarily determine positive capacity claims. Moreover, a certain degree of
introspection is common to participants who make capacity claims, though some of the
most introspective participants (for example, Norm), do not make them. Finally, while
capacity claims are more common in cases where the overall account of mediation is a
positive one, they do sometimes emerge from fairly negative mediation narratives. For
example, Beth’s negative experience with guided reflective listening does not prevent her
from feeling that she improved her assertion skills,117 which she links to her experience in
mediation (see excerpts from Beth above).
Therefore, while a range of educative mechanisms (teaching, modeling, refreshing)
are identified by participants, and a number of participant characteristics appear relevant to
the success of these mechanisms (introspection, positive mediation experience, pre-existing
efficacy), no clear pattern emerges about what, beyond an experience in mediation, produces
capacity claims. In general, my analysis of participant narratives suggests that although
capacity claims fall short of practitioner expectations in terms of frequency and depth, they
nevertheless mirror those expectations in their focus on communication skills and
techniques.

117 In fact, although she doesn’t say so, it is possible that it is because the part of mediation which emphasizes
listening failed in her case that she was forced to focus a great deal on her assertion skills in effort to get her
message across to a party who she felt was not hearing her. “The mirroring, mirroring back what I said, as I
mentioned, the tone of voice he took on and also when he played me, it was hurtful and it indicated that he
didn’t hear what I was saying in the mediation” (Beth).
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3.3.5

Scope of Participant Efficacy Claims
Overall, I find that about half of the mediation participants I interviewed reported at

least one kind of positive efficacy effect (confidence, self-reliance, capacity) resulting from
their mediation experience. Yet, as I have described above, these efficacy claims are often
quite modest and limited in their scope. I characterize the scope of positive efficacy claims
by coding each as either “specific” or “general”. This distinction draws attention to the
transfer potential of educative effects. As I noted in Section 3.2, practitioner efficacy
expectations suggest that generalized efficacy effects are built as a result of their transfer
beyond the specific context where they are acquired. According to this assumption, the
strength of efficacy effects can be determined in part by the degree to which efficacy claims
are articulated in generalized terms.
For confidence, this means that participants are expected to feel a greater sense of
confidence in their ability to interact with their mediation partner(s) (specific), and this in
turn transfers to greater confidence in their interactions with others more widely (general).
For self-reliance, there is a distinction between a participant’s intentions concerning ongoing
interactions with the conflict partner (specific), and their intentions concerning other
conflicts they will encounter (general). With respect to capacity, the expectation is that
participants have the experience of applying and practicing a set of techniques with their
mediation partner(s) during the process. Specific capacity claims indicate an ability to apply
these skills in future interactions outside the mediation with those same mediation partner(s).
A further step is to recognize and apply this technique as a transferable skill in other
contexts of daily life. In each case, the element of “transfer” from the specific mediated
relationship(s) to a generalized application is considered central to reaching full educative
potential.

126
Pincock-Chapter 3
Table 3.5 summarizes the scope of participants’ confidence, self-reliance, and
capacity claims. It shows, as I have noted in the preceding sections, that confidence and selfreliance claims are more likely to be specific, while capacity claims tend to be made in
generalized terms.
Table 3.5: Scope of Participant Efficacy Claims
Specific
General

High
6 (60%)
4 (40%)

Confidence
Low
Negative
5 (71%)
‐
2 (29%) 1 (100%)

Self‐Reliance
Self
Fall
First
4 (100%) 6 (46%) 1 (25%)
‐
7 (54%) 3 (75%)

Capacity
Listen
Assert
1 (13%) 1 (20%)
7 (87%) 4 (80%)

Total
Efficacy
24 (46%)
28 (54%)

The far right column includes a breakdown of all efficacy claims and indicates that almost
half of participant efficacy claims (46%) are specific to the mediated relationship.118
My analysis suggests that these specific efficacy claims are some of the most
compelling. The specific efficacy claims below from Christine about confidence and from
Michelle about capacity illustrate this.
I mean I, I feel more confident with him. ... I often felt sort of judged by him or
insecure or like uncomfortable or nervous with him. ... I have more confidence
within the relationship too I think. (Christine)
I kind of think back to when we’re here unless it’s something really, really big
then. I don’t yell anymore because I couldn’t yell when I was here, right, so. And
like I said when we’re, if it’s like a really big fight then no, all that stuff kind of
goes out the window. But like if it’s something calm and we’re just dealing with a
small issue, then we kind of replay what happened here, we don’t set out all rules
and stuff but it’s kind of like well you talk and I’ll listen and then I’ll talk and you
listen, so. We still get interruptions every once in a while because there’s nobody
there telling us, you know not to do it. But, we try. (Michelle)
Specific claims like these are worth noting because they shed light on the kinds of lasting
changes that we might realistically expect to follow from mediation. Rather than viewing
specific claims as an indicator of partial or suboptimal effect, capacity claims like Michelle’s
118 Here I count the total number of efficacy claims without reference to the number of participant narratives.
Because some participants make efficacy claims in multiple categories, the total number of positive efficacy
claims is 24 while the total number of participant narratives that include at least one positive efficacy claims
cited previously is 18.
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and Christine’s emphasize that the experience has had important effects on the ongoing
dynamic between she and her conflict partner. This draws attention to the ways that the
mediation experience may shift dynamics within particular relationships without necessarily
having measurable effects at the individual level. In these accounts, it is not so much
individual efficacy or skills that have changed, but rather that the habits of interaction that
exist between two or more people have been altered by the mediation experience. Another
indication of this is that specific efficacy claims are sometimes offered in explicitly relational
or collective terms. For example:
This time too if it wasn't working I'd go ok, it's not working because of
something that we are both doing. (Lisa)
I don’t think we need the mediation part, yeah I think we know how to do this
now. (Evelyn)
Both Evelyn and Lisa use “we”, and describe a change that highlights the need to manage
conflict and collective decision making in the context of relationships with others. When
combined with the observation that participant narratives place little emphasis on the
importance of self-determination in the process, this suggests that the efficacy category does
not capture a relevant set of lasting changes that can occur for participants. The
interpersonal context of these conflicts makes clear how little collective decision making has
to do with individual autonomy for participants. According to participants’ post mediation
narratives, relationships and their related emotional content are much more important to the
process. I will explore these elements further in Chapters 4 and 5.
3.4

CONCLUSION
In sum, efforts to build the skillful citizen through the community mediation

process yield positive results, but these results do not always conform to the expectations of
theorists and practitioners. Though skeptics of educative effects can rightly point to the
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prominence of pre-existing efficacy claims and the absence of efficacy effects in about half
of participant narratives, this does not tell the full story of mediation’s educative potential. A
small but notable number of participant narratives suggest that previous familiarity with,
exposure, and openness to the competencies that mediation is designed to strengthen can
serve to prime individuals to experience some lasting efficacy effects. Furthermore, in some
cases participants who make no pre-existing efficacy claims also attribute efficacy effects to
their mediation experience. While these educative gains do not resemble the stark shift from
“conflict dunce” to “conflict expert” that is implied by mediator narratives, these
participants make convincing claims about strengthened confidence and capacity resulting
from their mediation experience. Similarly, while reliance claims do not stress self-reliance
the way mediators hope, “fall back on mediation” reliance claims are consistent with a more
measured account of mediation’s capacity to strengthen participant efficacy.
Overall, these effects do not appear to follow from the salience of self-determination
in the process, something that mediators stress far more than participants in their accounts.
This misalignment, which is reinforced by the prominence of specific efficacy claims and
relational themes in participant narratives, draws attention to changes that are not adequately
captured by the efficacy category. I will explore these changes further in my discussion of
interests in Chapter 4 and relationships in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 4
Community Mediation & Interest Clarification
Trying to Build the Reflective Citizen
4.1

INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, I focus on interests, the second of three categories for conceptualizing

deliberation’s educative effects that I proposed in Chapter 2. As I noted there, deliberative
and participatory theorists describe the process of ‘interest clarification’ as a central goal of
deliberation. Jane Mansbridge has been a key theorist in developing the concept of interests
and articulating its importance to deliberative and participatory forms of democracy. Interest
clarification expectations suggest that participants come to a better understanding of their
interests as a result of deliberative participation. While maintaining this view, Mansbridge has
sought to distance her conception of interests from notions of a fixed and objective
construct that can be revealed or discovered. She also rejects the opposite extreme, that any
expression of preferences is necessarily consistent with a person’s interests. She therefore
seeks to distinguish between pre-reflective preferences and enlightened preferences.
Enlightened preferences are those that approximate what a person would choose if they had
complete knowledge of the consequences (for themselves and others) of all possible choices.
Deliberative participation is expected to help participants clarify their interests and develop
enlightened preferences because it provides participants with an opportunity to discuss their
own and encounter other perspectives on one or more particular issues, problems, or
conflicts (1983; 2006).
Theories of interest clarification have grown increasingly complex to acknowledge
the value of clarifying both self and other regarding interests. As Mansbridge notes:
It is admittedly not easy to explore commonalities collectively, remain open to
transformation, and forge a common good while at the same time exploring and
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keeping an appropriate grasp on one’s own self-interest and potential conflicting
interests. But the task is neither impossible or a contradiction in terms. It is, in
fact, the ideal.
(Mansbridge et al. 2010, 79-80)
Though the appropriate balance between self and other regarding interests is a difficult one
to identify abstractly, all interest clarification claims suggest that deliberation assists
participants to become more reflective to some degree about their own interests as well as
the interests of others, and in so doing to develop a capacity that is crucial for democratic
citizenship. Among several ways proposed for testing deliberation’s success at generating
these shifts in understanding and their associated dispositional shifts, Mansbridge suggests
we turn to “the reflective conclusions of those who have changed their understandings of
their interests” (2006: 108). This is precisely the approach I take in this study by conducting
post process interviews with mediation participants.
The mediation context seems an appropriate one to explore deliberation’s interest
clarification potential not only because of the conditions I outlined in Chapter 2 (collective
decisions, scope, intensity), but also because mediation theorists have advanced interest
clarification claims that map onto those reviewed above. The claims of classic deliberative
theory that suggest participants develop attachments to the common good and clarify their
interests in other-regarding directions are echoed by proponents of transformative mediation
who believe that “parties may be more willing and able, in other situations, to withhold
judgment and give others the benefit of the doubt” in the long term following their
mediation experience and that they will have developed “their level of other awareness and
their capacity for consideration and respect for others”(Bush & Folger 2005: 80, 81).
Though Bush and Folger’s articulation of this perspective is fairly recent, they claim to be
concretizing a set of expectations about mediation’s educative potential that they trace back
to the field’s origins (Bush & Folger 2005:13). Early proponents of mediation (Shonholtz
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1984; Wahrhaftig 1982) also advanced claims, which continue to have adherents today
(Herrman 2006; Shonholtz 2000; Wahrhaftig 2004), that place more emphasis on the
potential for mediation to clarify conflicting interests in ways that catalyze community
organizing and mobilization. Though they place varying degrees of emphasis on self and
other-regarding interests, both perspectives make strong interest clarification claims for the
mediation process. In fact, in these varied ways, mediation theorists suggest that the value of
the process lies in its capacity to generate lasting shifts in the participants’ understandings of
and dispositions towards their interests.
I examine these claims empirically at the Toronto CDRs, beginning with the
expectations articulated by Toronto CDR practitioners, and followed by an analysis of the
interest clarification claims made by mediation participants. I find that Toronto CDR
practitioners overwhelmingly conceptualize interest clarification in emotional terms, stressing
the ability of the mediation process to uncover the emotions that help to explain
participants’ actions, motives and preferences. They stress the importance of developing
mutual understanding between parties even in the absence of any agreement or collective
decision. Finally, they expect this to lead to a general dispositional change that makes
participants more inclined to practice self-reflection and perspective taking in the future.
My analysis of the interest clarification claims of mediation participants suggests that
positive interest clarification claims are made by a little less than half of participants. Despite
this, it appears that few of the expectations articulated by theorists and practitioners are
realized. Contrary to those expectations, interest clarification claims are sometimes nonreciprocal and there is little evidence that interest clarification effects transfer beyond the
specific conflict context. In those cases where positive interest clarification claims are absent,
participants make interest clarification claims that establish or reinforce uncharitable views of
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each other or report that misunderstandings persist following the mediation. Overall, these
findings suggest that mediation has the potential to generate interest clarification effects, but
that these will often fall short of the educative aspirations of practitioners and theorists.
4.2

MEDIATOR INTEREST CLARIFICATION EXPECTATIONS
My conversations with CDR staff and volunteers reveal several ways of

conceptualizing the interest clarification expectations they have from mediation. As my
review of deliberative and mediation theory has suggested, practitioners acknowledge that
when participants explore their own and others’ preferences, this can serve an instrumental
purpose by revealing areas of agreement that were not known previously. Mediators are
likely to understand this in terms outlined by theories of “integrative” or “interest-based”
negotiation.119 These theories focus on the need to shift parties from positions to interests,
that is, from the demands they make to the underlying reasons for those demands, in order
to find integrative solutions that satisfy the needs of both parties (Fisher, Ury, and Patton
1983). A classic example that illustrates the value of such a shift involves a conflict between
two people in a library. One takes the position: “I want the window open”, and this runs up
against the position of the other, which is: “I want the window closed.” These positions
appear incompatible and a typical approach to resolution might revert to compromise (open
the window halfway). Through discursive exchange, however, the parties might discover that
their underlying interests suggest options for mutual gain. For example, the interests “I want
fresh air in the room” and “The draft from the window makes me uncomfortable” can both

See Mansbridge et al (2010) and Mansbridge (2009) for the view that integrative negotiation is a form of
deliberation (in contrast to classic views that characterize negotiation and bargaining as deliberation’s opposite.)

119
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be met by opening a window in the next room, which allows fresh air without producing a
draft (Metcalf and Urwick 2003).120
This is how volunteer Vivek understands the purpose of interest clarification in
mediation.
I think when you move people off positions and on to their interest in what
their needs are, there’s more ability to fashion solutions that can maybe[meet]
both, those needs and desires. And it’s like the whole, the orange analogy.121
(Vivek, CDR Volunteer)
Yet aside from its immediate potential to produce better collective decisions, interest
clarification is also expected to have lasting impacts on participants in ways that will make
them better citizens. Interest clarification expectations with this educative aim take three
general forms in the accounts of CDR staff and volunteers.
One form follows the vision of early community empowerment approaches to
community mediation, and associates the lasting impact of interest clarification with
community organizing. From this view, mediation presents an opportunity to uncover the
‘root causes’ of a conflict such that its connections to broader social conflicts are made clear
(Wahrhaftig 2004, Shonholtz 2000). It is also expected to build alliances within
neighborhoods, particularly underserved neighborhoods, around interests shared in common,
and in so doing build capacity for collective action around shared problems. These goals

120

This classic example of the library window dispute is described by Mary Parker Follet in her 1925 paper
entitled “Constructive Conflict” (see Metcalfe & Urwick eds. 2003 pp. 1-22). Follet’s example was used in
1981 by Fisher, & Ury in their first edition of Getting to Yes without attribution to Follet. It is recounted in
many places as a classic and simple example of integrative or interest based negotiation (Mansbridge 2009).
121 The orange analogy is another classic example illustrating the value of exploring the interests that are
underlying the positions parties adopt in a conflict (see Fisher, Ury, and Patton 1983). In this case two parties
are in a dispute over an orange. One strategy, often considered fair, is to split the orange in half. However
exploration of the parties’ interests reveals that one party wants the rind to bake a pie and the other wants the
flesh to eat. Though many disputes do not have such a simple “win-win” solution, the analogy, like the
window example, illustrates neatly the way that exploration of interests can open up ways of maximizing
mutual gains.
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resonate with a small number of Toronto CDR practitioners. Though she is somewhat
measured in her claims, Courtney clearly understands interest clarification in these terms.
I think too that dividing and conquering is one of the most effective tactics of
those high up in the power structure who kind of just want to maintain the
status quo, if you have people from somewhat marginalized communities or
social classes who are spending all their time arguing with each other, they’re not
going to organize and demand social change. So it’s not as though we at
[CDR2] can say oh well having done this and this mediation now we can see that
you know such and such a neighborhood is ready to organize against that toxic
waste dump that you know someone was planning on putting there ... but I
think you know we don’t need to be able to say we saw this result in a really
demonstrable way. I think it’s enough to feel that we’re putting a few bricks into
that foundation so to speak. (Courtney, CDR Volunteer)
Her comments suggest that this kind of effect on the way participants come to understand
their interests may not be demonstrable, but Nikola describes a case that he believes
demonstrates it quite clearly. Describing a conflict he mediated between several residents
living on the same street where crime had been on the rise he says:
They were not organized as a neighborhood, they were not talking about the
issues, they were not trying to solve some problems together but individually,
which of course weakened them a lot ... [but] after that small problem on the
street was solved between two of them they started facing the bigger problem of
the street which involved more people and they talked about, it was early
summer, and they talked immediately about organizing a street party or a
barbecue and that they could get together and talk about what’s happening,
should they contact the police or the counsellor, and those type of issues.
Immediately. I mean it was very interesting what happened that day [following
the successful mediation]. (Nikola, CDR Volunteer)
It is based on this experience that he concludes “in that sense it is [a] kind of revolutionary
activity” when describing the educative goals of community mediation.
For the most part however, this characterization of the interest clarification process,
one that places emphasis on the social and/or political sources of conflict, is rare among
CDR staff and volunteers. Far more dominant in their narratives is the second form of
interest clarification which places emphasis on the psychological and emotional sources of
conflict.
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It’s more about digging deeper, it’s really about connecting parties as individuals,
as human beings, and what they do is they look at what their, you know, quote
interests are, what’s the, not the issue, not the thing on top but what’s going on
there underneath ... so it’s a lot of the emotional stuff behind it, and it’s allowing
two people or more than two people to understand each other. …I guess there’s
a business model I guess it comes out of the Harvard Negotiation Project122
and ... so it’s less emotional and it’s about what your interests are and you know,
but here we dig even deeper and get into the emotions. (Frank, CDR Volunteer)
Here Frank emphasizes the importance of uncovering parties’ emotions in order to develop
mutual understanding. He distinguishes this form of “deep” therapeutic interest clarification
from what he perceives to be a more “shallow” instrumental interest clarification to stress
the educative potential of the former.
Gary also focuses on the emotional and psychological roots of conflict and the
lasting educative potential he believes follows form its exploration.
What a dispute is, is a difference of fact, or a misunderstanding of fact. And a
conflict is a misunderstanding of feeling. So, a feeling is a deeper more internal
process and we use ... the symbolism of an iceberg123 where the iceberg is on the
surface of the water, and you see it on the horizon and wow it’s big, but that
only represents about ten percent of its true size. The rest of it is below the
water level and that’s really where we go with mediation, the transformation
process, to get to the root, that’s where all the stuff you don’t see, the feelings,
the emotions, the parts that people, that influence behavior and attitudes, and
that’s where we’re going. (Gary, CDR Staff)
This conception of interest clarification involves introspection about one’s own feelings, the
cathartic experience of having those listened to and affirmed, initially by the mediators and
hopefully later by the other party, and finally the exposure to and appreciation of the feelings
of the other party on the matter. As Gary continues below, the structure of the mediation
process is intended to bring about this shift among participants.

Here Frank refers to the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, established by Fisher and Ury
(among other leaders of the negotiation field) authors of the classic text cited earlier (Fisher, Ury, and Patton
1983).
123 See Cloke and Goldsmith (2005) for elaboration of the “Conflict Iceberg”. In short, Cloke and Goldsmith
present an approach to conflict management that requires parties to go beneath the surface of issues in a
conflict to explore its emotional and psychological content.
122
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You get that kind of real connection where people can tell their story, maybe for
the first, first time when someone’s actually listening and hearing and they can
do that, in a way that they feel heard. And just to be heard can be just very
cathartic to shift people to then move into considering other, cause when people
are in conflict usually they just, think self, one perspective, one dimension, it’s
not, I don’t really give a shit about the other person. It’s what I’m going through,
and what they made me go through, how they’ve been affecting me. So we have
to get them to consider how the other person’s feelings and how their own
behavior may have affected the other person too. (Gary, CDR Staff)
Gary’s comments focus on the dynamics within the process that help parties to reflect and
consider their own interests (understanding self) and the interests of the other
(understanding other), with an emphasis on feelings.
That practitioners see this interest clarification in educative terms is clear from the
way they stress its value even in cases where it does not generate agreement between the
parties on substantive issues.124
You know, even if they don’t agree with where the other one is coming from
but at least they understand why the other person did what they did. (Gloria,
CDR Volunteer)
And sometimes you go through a mediation session, you may not go into
agreement, but they’ve heard each other, parties have actually heard each other.
(Kate, CDR Staff)
But even if they don’t agree on everything there’s still a huge transformation as
far as how they look at each other. And I think how they look at other people
after that. It’s very emotional, it’s a very emotional experience to be there as a
mediator and to watch the parties go through this too. (Alyssa, CDR Volunteer)
Alyssa’s account above takes this educative conception of interest clarification one step
further by suggesting that it is a transferable process that alters the way participants “look at
other people” in general following the mediation process.

124 It is also the case however that the goal of mutual understanding is important to generating agreements in
the minds of mediators. In contrast to the “win-win” solutions mentioned above, CDR staff and volunteers
also discuss the exploration and disclosure of motives and feelings that may generate empathy and create
potential for concessions and compromise. My focus here however, is on their belief that mutual understanding
has lasting and transferable benefits regardless of its relationship to settlement.
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This captures the third theme emphasized by CDR staff and volunteers that a
general dispositional change occurs for mediation participants with respect to their own
interests and the interests of others. CDR staff and volunteers emphasize their hope that
participants develop a disposition towards self- reflection and perspective taking as a lasting
result of their mediation experience.
Paul and Leila’s comments below are illustrative of these aspirations.
That capacity, 125 I guess it entails the capacity on the part of people to know
themselves, to understand themselves you know, why does it bug me when the
neighbor uses that language or why do I care so much about that way of
constructing the workplace or, what is it that’s poisonous about this
environment. So if that’s part of the capacity to know ourselves and what our
triggers are and what our values and beliefs are and to reflect on those things
and to, and to use those things sort of consciously. It’s the capacity to see those
things in other people, to understand other people beyond simply that being
another bundle of individual rights and obligations, or that being you know
another noisy organic unit, source of noise but to understand that person as a
person. That there are reasons why they act the way they do, they too have
feelings and values, they too have a history that leads them to act in certain ways.
(Paul, CDR Staff)
I think one of the helpful things that a mediation can create is for the person to
go away from what he or she thinks, and for a moment would put herself or
himself in the shoes of the other. And I think in mediation and particularly in
transformative mediation that is very relevant, that people would understand
what’s going on in the mind of the other person. And I think ultimately when
you’re in a conflict later with somebody else that would be a training that you

125

Paul refers to reflectiveness as a capacity in a way that hails back to the “capacity claims” discussed in the
previous chapter. There I focused on communication skills such as listening and asserting. Though the
language of ‘capacity’ and ‘skill’ are invoked in descriptions of ‘reflectiveness’, I characterize it in terms of a
disposition to help draw an analytical distinction between efficacy and interest related changes. I do not claim
that the categories of efficacy, interests, and relationships operate entirely independently of each other, but
instead parse them in these ways so that we may begin to unpack and scrutinize what is often an amorphous
category of “better citizen” claims. The accounts of CDR practitioners also suggest that they see a distinction
between reflectiveness and other skills they describe even though they struggle for language to make this
distinction. Consider the ambivalence towards the word “skill” in the following comments from Kate:
Ok, well, it just, it teaches them the skills almost to step back, and actually acknowledge their
own needs, and their own interests behind conflict. As well as that of their neighbor or the other
party. ... so I guess when I say skill I guess just the skill of acknowledging and um, taking time. ...
So just getting them really thinking, maybe I shouldn’t say skills but I just think it really helps
them to acknowledge things, and to be able to step back and understand where they’re coming
from, truly and that of their, their neighbor or the other party. (Kate, CDR Staff)
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would have learned to understand and that, listen, it’s true that I think this in my
mind but, but what about this other person. (Leila, CDR Volunteer)
Clearly such a disposition is related to the communication skills of listening and assertion
discussed in the previous chapter. It relates as well to the development of bonds of
affiliation and affection that I will discuss in the next chapter. Here however, I narrow in on
the process through which parties are expected to clarify for themselves and to each other
what they want and need and the general dispositions of reflectiveness (self-reflection and
perspective taking) that are expected to develop as a result of such a process. Overall, the
dominant view of interest clarification expressed by Toronto CDR practitioners focuses on
uncovering the emotions of self and other in ways that are expected to have lasting effects
on participants’ general ability to engage in self-reflection and perspective taking.
4.3

PARTICIPANT INTEREST CLARIFICATION CLAIMS
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the emphasis of CDR practitioners, participant

interest clarification claims are also focused on the emotional content of their conflicts and
the degree to which they reached mutual understanding with conflict partners. These kind of
interest clarification claims are much more typical than claims that emphasize the sociopolitical roots of conflict. Two participants described their interests in overtly politicized
terms and recounted their involvement in community organizing activities related to their
conflicts. But in the cases where this occurred,126 the organizing transpired prior to and
independent of the mediation experience. This lends support to the view that conflicts
addressed by community mediation, that often manifest as small scale interpersonal conflicts,
do sometimes engage with broader community interests that call for organizing. It also
suggests however, that mediation is not likely to catalyze this sort of organizing. In the cases
126 Lorna organized a sound survey in her building to find out if other tenants were having difficulty with noise.
Jeremy organized meetings with residents on his street to address the noise and safety issues raised by the scrap
yard adjacent to their street.
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I examined, therefore, there is no evidence to confirm community mediation generates the
kind of socio-political interest clarification emphasized in the community empowerment
goals of theorists and practitioners cited above.127
Table 4.1 summarizes the distribution of psycho-emotive interest clarification claims
in the participant interview narratives. It shows that a little under half of participant
Table 4.1: Participant Interest Clarification Claims128
Positive (45%)
Self/Other
14 (45%)

? (23%)
Divisive
7 (23%)

Neutral (32%)
Misunderstanding
10 (32%)

Negative (3%)
Coercion
1 (3%)

narratives include at least one positive interest clarification claim that is attributed to
mediation. This column includes both claims regarding clarification of one’s own interests
(“self-understanding”) and claims regarding clarification of the other’s interests (“otherunderstanding”).129 Though this presents support for the view that practitioners’ educative
expectations are met, there are several reasons to remain cautious about drawing that
conclusion. As I discuss more below, the educative strength of these self and other
understanding claims is often limited by their non-reciprocal, non-transferable, and
ambivalent qualities. Relatedly, the middle column in Table 4.1 shows that 23% of
participants credit the mediation with generating what I call “divisive understanding” interest
clarification. These are instances where participants report learning about the perspectives
and motivations of their conflict partner in ways that solidify or reinforce negative feelings
In two additional cases, both Jonathon and Anne say they did not feel the mediators were sufficiently
sensitive to the gender dynamics in the conflict due to their heteronormative bias providing additional evidence
to suggest that mediation is not a process that attunes participants to their socio-political interests. Instead their
comments suggest that it can sometimes be a process where participants who are already conscious of their
socio-political interests are channeled in other directions by mediators who do not grasp those interests.
128 Percentages are calculated based on the total number of participants (31). Totals exceed the number of
participant narratives in the table because Beth makes a Self/Other understanding claims and a
Misunderstanding claim, resulting in a total of 32 interest clarification claims listed in the table. Hers is the only
narrative that includes competing interest clarification claims. This suggests that although the categories I
present are not mutually exclusive, they each capture fairly distinct outcomes.
129 3 participants report both self and other understanding, and the remaining 10 report other understanding
only.
127
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and impressions towards them. This category of interest clarification is not highlighted by
CDR practitioners and, as I discuss below, its relationship to their educative aspirations is
unclear (as is indicated by “?” above this column). 32% of participant narratives include
“misunderstanding” claims. These suggest that mediation does not serve to clarify interests
and that pre-existing misunderstandings concerning each other’s interests persist. Finally,
there is just one participant who reports feeling pressured to act against their interests in the
mediation, which I label “coercion claims”. This is the only instance where I find evidence
that mediation has negative effects with respect to interest clarification.
4.3.1

Self and Other Understanding Claims
Within the group of participants who make positive interest clarification claims, only 3

participants (10%) make “self-understanding” claims that focus on the way the mediation
experience improved their understanding of their own interests. For example, Beth describes
how the mediation provided an opportunity to really focus on and explore her own needs in
the conflict.
I was trying to listen to my own inner voice and my own needs instead of
automatically giving into the needs of other people, it’s hard work to do that.
(Beth)
The rarity of self-understanding claims in participant narratives departs from the emphasis
practitioners expectations place on this kind of interest clarification. It is consistent however,
with the findings, noted in Chapter 3, that participants do not usually come to mediation
oriented to their own deficits. The potential for mediation to contribute to selfunderstanding, at least in a form that participants are capable of articulate, therefore appears
quite limited.
Furthermore, there are reminders in participants’ narratives about the challenge of
isolating educative effects back to the mediation experience itself in contrast to the overall
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conflict experience. Anne’s comments below, an excellent example of self-understanding, are
attributed to the broader conflict experience and not to insights gained during the mediation
specifically.
Anne: So the situation itself was really, was a learning experience for me in that I
came to know myself much better in terms of what’s ok for me and what
situations, are sustainable. And then after that I had a much better living
situation.
Heather: Do you think that the, the mediation process gave you access to that
learning or was it by virtue of the experience itself that those lessons came?
Anne: I think it was the experience itself. I think mediation was really important
and useful for me, but that most of the learning was from the situation.
As this excerpt illustrates, I probed for this distinction in interviews and, whenever possible,
excluded those educative claims that are not attributed directly to the mediation (Anne’s selfunderstanding claim is therefore not counted in Table 4.1). This ambiguity however,
provides one reason for caution in attributing educative effects to mediation.
Most positive interest clarification claims that are unambiguously linked to the
mediation experience are framed in terms of “other understanding.” A minority of these
attribute broad other understanding to the mediation experience. In these cases, participants
report an ability to see the perspective of the other in the current conflict, and relate this to
an appreciation of and respect for the general perspective of the other more broadly. Alan
describes the shift in his perspective about Lisa, his ex-spouse this way:
I could sit back a little bit more objectively and look at Lisa as a person and I
just felt you know that she’s the way she is and we were not, I was never meant
to have any easy conversation with this lady, like literally, it was too difficult, like
it was just too hard, too much work for me,... and I’m ok with that, I can’t fix
that, I can’t change that about me. I certainly can’t change it about her, so yeah.
(Alan)
Lisa reports a similar shift, though she does not frame it quite the same way as Alan. When
asked if she wanted different things from the mediation process at the end compared to the
beginning, Lisa explains that she no longer approached the process as a way to humiliate

142
Pincock-Chapter 4
Alan. She describes herself shifting from the “little mind” to the “big mind” and when
asked to explain what she means by that she says the following:
Lisa: The big mind is generosity of spirit, it's just good. ... big mind embraces and
the little mind is just like judgmental and not nice.
Heather: ... What happened in the process, do you think that caused that change
for you?
Lisa: just every, things where clarified, we were able to listen to each other. We
were able to at least partially see each other. We got past the emotion. It took
away all that, just there, there wasn't a place for it.
This first part of Lisa’s comment is focused on “self-understanding” and a shift to be more
generous and other-regarding in her conceptualization of her own interests (i.e., no longer
seeking to humiliate Alan). Lisa emphasizes that this was made possible through the mutual
listening and processing of emotions that took place during the mediation, suggesting that
she learned things about Alan’s perspective (i.e., “other understanding”).130 Lisa does not
describe this in terms of particular interests, but instead as a general disposition she had
towards Alan by the end of the mediation. Michelle describes her experience in quite similar
terms, describing a mediation with her spouse from whom she had recently separated:
Also, like I said I’ve, not that I didn’t have patience before but I learned to have
a little bit more patience, I kind of understand where he’s coming from. Cause
before it was me just you know, I want my point out there, you’re not
understanding the point but at the same time I wasn’t understanding his point,
right so, that’s one of the things I learned, like just to be more understanding, to
compromise, ha ha, so yeah. But you know at that point I was getting tired of
compromising but yeah, after the meeting like I was feeling a little better so it
gave me just a little bit more, you know, so. (Michelle)
The remaining “other understanding” claims are more limited to the perspectives and
motivations that apply in the particularly conflict.
I guess that helped knowing that he felt just as bad that we lost our easy way
with each other. ...
I didn’t feel as angry at him, I had a bit more compassion for him I think.
(Lorna)
130

Lisa is 1 of 3 participants who make both “self” and “other” understanding claims during their interview.
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We were very sympathetic of what would happen here, and you get to hear both
sides of the story and, but now you know that there’s a reason all the time for
why something’s happening so it’s not always people aren’t doing it just to do it
to you. (Jeffrey)
I guess I’m not as angry, I think we kind of understand each other a lot better, I
think he and his father realized that we’re not a bunch of crack pots who are
complaining about the slightest little bit of noise. … And I kind of realize the
same about them, they’re not out to get us and all that, we both kind of realize
you know where each other is coming from. I think they understand our point
and we understand there’s whereas before I don’t think, I don’t think either of
us kind of saw the other side clearly. (Jeremy)
Participants report learning particular information about the wants and needs of others that
they did not have previously, and they suggest that the result of this is to be more
understanding of their conflict partners. These clarifications are discussed, not in terms of
their utility in fashioning agreements, but with emphasis on how they generated compassion,
sympathy, and understanding. Lorna’s claim is notable in particular because she and her
conflict partner did not reach an agreement in mediation. Although she is the only
participant who makes a positive interest clarification claim that did not reach agreement in
mediation,131 this provides some minimal support for the notion that interest clarification has
a non-instrumental (i.e. educative) value.
Although the positive interest clarification claims described above provide good
support for the interest clarification expectations of practitioners, there are several reasons to
temper the conclusions that are drawn from them about mediation’s educative potential.
First, in all cases, these interest clarification claims are focused on understanding with respect
to specific others, who participated in mediation. Jeffrey’s comments above are couched in
somewhat generalized terms suggesting that his experience with interest clarification in
mediation may carry over to an overall disposition towards reflection and perspective taking

This is not surprising given that 86% of those attending mediation at Toronto CDRs between July 1, 2006
and July 1, 2007 and 82% of interview participants reached agreement in their mediation. See Appendix I.
131
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in his future interactions. Aside from this however, there is minimal evidence to suggest that
positive interest clarification claims are transferable beyond the specific relational context
where they occur.
These findings resemble those discussed in Chapter 3 with respect to the nontransferable quality of many efficacy claims. The exception there were capacity claims that,
unlike confidence and self-reliance efficacy claims, are more likely to be made in generalized
form. Examining these generalized capacity claims with interest clarification in mind
generates some limited evidence that mediation does, in a few cases, contribute to lasting
dispositions towards reflectiveness, and perspective taking in particular. About four
participants make listening capacity claims that suggest they have not only acquired a
generalized ability to listen to what others are saying, but also to reflect on their interests.
Recall Christine’s comments, also cited in Chapter 3 in my discussion of capacity claims:
There have been a few times where I felt that I’ve been able to do it, in a sense,
invite someone to explain or express his or her point of view in order to achieve
a deeper understanding of what’s going on even if it’s painful or if it’s not what I
agree with but to achieve it. So, in a sense I think that I’m able to integrate some
of those techniques, at least periodically, if not all the time. (Christine)
Christine’s capacity claims about listening point to a disposition towards perspective taking
and stresses its purpose in terms of understanding as opposed to agreement- just as
mediators do when they talk about their interest clarification expectations. Indications of
this kind of disposition are also found in the capacity claims of others who make positive
interest claims (these are Lisa, Alan, Julie and Evelyn).132 Yet, my analysis suggests that
generalized interest clarification claims are made at most by 15-20% of participants.
Furthermore, participants convey some ambivalence about the scope of their interest
clarification claims. This exchange between myself and Jeremy’s is illustrative:
For more details about the educative claims of individual participants and how the outcomes in the different
categories relate to each other, see Chapter 6.
132
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Heather: Do you think that your experience with the mediation has effected at
all the way you approach any of those other situations in your life… and aside
from possibly using the mediation service, in another context, do you think
there’s any other way that it may have changed your approach at all?
Jeremy: That’s hard, it’s a tough one. Maybe in terms of just kind of trying to see
things from different sides a little more, like that’s all I, I think that’s always a
good thing. …
H: Is that your sense that you already did that pretty well, or do you feel like
there’s actually been a change in your way of approaching things? …
Jeremy: … I don’t know, that’s a tough one, it really is, I’m not sure, to tell you
the truth, I’m not sure. You know I’d like to think well maybe now I’ll
understand a bit more of what they’re going through maybe, a little more you
know sympathetic to their plight but I mean by the same token maybe I’m not, I
don’t know.
Two things are important to highlight about Jeremy’s statements above. First, he is careful
not to overstate the effect of mediation on his general disposition towards perspective taking.
Second, though he begins by suggesting that a transferable effect has occurred, he concludes
by suggesting that gaining a better understanding of the perspectives of his conflict partners
in mediation may not even have much effect on his future interactions with them.
Comments like these, along with the scarcity of interest clarification claims framed in
transferable terms, suggest that when interest clarification does occur in mediation it will
most likely remain limited to the relational context.
There is a second limitation to the positive interest clarification claims of participants.
Not only do they suggest that interest clarification is quite modest in its reach, but some also
highlight the non-reciprocal nature of interest clarification. Though it is typically described
by practitioners as a balanced process where parties are able to “hear each other” and “reach
mutual understanding”,133 there are cases where participants describe the clarification process
Though they are few, there are exceptions to this. For example see Paul’s comment below which
acknowledges the potential for non-reciprocal interest clarification.
“Yeah it’s certainly possible that it can have negative impacts, if you re-traumatize people. ...We
just made this person sort of open themselves up and make themselves vulnerable and do a lot
of hard work, bearing their souls so to speak, and they didn’t really accomplish anything. The
other person seems just as uninterested or just as cold or just as unconnected as they were before.
That’s not good.” (Paul, CDR Staff)
133
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as unbalanced and/or that comparisons between different narratives of the same case
suggest an asymmetry.134 For example, Beth feels that she came to understand the
perspective of her brother, but her narrative is dominated by expressions of disappointment
and frustration that she did not feel understood by him.
Probably the most difficult though was the feeling that I didn’t feel that he was
hearing me, which I’d thought was what mediation was all about. ... And you
know it’s hard for me to say whether the process it failed or not, we came to a
resolution, we both signed the documents. ... So I mean that is a resolution. But
it wasn’t a happy one. And I don’t think my brother felt happy either. Because
we went through a difficult process for both of us. (Beth)
This feeling of disappointment, attributed to the occurrence of non-reciprocal interest
clarification, dominates Beth’s overall assessment of the mediation experience. It is perhaps
not surprising, given her experience, that Beth does not report a greater disposition to
consider the perspectives of others in future interactions.
In another instance, Victor describes learning important information about Sylvia’s
perspective, saying that it helped him to identify boundaries for interacting with her in the
future. He even describes a more generalized learning about the importance of listening for
the way others see a problem instead of viewing it only from one’s own perspective and
suggests that this insight has improved his interactions with others, such as his wife.
Removed from their context, Victor’s interest clarification claims appear to exemplify an
optimal educative outcome. Yet Victor’s insight in the mediation surrounds matters that
suggest quite modest levels of understanding of Sylvia’s perspective.
And the other thing I learn is that she say I was harassing her, stalking her and
all those things. ... it seems that that was her problem so that’s good too because
I never thought it would be, so that’s why I try not to even look at her. After
knowing the fact that’s what she thinks. (Victor)

134 It was not possible to interview both parties in all cases so these comparisons were not always possible. In
cases where only one party was interviewed, claims must be interpreted carefully and with caution in order to
account for this possible imbalance.
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Not surprisingly, given the nature of her concerns, Sylvia does not report similar gains in
terms of her understanding of Victor. She continues to be quite baffled about Victor’s
interests, and assumes mental illness as a way to explain his actions.135 Other than concluding
that he set out to harass her in order to get her to pay for a new fence between their
properties, she claims to have learned nothing about his perspective of the situation. While
cases like Victor and Sylvia’s provide some additional illustrations of modest interest
clarification claims,136 they also illustrate that these changes are more limited and sometimes
less reciprocal than practitioner expectations suggest. Sylvia’s narrative also sheds light on
the category of “divisive understanding” interest clarification claims shown in the center
column of Table 4.1, to which I turn next.
4.3.2

Divisive Understanding Claims
Divisive understanding interest clarification claims are made by 23% of participants

and suggest that participants develop wholly negative understandings of the motives or
perspectives of their conflict partners in the mediation. While participants often begin the
mediation process with an uncharitable view of their conflict partner, I reserve this category
for those who report learning new information during the mediation that generates or
solidifies their negative opinion of the other. I have already noted how Sylvia comes to
understand Victor as manipulative, and attributes this new understanding to the mediation
process. In other examples, Alfred comes to see Beverly as a woman scorned, and she
attributes his actions to a bruised ego, both suspecting that the other’s unreciprocated
romantic interest is at the heart of their conflict. And Lynn claims to have learned of her
135

Sylvia is a medical doctor and comments: “I didn’t examine him obviously but I think he’s mentally off. I
think he has a mental disease, he’s not normal.”
136 As I will discuss in the next chapter, though Victor and Sylvia do not reach “mutual understanding” in terms
that are likely to be celebrated by mediation practitioners or democratic theorists, they do adopt habits of
avoidance that ensure peaceful coexistence as a result of the insights they gain from mediation. I will argue that
this too is a form of good citizenship, though not the kind normally invoked by educative claims.
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interlocutor’s vindictiveness throughout the conflict, an insight she claims not to have had
before and attributes to comments made during their mediation.
In each instance, the insights gleaned during mediation help participants to
understand the motivations and perspectives of the other party, but they do so in a way that
lowers their opinions of the other and makes perceived or real differences more salient.
Participatory theorists have maintained that interest clarification can serve to increase
conflict in productive ways, by heightening participants’ awareness of differences between
themselves and making them better advocates for their own interests. But their focus has
been on political and social roots of conflict, not the psychological or emotional realm that
mediation practitioners emphasize. When the understandings participants glean from their
exchange in mediation direct them to attribute unsympathetic motivations, emotions, or
perspectives to their interlocutors, the lasting educative results that mediation practitioners
expect are not reached. That is to say, as we might expect, those participants who report
these sorts of negative insights about their interlocutors, do not attribute increased selfreflection or perspective taking to their mediation experience as psycho-emotive interest
clarification expectations suggest. And while they serve to highlight conflicting interests,
divisive understanding claims do not serve to motivate community organizing, political
mobilization, or even self-advocacy as socio-political interest clarification expectations
suggest.
For these reasons, I do not group “divisive understanding” claims with “self/other
understanding” claims as examples of positive interest clarification. It is clear that they do
not match the educative expectations of practitioners and theorists. It is also clear from these
claims however, that participants have learned something from their mediation experience.
For this reason, they can hardly be categorized in the “neutral” category as evidence that
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nothing changes as a result of mediation. And yet, I also do not consider these claims to
provide evidence that mediation has a negative effect on participants. Particularly given the
emphasis recent deliberative theorists have placed on the value of clarifying conflicting
interests, it is important to consider that these outcomes may in fact be valuable. As the
comments from Victor and Sylvia help to illustrate, the perceived differences and antipathy
that mediation helps to generate in these cases may in fact be warranted. Embracing them as
such requires a reconceptualization of deliberation’s educative effects. I will turn to this task
in greater depth in Chapters 5 and 6. At this stage the normative significance of mediation’s
“divisive understanding” effects may remain unclear, but they provide clear reason to
question the interest clarification expectations of practitioners and theorists.
4.3.3

Misunderstanding Claims

This is further evidenced by those participants (32%) who report persistent
misunderstanding following the mediation, suggesting that the mediation experience has not
produced interest clarification. In about half of these cases, misunderstandings seem to
persist between parties in part because they do not approach the mediation process with the
goal of understanding in mind.
I felt like I needed to be reasonable about what I thought was achievable. My
goal was to get all of the money stuff worked out in as safe a way as possible.
And so it was, it could have been safer but it wasn’t as unsafe as you know me
like sitting in the living room. (Anne)
Like Anne, these participants seek to negotiate a basic distributive or logistical problem with
no intention of delving deeper into motives, emotions, or perspectives. They engage in the
mediation process not because it offers the chance to cultivate mutual understanding but
quite the opposite, because the formality of the process and the presence of outsiders is
expected to ensure that discussions do not stray below the surface. The desire to keep
discussion focused in this way is justified in terms of emotional and sometimes physical
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safety, something the mediators help reinforce by their very presence in the view of some
participants.
In one case, this expectation is taken further, to the point that Martha expects the
mediators to advocate for her perspective. According to her, the mediators helped her
communicate to the Pastor of the church next door, whose members are mostly recent
immigrants, the cultural understanding of good neighborly behavior that applies in Canada.
I had the satisfaction that they had been told137 what they can and cannot do, or
the minimum of what they should do as good citizens, I had that satisfaction.
(Martha)
And because she experienced the mediation process in this way, it is not surprising that she
did not see it as an occasion to clarify her own or other’s interests.
Heather: Was there anything that you found out from the meeting that changed
your view at all about what was causing the conflict?
Martha: No, no, no. That was plain and clear to me right from the beginning...
that they were harassing me.
Though an extreme example, Martha’s narrative illustrates how the mediation process can
fail to clarify interests at times because parties have more limited or simply different
expectations from the process. As noted previously in Chapter 3, the orientations and
expectations of the participants are one of the reasons why educative goals often go unmet.
On the other hand, even those participants who are quite committed to clarifying
psycho-emotive interests may still have difficulty reaching this goal. Norm describes feeling
disappointment, and even lasting resentment, towards his siblings following the mediation.
He feels that misunderstandings persist between them because he was not able to express his
perspective and emotions to them during the mediation. He suggests that the time and

Elsewhere in her narrative, Martha makes explicit that “they were told” not by her, but by the mediators. If
this in fact occurred, it would be a clear violation of principles of neutrality and party self-determination that
mediators are expected to adhere to.
137
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commitment that would have been necessary for him to express his true feelings in a
productive space were not available in the mediation process.
I would say that [at the] final meeting, for myself, that the emotional intensity
and my negative feelings kind of really came to the surface and I was just sort of
stuck to deal with them on my own. Which is, this is not necessarily a criticism
of the process, I mean it was stressed at the beginning that you know there’s a
strong distinction to be made between mediation and therapy. Well, I’d say the
line can get very thin and even, well in terms of what comes, the line can get thin
and even dissolve. (Norm).
For Norm, the therapeutic tone of mediation and the emphasis placed on psycho-emotive
interest clarification became a false promise in a process that was too brief and problemoriented. Though he does not direct it toward the mediators or the CDR, Norm reports a
lasting sense of bitterness towards his siblings, who were not open to hearing from him in
the process.
Cases like these further underscore the difficulties posed to achieving reciprocal
interest clarification in ways that have desirable lasting effects on participants’ dispositions.
They indicate, contrary to what theorists and practitioners ordinarily seem to suppose, that
face-to-face talk is often simply not enough for participants to clarify their interests for each
other. Furthermore, in cases where misunderstandings persist in this way, participants are
not likely disposed to attend more carefully to the perspectives of others in the future.
Indeed, those describing disappointment do not attribute such effects to their mediation
experience.
4.4.4

Coercion Claims
As I noted in Chapter 3, Loretta’s narrative stands out as unambiguously negative

when compared to the positive or mixed accounts from mediation participants. Not
surprisingly, this has an effect on her interest clarification claims and hers is the only
narrative containing what I call “coercion” interest clarification claims. This is in large part
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because she felt pressured, by her conflict partner and the mediators, to enter into an
agreement contrary to her interests. For Loretta, the mediation process was not an open
discursive environment for sharing and gaining information about interests in order to make
better collective decisions. This is the basic instrumental assumption upon which educative
assumptions are built. If instead, as Loretta’s account suggests, the process becomes one
where the interests of one party dominate heavily at the expense of another’s, the
mechanisms expected to produce better citizens are seriously compromised.
This was the case for Loretta, who found the process to be one where she was made
a villain and shamed into an agreement she considered unfair.
They [the mediators] made me feel the bad one. I am a loser, I am a thief, I feel
like I was a thief. You know, they made me feel bad. The bad person, you are
the bad one because you owe money to him. ... Whenever mediation is I hate
them, because it hurts me, it hurts me. (Loretta)
The potential for this kind of social pressure and power imbalance is often invoked by
skeptics of deliberation’s normative appeal. Loretta’s case is notable because of the warning
it signals that such fears are certainly warranted, particularly when mediators are perceived as
advocates for one party against the other. Her case is also notable because it is unique among
those I encountered. While I have argued that interest clarification goals are often frustrated,
this is not usually because of outright coercion and disregard for a person’s interests as in
Loretta’s experience. Interest clarification is more often limited due to the psychological and
emotional sources of conflict that are not easily clarified through face-to-face talk.
4.4

CONCLUSION
To sum up, my analysis of interest clarification expectations and claims at the

Toronto CDRs has revealed several insights. To begin, it focuses attention on the
importance of emotional and psychological interests to collective decision making processes,
and in particular to their educative potential. This emphasis however, may come at the
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expense of alternate approaches to interest clarification intended to emphasize the social and
political roots of interpersonal conflicts. Though a group mobilization approach is expressed
by a handful of mediation practitioners, and though some cases exhibit the potential to be
addressed through community organizing, mediation does not appear to clarify collective
interests in a way that catalyzes such activity. This provides some confirmation to those who
have criticized mediation for personalizing and depoliticizing conflict in ways that risk
reinforcing structural inequalities (Nader 1993; Hofrichter 1982). But by focusing their
interest clarification efforts and aspirations on the psycho-emotive aspects of interpersonal
conflict, mediation practitioners and participants highlight the importance of these kinds of
interests to deliberation and provide a setting where they can be explored in-depth.
Such a focus reveals the significant challenges to clarifying interests in ways that
generate mutual understanding and lasting dispositions of reflectiveness. Although a
significant proportion of participants make positive interest clarification claims, they are
usually articulated in non-transferable terms and sometimes underscore the non-reciprocal
nature of interest clarification. Quite often significant misunderstandings persist and
participants are not clearer about each other’s perspectives and motives. Other times
participants do not want deeper levels of mutual understanding but rather seek out
mediation as a process that can ensure discussions remain focused on instrumental matters
that can be resolved relatively easily. And sometimes they report a clarification process that
reinforces negative conceptions of their conflict partners’ emotional or psychological
motives in the conflict. Though such outcomes may be necessary, and as I discuss in the
next chapter, even desirable in certain cases, they are not likely to generate lasting effects on
participants’ disposition to be self-reflective and engage in perspective taking. Indeed, in the
cases where misunderstandings persist in these ways, participants make no such interest
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clarification claims. As a result, efforts to build the reflective citizen through the community
mediation process often come up short.

155
Pincock-Chapter 5

Chapter 5
Community Mediation & Relationships
Trying to Build the Friendly Citizen
5.1

INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, I focus on relationships, the last of three categories for conceptualizing

deliberation’s educative effects that I proposed in Chapter 2. As I suggested there,
relationship expectations concern the effect of deliberation on the dynamics of interaction
between deliberative participants, and on members of the relevant political community more
widely. Participatory theorists like Barber have argued that deliberative experiences establish
and strengthen civic bonds between participants by generating and reinforcing feelings of
empathy and mutual respect (Barber 2004). Deliberative theorists similarly maintain that
deliberation has the potential to generate “more equal, caring and cooperative social
relations” (Rosenberg 2007a). Mediation theorists and practitioners have also focused on
the potential for community mediation to change the relationships between participants and
to influence the social relations of communities more broadly. Early articulations of the
community mediation model and more recent representations of “transformative”
approaches both stress the potential for mediation to generate understanding and respect
between participants in ways that result in lasting changes to their relationships with each
other and others in their community (Shonholtz 1993; Bush and Folger 2005). My review of
the empirical literature suggests that though the relationships category encompasses some of
the weightiest normative claims about participatory deliberative processes, it occupies the
least attention in empirical investigations of deliberation’s educative effects.
In this chapter, I begin to address this by focusing explicitly on the category of
relationships, first, as it is articulated by practitioners at the Toronto CDRs, and second, as it
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is described by mediation participants following their mediation experience. I find that
practitioners at the Toronto CDRs describe ideal relationship outcomes in terms that evoke
notions of friendship and friendliness. The ideal of friendliness is not monolithic however;
it spans from “below the surface” feelings of genuine care and authentic attachment
(authentic friendliness) to “above the surface” behaviors of tolerance and courtesy
(courteous friendliness). Across this spectrum, practitioners envision relationship changes to
have wider transferable effects on the social relations within the political community as a
whole. Finally, practitioners highlight their own direct role in generating friendlier relations
between citizens by both modeling care and courtesy in their interactions with participants.
I find participant accounts of relationship outcomes do sometimes map onto the
spectrum of ideals articulated by Toronto CDR practitioners in both intimate and
neighborhood contexts. In these instances, participants describe changes in their patterns of
interaction that emphasize increased friendliness. More often however, participants describe
their post mediation relationships in terms of avoidance. Sometimes avoidance is the result
of physical relocation and the total severing of communication; other times participants
describe patterns of avoidance maintained within contexts of ongoing proximity and
interaction. This avoidance is often quite blatant and departs from even the most modest
ideals described by mediators. For example, participants engaged in avoidant relationships,
particularly in the neighborhood cases, sometimes express a desire and preference to eschew
norms of common courtesy such as greetings and pleasantries. Furthermore, there are some
instances of avoidance where participants express a genuine appreciation for their new
patterns of interaction suggesting that the failure to achieve friendlier relations is not
necessarily a failure to build desirable relationships. As I will elaborate below and in the next
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chapter, these findings not only suggest that mediation usually falls short of its relationship
ideals, but also that these ideals themselves warrant re-examination and reformulation.
5.2

MEDIATOR RELATIONSHIP EXPECTATIONS
Mediation practitioners place considerable emphasis on relationships when discussing

their expectations and aspirations about the lasting effects of the process. Statements about
relational changes are frequent but many times quite broad and underspecified. For example,
when asked what question she would have for participants if she had the chance to do long
term follow up, Leila responds in the following way:
I want to know if that mediation has affected them long term, and [if] it has
affected them in relating to others ... And I want to know how that changed
them. Because ultimately I think conflict resolution is about changing people in
their relationship, in their behavior, and their thoughts. (Leila, CDR Volunteer)
While some describe relationship changes as the fulfillment of individual efficacy and
interest expectations described in previous chapters, others focus on relationships as a more
plausible kind of change.
I think in the majority of the cases we’re transforming that particular
relationship. At least that’s what I’ve seen, that particular relationship will not be
the same as it was before when they had the conflict, so that’s change we’ve
affected. Have we changed the individual people so that they are now much
better conflict resolution specialists than they were before? No, I don’t think
that’s necessarily the case. (Sophie, CDR Volunteer)
Though she is more guarded about other categories of educative effects, Sophie is confident
that mediation will change relationships between parties. Such comments underscore the
centrality of ‘relationship change’ to the goals of community mediation practitioners, but
they do not provide much detail about the specific changes practitioners have in mind or
how they might be observed.
When practitioners do discuss relationship changes in observable terms, their focus is
usually on body language cues that they are able to observe during the mediation itself such
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as eye contact, handshakes, and hugging. In addition to these physical cues, practitioners
reference indicators like the shift from not speaking to speaking, leaving the mediation
together, and even making social plans towards the end of the mediation in their
descriptions of relationship change. Those who provide more detail stress that ideal
relationship outcomes are characterized by respect and trust. Describing a neighborhood
conflict he once mediated that dealt with sexism and homophobia, Nikola says:
It boils down usually to disrespect, or found respect again, for each other. And
all these issues, and there was so many of them, became irrelevant because they
were talking to each other again and that was the biggest actually problem,
because they were not communicating. My reward in that case was obviously
that people talked to each other and then actually invited each other to dinner
parties after that and so on after not talking to each other for a year. (Nikola,
CDR Volunteer)
Describing the way these relational changes produce more deeply rooted agreements, Paul
highlights similar themes.
The objective is to change the way people relate to each other so ... that that deal
is something they do because of their own relationship, their own capacity, their
own trust of each other, because they now respect each other, because they now
tolerate each other’s differences or because they now care about each other in a
different way. (Paul, CDR Staff)
This emphasis on social interaction, respect, and trust suggests that practitioners envision
friendliness as the ideal relational outcome. They emphasize its outward display (handshakes,
eye contact, hugging) and its internal sentiments (respect, trust, care) in their accounts.
Paul’s statement also identifies two modes in which citizens may adopt “friendly
relations” after mediation. Though he does not make an explicit distinction between them,
by juxtaposing the words tolerance and care, he suggests two different registers at which
ideal relationships operate, each signalling different degrees of attachment. In general,
practitioners’ accounts of relationship change follow this pattern by referencing two kinds of
“friendliness”. I describe these as “authentic” and “courteous” friendliness. Authentic
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friendliness expectations are most ambitious and stress mediation’s therapeutic potential.
Not surprisingly, practitioners are more likely to stress this sort of change in family and
intimate contexts where pre-existing relationships have tended to be more intense and long
standing. For example, referencing a mediation involving adult siblings, Richard describes
the sort of event that is expected to generate authentic friendliness:
We had breakthroughs in communication between the siblings that, I mean they
said things to each other that they hadn’t said in fifteen or twenty years, so I
think it was like a revelation to them. (Richard, CDR Volunteer)
Regardless of the context however, authentic friendliness expectations concern internal
feelings and not simply outward behavior. Again, Paul articulates this aspiration with clarity:
There’s no law that says you have to like people. You can’t make laws that say
you must respect your neighbor. You can only make laws about people’s
behavior but not what goes on in their heads. But community mediation is
about what goes on in people’s heads. And it says to people, that’s your
responsibility, you’re the only one frankly who ultimately has responsibility for
what goes on in your head or your heart or your soul. (Paul, CDR Staff)
Here practitioners describe a form of friendliness between parties that is grounded in
genuine feelings of affection, respect, and openness.
Practitioners also acknowledge however, that this kind of relationship change will
not always be possible or long lasting. Jim underscores the fragility of the shifts that occur in
mediation and speculates that many times they do not last.
I think what we give them is at least a tenuous new way of seeing the other
person which can fall apart fairly quickly if anything further happens. (Jim, CDR
Volunteer)
In another example, Maureen characterizes authentic friendliness as a theoretical ideal but
sees a more surface level form of friendliness as the attainable ideal:
I suppose in the ideal, everybody would understand each other’s side so well and
will shed whatever tears they want that they would be totally loving and totally
restored. I have not seen that very much. For me that remains kind of a
theoretical ideal maybe. In the real world the best I have seen is... where they
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walk away, out the door together without real antagonism. (Maureen, CDR
Volunteer)
Practitioners describe how efforts to process the emotional content of the conflict in order
to build trust and respect at times frustrate participants, and report that they sometimes
abandon such goals in favor of quick settlement of substantive matters. But even when they
abandon authentic friendliness, they still argue that a less dramatic form of relationship
change can result from mediation. Echoing Maureen, Jim further notes that this less
ambitious form of relationship change is especially appropriate in the context of neighbor
conflicts:
I mean very few of them if you ask them, would you like to have a really good
relationship with your neighbor, they would probably say I don’t care, I just
don’t want that person’s dog to be disturbing me or, whatever, you know the
issue is. So, I think if there’s any reduction in tension that’s an improvement.
(Jim, CDR Volunteer)
I call these “courteous friendliness” relationship expectations because they highlight the
establishment or restoration of common courtesy.138 When practitioners describe
“courteous friendliness” as an ideal, they acknowledge that citizens may not have come to
like each other through mediation but suggest that “at least they know where they stand and
they don’t have to be rude to each other” (Melissa, CDR Volunteer) and that “at least they’ll
be civil to each other” (Andrea, CDR Volunteer).139

138 I am drawing here on Keith J. Bybee’s account of common courtesy, which stresses its inherent hypocrisy
(Bybee 2010). On this view, courtesy relies on “an insistence that individuals conform to an artificial code of
decent behavior whether or not they actually like one another” and this hypocrisy makes “social peace and
smooth interaction possible” (56). Courtesy does not require genuine feelings of care or concern for fellow
citizens because “manners are primarily an activity of outward display” (61). Therefore when I suggest that
mediation practitioners idealize friendly relations, I mean that they envision a range of friendliness outcomes
spanning from “true” friendship, grounded in feelings of respect and trust, to “false” friendships (37) that are
based on courteous behavior.
139 It is worth noting that not all uses of the term “civil” or “civility” align with the definition of courtesy I have
outlined in the previous footnote. According to Bybee “civility typically refers to the bare minimum of good
manners, suggesting little more than the avoidance of overt rudeness” and courtesy is a form of good manners
that is “more attentive than civility” (39). Andrea and Melissa’s comments appear to appeal to exactly that
understanding of civility. In contrast however, several contemporary treatments of civility suggest it has its
own moral content and equate it with honesty, decency, virtue and goodness (see for example: Forni 2003;
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Beyond basic politeness, practitioners also stress behavioral changes that may at first
seem quite mundane, pointing to the important influence they can have on ongoing
relationships. For example, Arnold describes a case he mediated as a volunteer where one
party agreed to move her piano to another part of her apartment and practice at different
times in order to disturb her neighbor less. Such an example illustrates what Kevin, a CDR
Volunteer, means when he argues “the disputants don’t want necessarily to have to change
their relationship in order to get the issue solved, which is not to say that in mediation by
doing a simple transactive mediation they don’t also change their relationship.” Here Kevin
emphasizes the potential of more surface level shifts in behavior to improve long term
relationships in significant ways even when participants are disinterested in processing the
conflict at a deeper emotional level.
Across the spectrum of relationship expectations that practitioners express, from
authentic to courteous friendliness, they emphasize the transferable benefits to the wider
political community. In comments already referenced above about an instance of positive
relationship change, Nikola goes on to describe the benefits for all citizens in the political
community, including himself:
My reward in that case was obviously that people talked to each other and then
actually invited each other to dinner parties after that and so on after not talking
to each other for a year. But for me, maybe because I’m a city planner, the
reward was that I created, I put a piece of my small puzzle in creating Toronto a
very liveable, tolerant, understanding city. By doing that, I mean creating a better

Carter 1998; Shils 1997; Buss 1999). See also President Obama’s January 13, 2011 address honoring the victims
of the Tucson Arizona shootings where he calls for a new era of civility along these exact lines
(http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/13/us/politics/13obama-text.html). This understanding of civility
resonates with the mission of CDR practitioners as well and this is evident in correspondence on the National
Association for Community Mediation listserv on the day following the President’s address. In those postings
CDR senior staff, including one from a Toronto CDR included in this study, viewed Obama’s speech as a call
to their profession to continue its work and realize its potential to generate relationships of civility, understood
in this way, in their communities (emails on file with the author). The elasticity of the term civility and the
varied appeals mediators make to it lend support to my suggestion that their relationship ideals are best
conceptualized as a spectrum ranging from authentic to courteous friendliness.
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place to live- and to be very selfish- for me, but for the others [too]. (Nikola,
CDR Volunteer)
Paul also stresses that relationship changes can serve to strengthen civic bonds between
citizens and counter forces that are believed to hamper communal attachments in
contemporary times. As a result of mediation, he hopes:
…that people are happier. That they don’t feel so threatened, that they don’t feel
so alienated and alone, I mean I think community mediation goes some way
toward connecting people and creating social relationships in a world, a society,
frankly that, many things run in the opposite direction, alienate us from each
other, isolate us from each other. (Paul, CDR Staff)
As in his relationship expectations cited above, Paul’s statement again seems to operate at
two levels, by putting emphasis on the absence of threat and alienation on the one hand, and
the presence of social connection on the other. This suggests that at both ends of the
friendliness spectrum that I highlighted above (authentic vs. courteous), practitioners see
potential for transfer of the educative effects beyond the mediated relationship. As
Courtney’s comment illustrates, they believe that even small incremental changes have
important and broad reaching consequences:
I think if little bit by little bit we can build that kind of neighborly relationship in
our own backyard, those are the kinds of bonds that hold us together if some
big crisis occurs. (Courtney, CDR Volunteer)
Finally, practitioners note their capacity, as facilitators of democratic talk, to
contribute directly to improving the relationships among citizens in the political community.
This angle on relationship building has not been much explored by democratic theorists who
have tended to overlook the role of facilitators in participatory deliberative venues. But
mediators note two ways that they contribute to strengthening civic bonds between citizens.
First, they describe their role as “friendly strangers” who intervene in the lives of citizens in
ways that can have lasting effects on their ways of relating to others.
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If anything maybe it teaches them that there are nice people out there. ... It’s a
big city and you feel like you’re alone but there’s people there, if you can just
find the right place to go, who will listen. So I think that impresses them a lot.
(Andrea, CDR Volunteer)
My experience indicates that people, the disputants, come away feeling cared
about, that they appreciate just the attention that was paid, that they had a
chance to have their say, they see that we treat them carefully and attentively. I
think people are impressed with the care that we give and that we’re genuine and
that we listen. (Carly, CDR Volunteer)
In subsequent comments following this, Carly and other mediators in her focus group also
stress the importance of their status as volunteers. The fact that mediators volunteer their
time to assist others with conflicts is believed to make a lasting impression on participants
and possibly alter their feelings towards other citizens more generally. To return to the two
registers of “authentic” and “courteous” friendliness that I identified earlier, Carly’s
comments stress the capacity of mediators themselves to model feelings of care and generate
authentic friendliness between citizens.
Mediators also see themselves as capable of contributing directly to the improvement
of “courteous friendliness” by becoming enforcers of the boundaries of publically acceptable
behavior. Nikola tells the story of a case where an elderly couple were in mediation to
discuss conflicts in their marriage. When one participant used an anti-Semitic slur to refer to
their long time spouse, he and his co-mediator decided they would not continue with the
mediation. In doing so, he believes they sent a strong message to the participants that would
change their future public behavior.
I mean I know that we didn’t change their, whatever, their thinking about certain
issues, I mean how can we in three hours or in an hour but I know that we
changed, I’m convinced that we changed the way they address this in the public.
(Nikola, CDR Volunteer)
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Therefore, as Carly and Nikola’s comments illustrate, mediators consider it their job to
facilitate relationship changes between participants and also to be role models of both
courtesy and care in citizen relations.
To sum up, mediator relationship expectations take priority in their discussions
about the educative effects of the mediation process on participants. To the extent that they
specify what they envision by “building relationships”, they present friendliness as the ideal.
They describe relationship changes that range from the generation of deep feelings of care
and attachment (authentic friendliness) to more surface level changes establishing common
courtesy (courteous friendliness). They maintain that such changes have transferable
benefits on the wider political community, by strengthening civic bonds between parties and
by changing the way participants relate to others more generally. Finally, mediators maintain
that they play a direct role in generating friendly relations between citizens across the
continuum by modeling both care and courtesy in their own interactions with mediation
participants.
5.3

PARTICIPANT RELATIONSHIP CLAIMS
As I have indicated in earlier chapters, participants’ narratives about their mediation

experience and its lasting effects are dominated by discussion of their relationships with their
conflict partners. In my analysis of the efficacy and interests categories this has provided
cause for skepticism about the transferability of mediation’s educative effects to
circumstances outside the mediated relationship. This suggests, just as Sophie speculates in
the excerpt above, that mediation’s most important educative effects will be found in the
relationship category. But while participant narratives are generally contained to discussion
of the mediated relationship, they do not always describe changes that map onto the
friendliness expectations of practitioners. Table 5.1 summarizes the relationship outcomes
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described by participants. Any assessment of relationship outcomes must take into
consideration that participants come to mediation with different types of relationships to
begin with. To acknowledge the important differences across cases, I separate participants
into two categories according to the relational context of their mediation. Those in the
“intimates” category include family and romantic relationships,140 while those in the
“neighbors” category include conflict partners that associate as a result of residential
proximity.141 The table shows that a similar pattern of outcomes occurs in cases from these
distinct relational contexts.
Table 5.1: Participant Relationship Claims142

Intimates (13)
Neighbors (18)
Total (31)

Positive (29%)
Authentic Friendliness
5 (16%)
4 (13%)
9 (29%)

? (75%)
Courteous Avoidance
Blatant Avoidance
4 (13%)
5 (16%)
3 (10%)
11 (35%)
7 (23%)
16 (52%)

My analysis of the relationship claims in participant narratives suggests that some
post mediation relationships fit the friendliness ideals of practitioners. By coding these
relationship claims as “friendliness” claims, I do not mean to proclaim that participants in all
of these cases would describe themselves as friends. But I nevertheless find references to
140 One exception to this is the case of Jaime and Anne who were close friends that lived together. Though they
did not characterize their relationship in romantic or familial terms, their circumstances seem to fit best in the
intimate category. See Table 2.4 in Appendix I for more details.
141 One exception to this is Loretta, who was in conflict with a former business partner. Even so, Loretta’s
circumstances best approximate the “neighbor” category. See Table 2.4 in Appendix I for more details.
142
Participant narratives rarely include multiple competing relationship claims suggesting that these categories
are mutually exclusive. My analysis found consistency within participant narratives from cases involving two
people (one relationship). Narratives involving more than two people that still fit easily in to a two-party
framework (for example involving two married couples) also had consistent relationship claims applying to
“the other side” even when that involved more than one person (multiple relationships). In the multiparty
cases (involving families), the potential for distinct relationship claims within a single participant narrative is
higher because participants negotiate several relationships during the mediation. In these multiparty cases I did
not prompt participants to specify the nature of ongoing relations with each of the multiple conflict partners
present and therefore code only the relationship descriptions that are offered. In some cases participants
provide one description generalizing about their relationship with all family members- these narratives were
counted once in one of the two categories. In one case, Evelyn describes her relationship with several siblings
as friendlier following mediation and relations with another as avoidant. I therefore counted both of these
claims, once in each category, to reflect this mixed outcome. As a result the total in the “intimates” row of
Table 5.1 exceeds the sample size by one. Percentages are calculated based on the total sample size of 31.
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relationship change resulting from mediation that, just as practitioners hope, invoke genuine
positive affect. I therefore call these “authentic friendliness” claims and find them in 29% of
participant narratives. While this suggests that relationship expectations are indeed realized
some of the time, there is little evidence that these relationship changes transfer beyond the
particulars of the specific mediated conflict, and this limits their educative potential
considerably.
Furthermore, in the remaining cases I find relationships claims that stress the theme
of avoidance. According to my analysis, these avoidance claims take two distinct forms.
The first, which I call “courteous avoidance” claims, share features with the more limited
ideal of “courteous friendliness” that practitioners describe, and are present in 23% of
participant narratives. These relationships claims invoke forms of courteous interaction that
are superficial yet peaceful. But the theme of avoidance dominates these descriptions,
suggesting that these relationship changes are much more reliant on minimizing interaction
than they are on initiating or re-establishing courteous interaction between conflict partners.
Practitioners do not highlight avoidance in their accounts of “courteous friendliness”, and its
prominence suggests that these relationship outcomes do not entirely match even their more
limited ideals. I label these as “courteous avoidance” claims to emphasize the prominence of
the avoidance theme.
The theme of avoidance takes an even more prominent place in the remaining 52%
of participant narratives. I call these “blatant avoidance” relationship claims. They range
from accounts of actual physical relocation and complete severing of ties, to instances of
intentionally limited interaction in contexts of continued involuntary proximity. These
relationship claims depart starkly from the relationship expectations of mediation
practitioners. I find however, that participants attribute these outcomes, at least in part, to
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their experience in mediation. Furthermore, in a subset of cases where blatant avoidance is
described, participants report they are pleased, relieved, and grateful for the outcome.
Therefore, while there is evidence to suggest that mediation plays a role in generating
relations of avoidance, and these outcomes run counter to participant relationship
expectations, their normative value is unclear. In Table 5.1, I indicate this with a “?” over the
courteous and blatant avoidance columns and explore their normative value further below.
In the sections that follow I elaborate on each relationship category in turn, beginning with
“authentic friendliness” relationship claims.
5.3.1

Authentic Friendliness Claims
Just as practitioners hope, there are instances where participants describe changes in

their relationship resulting from mediation towards “authentic friendliness” (29%). To be
sure, the significance and nature of authentic friendliness varies according to the context and
history of particular relationships, but all cases in this category reference changes in internal
feelings. In intimate contexts involving divorce and separation, they describe stable patterns
of cordial interaction and in some cases even a stop on the return trip to romantic
attachments.
We came out of there able to talk, we can talk. Um, and I'll try to help him when
I can. (Lisa)
We tried the date thing and you know it was a little awkward at first but then we
kind of got into it and then we started talking more, so, from before mediation
to now, yeah it’s a lot better. (Michelle)
In family contexts, it signals new stages in long standing relationships that are characterized
by greater comfort and affection than before. Both Evelyn and Christine’s comments
illustrate this kind of relationship change between them and their siblings.
Just seeing who they are as people and liking them. And liking them through the
process and admiring them through the process. I think was, and feeling closer
to them in the process. (Evelyn)
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I have felt more comfortable with him ever since. So that I think, like for me
personally that’s actually a very positive thing. ... That feels like that wouldn’t
necessarily have happened actually if not for that really difficult time in, within
the process. (Christine)
Overall, 38% of participants with intimate conflicts credit their mediation experience, at least
partially, for having generated a shift towards “authentic friendliness”.
In the neighborhood context, authentic friendliness is sometimes restored or
established as a result of mediation, but this is only described by 22% of those in mediation
with neighbors. Not surprisingly, in comparison to intimates, friendly relations between
neighbors are characterized by shorter histories and much more limited attachments. In one
case, Sara describes becoming friendly again with her neighbor after a conflict between them
resulted in police orders barring them from interacting. Since the mediation, she has agreed
to babysit for her neighbor on occasion and says: “We talk now. She’s a nice person.”
In two other instances where no prior relationship existed, participants characterize
their current relations as friendly. First, Jeffrey and Leslie explain that they now feel very
comfortable calling the adult sons of their mentally ill neighbor when problems arise. Leslie
explains how one of the sons extended this invitation at the end of the mediation “I mean
joking around he says, Jeffrey why don’t you invite us over for a beer.” Second, Jeremy
describes the difference that mediation made to his future relationship with the family whose
business borders on his home. Since the mediation, he had received an email from the owner
after an unusually noisy day at the business.
I don’t think that would have happened before the mediation, that was a direct
result of him meeting with me and with, with my neighbor down the street, and
him realizing like ok, I better at least send them, you know this is why it
happened, you know apologize and say sorry. That’s fine. That goes a long way.
(Jeremy)

169
Pincock-Chapter 5
As these examples illustrate however, the extent of the relationship change should
not be overstated. Especially in the case of neighbors, these changes appear to be quite rare
and suggest that only weak relationship effects follow from mediation. Furthermore there is
little indication that these subtle movements towards friendliness have transferable effects
on how participants interact with other citizens in general. In light of this, combined with
the fact that the CDRs reach a relatively small number of citizens, and affect the
relationships of even fewer in these ways, the effect of the community mediation process on
the broader political community appears to be quite limited.
5.3.2

Courteous Avoidance Claims
The relationship claims in 23% of participant narratives invoke forms of courteous

interaction that resonate with the more modest practitioner relationship expectations I called
“courteous friendliness” in Section 5.2. These claims describe relations as outwardly
peaceful despite underlying negative feelings. Beth characterizes her relationship with a
sibling following mediation along these lines.
I’d say there’s just been a level of tension, we try to keep things pretty superficial
when we get together. (Beth)
And Lorna explains how an exchange during the mediation helped to bring about this kind
of relationship between she and her neighbor.
So we actually started saying that it feels really bad living next door to somebody
that you can’t stand. Or well, I don’t know what the words we used, but, that it
wasn’t a really good feeling and [he] said he missed the friendliness and the
joking with me that use to go on before that, and I said that every time I pass his
door my stomach turns. … And actually after that …it’s not like it used to be,
it’s definitely not neighborly, but we’re trying to be civil. And, my stomach
doesn’t budge anymore, I used to go to the back door usually to the downstairs
just to avoid him. (Lorna)
Lorna characterizes her current relationships as “civil”, and situates it somewhere between
the friendliness that predated the conflict and the blatant avoidance that she employed at its
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peak. Yet it is avoidance more than friendliness that seems to dominate the post-mediation
relationships described here. Beth also suggests that she avoids discussing certain topics
with her brother since the mediation. I call these “courteous avoidance” relationship claims
to indicate the prominence of this theme.
As the examples from Lorna and Beth demonstrate, courteous avoidance claims are
present in both intimate and neighbor contexts. In both contexts participants describe how
following the mediation they opt to limit their interactions without completely severing ties.
I would say that over all it left me feeling less inclined to socialize with my
siblings, just to have distance and I guess it left me feeling uncertain about how I
was valued and so that lead me to turn my social attentions away you know to
other friendships. (Norm)
Rita describes her avoidance of her neighbor as subtle, suggesting that she aims to limit their
interaction as much as possible without overtly alienating him.
He will start a conversation with me and I don’t get involved. Like, you know he
says “what are you doing” or whatever and I’ll state the obvious and then that’s
it like I don’t try to continue the conversation. (Rita)
Although many courteous avoidance claims are tinged with disappointment, it is striking that
Rita describes it as a positive outcome of the mediation. About the mediation she says that
“what we’ve been able to accomplish was really good, I mean I wish it was more but you
know if he’s been doing that for ten, fifteen years, I don’t think I’m going to change it.” But
rather than wishing for more friendliness with her neighbor, Rita seems to be wanting more
avoidance. Elsewhere she says “I wish we could have a six foot fence all the way in the
middle and not have to deal with him.” She goes on to say “my wish would be, for him
never to talk to me but I know it’s not possible”. Rita does not consider a more pronounced
form of avoidance to be possible in her situation, believing that if she insists on it she will
offend her neighbor and generate more conflict between them. In other cases, however,
participants agree to establish relationships of blatant avoidance following mediation.
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5.3.3

Blatant Avoidance Claims
About half of the mediation participants I interviewed make “blatant avoidance”

relationship claims. In the most extreme form of blatant avoidance, participants have
literally moved away from neighborhoods where they encountered conflicts. This only
occurred in two cases, and the extent to which their moves are related to the conflict is
unclear.143 Although the motives and reasons for relocation are no doubt complex, some
interviews do suggest that moving is an option participants have seriously considered in
response to conflicts with neighbors. Regardless of the precise reasons for these moves,
their result is the total severing of relational ties with former conflict partners, an outcome
quite overlooked by practitioners in their discussions of relational expectations. Their
discussions of mediation’s desired relationship effects do not acknowledge that participants
may sometimes end a relationship entirely following mediation. Something resembling this
total separation also occurs in a handful of intimate relationships. In such cases, deliberate
efforts to put physical distance between each other are accompanied by an end to or long
breaks in communication, even when encounters continue to occur. Jaime describes how
this unfolds:
I see her, sometimes she doesn’t see me and I just like disappear into the other
direction ... We will never be friends again and that’s fine with me. (Jaime)
It is in cases like these where I find the only evidence that transferable effects beyond
the mediated relationship occur. These broader effects, however, do not take the form that
practitioners hope. For example, Catherine describes the general effect the experience had
on her:

143 In one case I was not able to interview the parties who moved but their neighbors believed they moved as a
result of the conflict. In the other case, the party who moved was concerned about his liability with respect to
the sale of his property should he go on record characterizing his move as a result of his conflict with the
neighbor.
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What I learned is that I have to not be so open and not be so courteous and
respectful...Like if I had a problem with someone now I wouldn’t engage at all, I
would simply go to the community liaison [police] officer. (Catherine)
And, as noted in Chapter 3, Loretta explains that the mediation experience lowered her
general feelings of social trust.
It affected me because I have bias of people, I cannot trust people the same ...
certain kind of people. When somebody’s offering me a service I doubt and I
think hum… I don’t sign anything, I don’t say anything, I am very careful what I
say, I’m very careful. I don’t use my feelings. I don’t think that I have to help
because it’s not worth it. (Loretta)
This suggests that in rare cases, contrary to the expectations of practitioners, community
mediation can teach citizens to adopt relational patterns that actually reduce their trust in and
respect for fellow citizens and encourage them to eschew courteous behavior, opting instead
to avoid direct interactions as much as possible.
Blatant avoidance is usually more limited in its scope and takes a less extreme form.
In the neighborhood context, participants continue to live alongside each other while
avoiding encounters that might lead to conflict. But their avoidance in these cases is not
subtle and often abandons the concern with maintaining appearances.
Sometimes, when we go in the elevator, if I’m coming up and he is there, I don’t
take it. Still. And if I’m downstairs and, and I want to go up and he is taking it, I
wait for the other one. Yeah, because I give him his distance. (Beverly)
What is striking about comments like these is that participants express what seems to be a
genuine preference for such arrangements, and a satisfaction with this sort of outcome
following the mediation.
I try to stick on to what we agreed on and probably leave it and it is probably
best to leave things that we have resolved the problems. It’s to leave it as it is
rather than take a chance trying to fix the relationship. ... I’m happy, and I think
she’s also happy ... we don’t look at each other, we don’t help each other, but we
are at peace. (Victor)
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Victor agreed not to communicate with his neighbor Sylvia in any form except mail, even
though they live next door to each other. He expresses a reluctance to work on changing
this arrangement because he considers it risky to try to achieve a friendlier relationship with
Sylvia and he does not want to “take a chance”. Not only is he unwilling to take that risk, he
expresses contentment with their current arrangement of mutual avoidance and characterizes
it as peaceful. Sylvia also reports sending a donation to the mediation centre as a gesture of
how grateful she is for the result and says “my accomplishment, I hope, is that he leaves me
alone. I don’t want him to exist in my life, and if this is the case you know, I’m happy.”
Similarly, when asked during her interview what she wanted from her conflict
partners Martha replies “just leaving me alone, ha ha, being good neighbors”, suggesting that
the two are equivalent in her view. Recalling one occasion prior to her mediation where she
encountered one of her neighbors she remembers saying to him:
I said I don’t think we need this talk, I said that’s one of the reasons that fence is
there so that you are on that side and I am on this side and to keep the peace,
good fences make for good neighbors. (Martha)
Martha is not the only one to invoke the proverb made famous by Robert Frost that
endorses avoidance between neighbors. The “good fences” attitude is shared by several
participants including Victor, Sylvia, and Rita quoted above.
Blatant avoidance claims are present in 61% of the neighbor cases, but even 38% of
participant narratives in cases involving intimates include blatant avoidance claims. For
example, Dalia describes this as a central feature of her relationship with her mother
following mediation:
Well there’s times where if she’s getting out of hand I’ll just hang up on her,
instead of yelling at her. Because she tells me she doesn’t want me to yell, and
I’m like fine, I will hang up on her. (Dalia)
She reports the benefits of this relationship:
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I only feel good now because I’m away from her. I don’t get to see her on a
regular basis, we don’t really talk, we do but we don’t. I don’t get to hear her
being, making me feel guilty for everything. I get to grow and be happy on my
own, what I want. (Dalia)
Therefore across a variety of contexts, relationships following mediation are regularly
characterized by patterns of avoidance. Though the extent and appreciation of avoidance is
more extreme in the neighborhood context, even in intimate contexts involving long
standing family relationships, this avoidance is common and even desirable according to
some participants.
These findings suggest that, contrary to the aims of practitioners, mediation rarely
contributes to building friendly relations between citizens. Though practitioners place
greater emphasis on the broader social importance of establishing friendly relations between
neighbors, it is in this context that participants tend to leave mediation with a greater
determination to avoid each other. Furthermore their patterns of avoidance appear to be
sustained not by trust and respect as “authentic friendliness” expectations practitioners
highlight, but by mistrust and apprehension. It may not be surprising that in cases of
extreme avoidance characterized by physical relocation participants have high levels of
mistrust towards each other. In fact, in two such cases participants expressed concerns to me
about the confidentiality of their interview and the possibility that their comments could be
used against them by their conflict partners. As both noted to me, such concerns are
concrete indicators of the lasting mistrust that can result following mediation, and I have
already noted the few instances where this lasting mistrust appears to be more generalized.
What is more notable however, is that in cases where citizens remain in physical
proximity mistrust is a salient feature of their ongoing relations. For example, Sylvia
describes her feelings of mistrust towards Victor and the sense of threat they produce for
her.
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I don’t trust him, because as I say he’s mentally off.144 He’s not normal. And
what do I know what’s going on in his brain? It could switch and who knows.
(Sylvia)
She explains that these feelings prompted her to put a lock on her backyard gate and
motivated her to practice blatant avoidance. Furthermore, even instances of courteous
avoidance appear to be sustained by feelings of mistrust and threat. In strikingly similar
comments to Sylvia,145 Rita talks about her feelings following mediation with her neighbor.
I don’t know how long it will last but it certainly has given me a freedom of not
feeling so fearful every day. I mean I’m still always on guard, I never know what
to expect but at least with what we’ve done in the mediation, you know it’s been
a (sigh) I guess a better feeling for me. (Rita)
Rita’s comments indicate that she considers her current relations with her neighbor to be
improved but quite tenuous. This suggests that rather than restore or establish feelings of
trust and respect needed to sustain friendly relations, most of the time following mediation
feelings of mistrust and threat operate in ways that sustain patterns of avoidance, sometimes
courteous and sometimes blatant, between citizens.
In Table 5.1, I place a “?” above the avoidance outcomes to indicate uncertainty
about their implications for the educative effects of mediation. Practitioner expectations
suggest these outcomes should be viewed as negative, and yet, several participants welcome
them. But before exploring further the normative merits of avoidance as a relational
outcome, its relationship to the mediation experience needs further elaboration. Particularly
The presence of mental illness is certainly a factor which complicates our conception of ideal relations
between democratic citizens. It is beyond the scope of the present project to explore in more detail the
standards that might apply to relations involving mental illness. For now I wish simply to note that a) although
accusations of mental illness are a regular feature of these conflicts they are not necessarily reliable indicators of
any person’s actual mental health, and b) that my field work suggests mental illness may be prevalent enough
amongst everyday citizen conflicts that we cannot so easily bracket it as an exceptional case not relevant to our
normative ideals.
145 A reoccurring pattern across the mediation cases I heard about involve single women feeling harassed,
bullied and even targeted by their male neighbors. In addition I encountered cases where parties felt similarly
targeted because of their sexual orientation and/or gender identity. These cases suggest that gender dynamics
have strong potential to influence perceptions of danger and threat in citizen interactions. I return to this in
Chapter 6.
144
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because of the preference some participants express for avoidance, it might be that these
outcomes are simply an indication that mediation has had no effect on participant
relationships. I find however, several indications that the mediation experience actually plays
a role in generating avoidant relationships.
In some cases, mediated agreements serve to support or reinforce avoidant
relationships following mediation. Sylvia and Victor’s mediation agreement codifies a
pattern of avoidance by stipulating that they will only communicate in writing despite being
neighbors. In other cases, participants report that agreements serve to enforce avoidance in
less direct ways. Rita describes the written agreement she and her neighbor fashioned as a
way to help manage their mutual mistrust:
It goes back to the paper we’ve signed that he said and now his signature is on it
so if it was really something and the police was called, we have a paper that says
he had agreed ... he’s the one that would look foolish if he then changes his
mind. (Rita)
According to Rita, the written agreement becomes a way to minimize interaction between
she and her neighbor, and to reduce the likelihood that further conflicts will arise. In her
view, this is not because of a true change in feelings on either party’s part, but because of
possible humiliation and hassle that could arise if police are contacted. In another case, Jaime
and Anne work out an agreement in mediation that resolves practical (mainly monetary)
problems arising from the end of their shared living arrangement. By helping them to
address those issues, mediation enables them to adopt blatant avoidance. In each of these
cases it appears that, without the agreements negotiated in mediation, relationships of
avoidance would not necessarily have been established or sustained.
Other times, patterns of avoidance seem to emerge independent of the agreement
reached or in response to the inability to make agreements during mediation. In these cases,
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participants suggest that the mediation experience reinforced or generated an unwillingness
to interact with conflict partners.
Lauren: You know, in regards to the first part of your question, whether or not it
had any impact on our relationships, with my siblings, like I said it made me not
want to go there. So that’s really the only thing I can say, it’s not something that
we’ve talked about since. …
Heather: And so this feeling of not wanting to go there, would you say it was
present prior and it lasted through or did it strengthen from that sort of “close
encounter”? …
Lauren: I believe it was present prior and probably was strengthened after the
initial experience with my siblings.
Heather: And did that have to do with certain things that occurred in the
[mediation] process?
Lauren: It had to do with being in this group facilitation, counseling
environment with my siblings, and being really resistant to that.
Alice: I don’t know, I’d wanted to forget about it. I don’t feel, I don’t like being
involved so much … I don’t know that I would do it again
Heather: the mediation?
Alice: ah ha
Heather: why is that?
Alice: because it’s been a lot of hassle, a lot of disruption, a lot of thinking about
things that I can’t do anything about.
I felt at the end of this that the mediation process, for whatever reasons, I don’t
know if I could identify them, did more to confirm a destroyed or burned bridge
then mending one. (Jonathon)
In these examples, participants identify the mediation process specifically as a moment that
solidified their motivations for avoidance. The mediation experience therefore plays a role in
generating relationships of avoidance in two distinct ways. First, by leading to written
agreements that codify, reinforce, or enable avoidant relations, and second, by confirming
the limits of face-to-face interaction in ways that prompt participants to avoid each other.
Although this is not the sort of effect practitioners emphasize, it does suggest that the
mediation process has a lasting effect on participants’ relationships.
What about the effect of interactions with the mediators themselves on the
participants? Recall that this is a second way practitioners claim to be building relationships
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between citizens. As I discussed in Chapter 3, participant narratives do highlight the
importance of their exposure to the services offered by CDRs, their interactions with CDR
staff, and especially volunteer mediators in ways that suggest a lasting significance. These
references come not only in the form of reliance claims discussed in that chapter, where
participants express gratitude and comfort in knowing they can “fall back” on the mediation
service in the future. They also make reference to the fact that mediators are volunteers and
to the impression that left on them. This is exemplified in comments from Lorna and
Christine about the mediators of their cases:
I think they’re amazing, to think that they’re doing this as volunteers, I think it’s
just mind blowing. (Lorna)
I remember that we were genuinely very grateful to these two people for having
you know, I mean my understanding is they were both volunteering and we’re
not an easy group to deal with, I mean we’re intense and there were a lot of us,
and they were very patient and kind. (Christine)
Unfortunately, in my interviews with participants I did not probe in depth for what, if any,
lasting effect these impressions about volunteer mediators have on participants. Though
their comments suggest that these encounters left lasting impressions on them, they do not
give any indication that their impressions have these more generalized effects. Further
speculation on this aspect of mediator relationship expectations will, in any case, have to
await more research.
5.4

CONCLUSION
To sum up, Toronto CDR practitioners envision the educative potential of

community mediation through a relational lens that idealizes friendliness, both genuine and
feigned. Their accounts of ideal relationship outcomes suggest a spectrum that ranges from
the generation of deep feelings of attachment to more surface level behavioral changes.
Although they stress the value of rather modest shifts in feelings and behavior, their desire
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to change relationships is ambitious and conceptualized in transferable terms that are
believed to help establish a more connected community of citizens. As I have outlined above,
in some cases participants do describe changes in their relationships that resonate with the
friendliness expectations of practitioners and attribute these changes to the mediation
process directly (authentic friendliness). But participant accounts of their relationship
outcomes are also rife with descriptions of avoidance, in both courteous and blatant forms,
and these are also attributed to the mediation experience. These avoidance claims do not
map easily onto the spectrum of ideal outcomes described by practitioners, and the accounts
of “blatant avoidance” in particular fall short of even the most modest relationship
expectations.
One might interpret these results as failures and as evidence that community
mediation’s potential to generate educative effects should be called into serious question.
Indeed, the findings presented here suggest that, at least in the case of the Toronto CDRs,
efforts to build the friendly citizen are not usually successful and that a healthy dose of
skepticism with respect to educative claims is warranted.146 But several features common to a
subset of the accounts of avoidance suggest an additional conclusion. While representations
of avoidance as an ideal outcome are absent from practitioner accounts, some participants
express contentment with these arrangements. For example, recall Victor’s characterization
of the post-mediation relationship he has with Sylvia: “I’m happy, and I think she’s also
happy ... we don’t look at each other, we don’t help each other, but we are at peace.”
Victor’s description applies more broadly to several of the avoidance cases and reminds us
that avoidance can serve to establish and sustain peaceful relationships between conflict

In the next chapter I will turn to a discussion of 1) the relevance of these claims to the field of community
mediation more broadly and 2) implications of these findings for the educative potential of participatory
deliberative processes more generally.
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partners who have had difficulty getting along for one reason or another. Furthermore, the
avoidance cases highlight that participants avoid in response to feelings of psychic and
physical threat that cannot be entirely resolved or eliminated through the mediation process.
This suggests that blatant avoidance can be construed as an alternate ideal
relationship outcome. Casting blatant avoidance in this normative light runs counter to the
way mediation practitioners and theorists describe their desired outcomes- even in their
most modest manifestations. It also differs from the ideal espoused by democratic theorists
because it does not rely on bonds of affection or feelings of trust or model itself on even the
appearance of friendliness. To be sure it overlaps to some extent with common courtesy, in
the sense that it enables social peace without depending on genuine positive feelings. But
blatant avoidance is distinct because it dispenses with even the pretense of friendly or polite
behavior in exchange for distance and disinterest. It suggests that it is possible, and even
appropriate in certain cases, to get along without liking each other, and without even
pretending to like each other. Therefore, this analysis of mediation’s relationship effects
suggests two major conclusions. First, it suggests that building the friendly citizen is not
often possible. Second, it suggests that what is more likely, blatant avoidance, is sometimes
more desirable according to participants. As I will elaborate in the next chapter, this ought to
inform the ideals espoused by practitioners and theorists of mediation and deliberation more
widely, as well as democratic theorists concerned with articulating the ideals of everyday
democratic citizenship.
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Chapter 6
Rethinking the Educative Potential of Deliberative Moments
6.1

INTRODUCTION
I began by highlighting the better citizen claims advanced in theories of participatory

and deliberative democracy, which locate the value of participatory deliberative collective
decision making in its capacity to improve the democratic skills and dispositions of citizens.
Such claims are advanced alongside better decisions claims, that emphasize the way the
decisions themselves are more legitimate, just, etc. I argued that, given the normative weight
better citizen claims often carry, they have not been sufficiently elaborated theoretically or
investigated empirically. In an effort to address this, I parsed the better citizen claims of
participatory and deliberative theorists into three analytical categories of efficacy, interests,
and relationships. Next, I argued that existing efforts to typologize the broad range of
deliberative venues has not been organized from the perspective of better citizen claims. To
address this, I proposed three spectrums along which a deliberative venue can be situated
that are relevant to its potential educative effects: collective decisions, scope, and intensity.
I identified community mediation as a deliberative venue located on each spectrum
toward the end most likely to yield educative effects, according to theoretical expectations. I
suggested that existing empirical research has not tended to focus on similarly situated
deliberative venues nor has it conceptualized educative effects in ways that are consistent
with the theoretical accounts. I argued that the logic of studying community mediation is
that it presents a context where educative effects are most likely to occur. Not finding
educative effects in this context would raise considerable doubts about the educative
potential, not only of mediation, but for deliberation more generally. As I have described in
the preceding chapters, my findings from research at two CDRs in Toronto do indeed raise
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doubts about the educative effects of community mediation suggesting there is good reason
to question the better citizen claims of deliberation enthusiasts more broadly.
My interviews with mediation practitioners and participants in Toronto suggest that
the experience of conflict can be educative. Their stories highlight that when we bump up
against other people in ways that make us feel badly or prevent us from having what we
want, the experience can be intense, challenging and require us to think, feel, and behave in
new ways. In other words, conflict provokes adaptation. This is part of the reason I have
argued that the community mediation process is a deliberative venue with high educative
potential- because participants are much more likely to be deeply invested in the content and
outcome of the deliberation, and thus more likely to commit the psychic resources necessary
to generate educative effects. And yet, this study of community mediation makes clear that
the experience of conflict does not fit neatly within the boundaries of one particular
deliberative moment. This not only makes it difficult to isolate the effects of that moment,
but also suggests that to expect dramatic adaptations to regularly follow from that moment is
misguided.
While a wholly dismissive view of better citizen claims is not borne out by the
evidence of modest educative effects I find in a minority of cases, it provides reasons to
moderate standard better citizen claims considerably. What is more, when adaptations do
appear to occur as a direct result of these deliberative moments, they do not necessarily
conform to the “good citizen” ideals articulated by deliberative and participatory democrats,
suggesting that the ideals themselves may require reconceptualization. These are the two
main findings of this study. In the next section, I elaborate on these findings and their
explanations in the context of my field work at the Toronto CDRs, acknowledging the
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study’s limitations. In the remaining sections, I discuss the implications of my findings for
the theory and practice of deliberation and for democratic theory in general.
6.2

DOES MEDIATION AT THE TORONTO CDRS MAKE BETTER CITIZENS?
In the participant interviews I conducted, the community mediation process is one,

often relatively brief, moment in the narrative told about a broader conflict experience. To
be sure, this is part of the methodological challenge of relying on self-reports to capture the
discrete effect of one deliberative experience, but it is also a relevant finding in itself that
raises doubts about the educative effect of the mediation process. If the mediation
experience does not often stand out in participants’ minds as a “turning point” in their
conflict narrative, then we should be all the more hesitant to attribute remarkable educative
effects to it.
As I have outlined in the previous chapters, in a minority of cases, there are clear
indications that the mediation process specifically provides the opportunity for an exchange
between conflict partners that generates increased efficacy, interest clarification, and/or
relationship change. That is, participants describe a change along these lines and connect the
change back directly to the deliberative moment of their conflict, that is, the mediation.
Overall, educative claims are limited and modest, and additionally participants are not always
able to make clear distinctions between the broader conflict narrative and the mediation
experience in particular. At times, participants report changes but with less certainty or
specificity that traces it back to the encounter in mediation. These accounts suggest generally
that the conflict experience generated educative effects but make it harder to say with
confidence that the deliberative moment of mediation is responsible for the change. The
difficulty participants have isolating their educative claims to the mediation experience, and
their reluctance to do so in certain cases reinforces my conclusion that the process alone is
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not often educative, at least not in a sense that maps on to the educative aspirations of
mediation practitioners and democratic theorists.
According to theorists and practitioners, central to the realization of mediation’s
educative potential is the idea that the changes participants experience are transferable- that
they extend beyond the mediated relationship and change the way participants think, feel,
and act in their everyday lives more broadly. I have found very scant evidence of this kind of
generalized educative effect in the post-mediation narratives of participants. Those that do
make educative claims concerning efficacy and interests often do so in ways that are limited
to their mediated relationships. When they describe increased feelings of efficacy, those are
limited about half the time to future interactions with conflict partners. When they describe
increased understanding of their own interests and the interests of others, they almost always
pertain to the mediated conflict and do not spill over into lasting dispositions of
reflectiveness or broader socio-political analyses of conflicts. Participants rarely describe
changes that are broader in scope. But even when they do, they are especially hesitant to
attribute them to the mediation specifically or to express with certainty that a lasting change
of that breadth has occurred. In general, the broader the educative claim, the less clear is its
tie to the deliberative moment in mediation versus the conflict experience overall. Together
these findings suggest that it is appropriate to temper educative expectations considerably.
The finding that educative effects of mediation are limited to future interactions with
mediation conflict partners suggests that mediation’s educative potential is realized when it
comes to the relationships category that are the focus of Chapter 5. Yet as I discussed there,
there are at least two reasons to be skeptical that mediation will often yield dramatic
educative effects with respect to relationships. First, the idea that restoring or establishing
friendly relations between conflict partners is educative relies on the same transfer
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assumptions that operate for efficacy and interest expectations. By generating an exemplary
experience in the mediation, theorists and practitioners hope to have broader effects on the
way participants relate to fellow citizens in general. But when participants describe friendlier
relations with their conflict partners following mediation, there is little connection made to
other relationships. Though the increased friendliness in these cases is a partial realization of
educative aspirations, it is far less clear that this has lasting effects on the wider political
community. Second, descriptions of friendliness are not only limited in their scope, they are
also dwarfed by descriptions of avoidance in participant narratives. Therefore, in the area
where mediation’s lasting effects appear most potent, the outcome is only a partial
fulfillment of and at times appears incompatible with the ideals of mediation practitioners.
Later in this chapter I will explore further the idea I proposed in Chapter 5, that some forms
of avoidance point to a conception of good citizenship that is overlooked by deliberative
theories. For the moment however, I take those conceptions at face value and therefore
conclude that the relationship claims of participants, like their efficacy and interest claims,
reinforce the conclusion that educative effects are unlikely and limited in their scope.
My findings also suggests however, that a fully skeptical view, one that rejects the
idea that mediation can ever be educative in any meaningful sense, is not borne out by
participant narratives either. Though they are limited in their frequency and scope, a minority
of participant narratives do make modest educative claims about the mediation process in all
three categories of efficacy, interests, and relationships. Their frequency, scope, and depth
suggest that educative effects cannot carry the normative weight that is often attributed to
them. But their consistent if modest presence confirms that they should not be abandoned
entirely as aspirations that are (at least partially) realizable. The findings I have presented in
the preceding chapters also suggest that mediation very rarely produces the deleterious
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effects attributed to it by its harshest critics. The worst fears about the mediation process’s
“counter-educative” effects- that it could reduce efficacy, obfuscate interests, and harm
relationships- are not generally realized in participant mediation narratives. While most
narratives suggest little or no educative effects, they do not suggest that mediation actively
undermines these goals the rest of the time.147
Table 6.1 provides a condensed summary of the educative claims for each participant
and an overall assessment of the educative effect across all three categories.148 Educative
claims are highlighted in bold throughout the table. The right-most column provides an
overall summary of the educative outcome reported by each participant. The “Yes” category
includes those participants who make educative claims across all three categories. Mixed
outcomes are those that include claims in two categories, and “No” outcomes include claims
in one or no categories.149 This assumes a cumulative approach to measuring educative
effects across all three categories. That is to say, it takes as most successful (from the
standpoint of educative aspirations) those cases where participants make educative claims in
all three categories. This approach to evaluating overall educative effects recognizes that the
three categories are not entirely independent of each other. For example, those with a

147

The exception to this is Loretta who has lasting resentment towards the mediators for pressuring her into a
settlement she regrets. She suggests that the experience taught her to be less trusting of people and to manage
conflict through formal court processes where she expects things will be more fair. Loretta’s experience
underscores the importance of self-determination. Though educative effects do not flow automatically from
self-determination in the process, when it is violated in the way Loretta reports, “counter-educative” effects are
possible. In other words, though it is rare that participants report such serious departures from mediator norms
of practice, when they do the process can become counterproductive from the standpoint of educative goals.
148 The efficacy category, described in more detail in Chapter 3, is the most difficult to summarize because it is
broken down into three distinct thematic subcategories. To simplify the table, only those efficacy claims that
most correspond to practitioner expectations are included in the table. Confidence in this table therefore
indicates a “high confidence” claim, reliance indicates a “self-reliance” claim, and capacity indicates a listening
or assertion related skills claim. For a more detailed discussion of these and other efficacy claims see Chapter 3.
149 Based on my analysis, participants who made one educative claim in their narrative did so in ways that were
too limited to correspond to the educative expectations of practitioners, even in their most modest form. I
therefore grouped them in the “No” category with those participants who made no educative claims at all in
their interviews.

Table 6.1: Summary of Educative Claims
Participant
Alan

Alfred
Alice
Anne
Beth
Beverly
Catherine
Christine
Dalia
Debbie
Evelyn
Jaime
Jeffrey
Jeremy
Jonathon
Julie
Lauren
Leslie
Lisa
Loretta
Lorna
Lynn
Martha
Max
Michelle
Kyung‐min
Norm
Rita
Sara
Sylvia
Victor
(n = 31)

Efficacy
Confidence
Self‐Reliance
Capacity
None
None
Confidence
Capacity
Capacity
None
None
Confidence
Capacity
Confidence
None
Self‐Reliance
Capacity
Confidence
Confidence
Self‐Reliance
None
Self‐Reliance
Capacity
None
Confidence
Confidence
Capacity
Negative
None
None
None
None
Capacity
None
None
Confidence
Confidence
Capacity
None
Capacity

Interests
Other

Relationship
Friendly

Educative Effect?
YES

Divisive
Misunderstanding
Misunderstanding

Blatant Avoidance
Courteous Avoidance
Blatant Avoidance

NO
NO
NO

Other
Misunderstanding
Divisive
Divisive
Misunderstanding

Courteous Avoidance

MIXED

Blatant Avoidance
Blatant Avoidance
Friendly

NO
NO
MIXED

Misunderstanding
Divisive
Other

NO
NO
MIXED

Misunderstanding
Other
Other
Divisive
Other

Blatant Avoidance
Blatant Avoidance
Friendly
Blatant Avoidance
Blatant Avoidance
Friendly
Friendly
Blatant Avoidance
Blatant Avoidance

Misunderstanding
Other
Other

Courteous Avoidance
Friendly
Friendly

NO
YES
YES

Coercion
Other
Divisive
Misunderstanding
Other
Other
Other
Misunderstanding
Misunderstanding
Other

Blatant Avoidance
Courteous Avoidance
Blatant Avoidance
Blatant Avoidance
Blatant Avoidance
Friendly
Courteous Avoidance
Courteous Avoidance
Courteous Avoidance
Friendly

NO [Negative]
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
YES

Divisive
Other

Blatant Avoidance
Blatant Avoidance

NO
MIXED

NO
YES
YES
NO
MIXED

Table 6.2: Summary of Educative Effects
TOTAL
n = 31
Percentages are
calculated based on the
total of 31.
Totals do not always
add to 100% because
some narratives include
multiple claims and not
all categories are shown
here.

Efficacy

Interests

Confidence
Self‐Reliance
Capacity

20 (32%)
4 (13%)
10 (32%)

# of Categories
None
One
Two
Three

14 (45%)
9 (29%)
6 (19%)
1 (3%)

Other
Divisive
Misunderstanding
Coercion

14 (45%)
7 (23%)
10 (32%)
1 (3%)

Relationships
Friendly
9 (29%)
Avoidance
23 (75%)

Educative Effect?
YES
7 (23%)
MIXED
5 (16%)
NO
19 (61%)
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“friendly” outcome in the relationships category almost always make educative claims in the
other two categories as well. This suggests that change in relationships towards friendliness
depends on, but is not necessarily determined by, efficacy and interest changes. As I noted
in Chapter 2, my intention in parsing educative effects into the categories of efficacy,
interests, and relationships and treating them in turn in the preceding chapters has been to
isolate them for analytical purposes. It has not been to suggest that they are entirely
independent of each other. The analysis summarized in Table 6.1 acknowledges the
interdependence between the three categories by considering those cases with effects across
all three categories as the strongest educative outcomes.
This is reported by about a quarter of participants, as is made clear from the totals
and corresponding percentages shown in Table 6.2.150 Though the table does not convey it,
the analysis in the three preceding chapters by now has revealed that even here, where the
evidence of educative effects is strongest, there is minimal indication of transfer outside the
mediated relationship. About half of all efficacy claims, and almost all interest and
relationship claims are made with specific reference to the mediated relationship. The same
is generally true for the 5 participants that have “mixed” educative outcomes (16%). Yet the
educative claims made by these participants are mixed not only in the sense that they do not
transfer beyond the mediated relationship. Even within the limits of that relationship, when
placed in the context of the broader narrative, the presence of educative claims in some
categories is combined with their absence in other categories and/or alongside claims that
run counter to educative expectations. This can be because of mixed outcomes in multiThe Efficacy column presents the totals in two formats. The frequencies for each of the three kinds of
efficacy claims (confidence, reliance, capacity) are included with corresponding percentages. Because these
categories are not mutually exclusive I also report the number of participant narratives that include all three
kinds of efficacy claims, only two, just one, and none. These numbers provide an indication of the cumulative
efficacy effect and indicate that dramatic effects are rare. Because there is minimal overlap in the interests and
relationship categories, simple totals provide a clear indication of educative outcomes in those columns.
150
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party cases with respect to different conflict partners, or because of partial success vis-a-vis a
single conflict partner- as in Beth’s account of non-reciprocal interest clarification. More
than half the time however, as Table 6.2 shows, participant narratives suggest that no
educative effects result from the mediation.
Participant interviews suggest at least two reasons why more dramatic educative
effects are not attributed to the mediation experience. First, as I have already discussed
above, often much of the conflict unfolds before the mediation takes place and continues to
unfold, in some sense, after the mediation as well. This means that the mediation is not
salient enough in the conflict narrative to be a memorable educative moment for participants.
In those cases where it does generate notable educative claims, it is described as a catalyst in
a more long term educative process associated with the relationship or broader life narrative
of the participant. This does not eliminate the role played by the mediation in the educative
process, but reduces its claim significantly to being a sole cause. Second, as I have elaborated
in the preceding chapters, participants do not come to the deliberation seeking the same
changes that practitioners and theorists seek, and my interviews suggest this disconnect goes
beyond what is typically acknowledged by practitioners. Beyond being more oriented to
instrumental outcomes than practitioners, participants do not often conceptualize mediation
as an educative opportunity and their experience diverges from practitioner expectations in
ways that are incompatible with educative aspirations.
In the case of efficacy expectations, participants do not conceptualize the mediation
as a remedial experience, nor do they diagnose the conflict as a result of their lack of
deliberative skills. Far from transforming conflict dunces into conflict experts, at best, the
mediation appears to offer a “refresher” for participants who already consider themselves
relatively capable communicators. In the case of interest expectations, again many
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participants are not looking for the “mutual understanding” that forms the basis of
mediators’ educative aspirations. Some are actually seeking mediation for the exact opposite:
a controlled environment with formalized process and strangers observing that will insulate
them from delving into the emotional or psychological content of their conflict. When they
are seeking such understanding, the mediation is more likely to “teach” participants about
the barriers to psycho-emotive interest clarification. This lesson does not prompt them to
devote greater attention to self-reflection and perspective taking as practitioners hope. And
finally, with respect to relationships, a significant proportion of participants are not
interested in developing friendly relations with their conflict partners, even when those
partners are members of their own family. Some are not even interested in pretending to be
friends for the sake of peace. Feelings of psychic and physical threat instead prompt
avoidance in various forms. Those participants who had hoped to deepen their relationships
with conflict partners occasionally get their way, but just as often they are disappointed by
their inability to do so and settle for avoidance instead.
In the remainder of this chapter, I will discuss the implications of these findings for
the better citizen claims of deliberative theorists and practitioners. First, several caveats are
relevant to a discussion of how the findings of this research at two Toronto CDRs relate to
broader conclusions about the educative potential of community mediation and CDRs more
generally. To start out, my purpose in this study has been to explore the educative effect of
deliberation and to study community mediation as a deliberative process. This motivates my
exclusive focus on the mediation process narrowly defined, where citizens meet face-to-face.
I have not claimed to be offering a comprehensive assessment of the educative effect of the
Toronto CDRs in all of their work. To say that the mediation process itself achieves only
modest educative effects is not to say that the Toronto CDRs may not have more dramatic
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educative effects through other aspects of their work. This possibility is certainly not lost on
Toronto practitioners who often emphasized to me their belief that important lasting
changes occur as a result of the CDR’s overall community mediation program casework
(including intake phone calls and case development meetings) and not simply from the
mediation process.
These claims are all the more plausible in the context of the Toronto CDRs given
the relatively in depth casework they conduct, most notably through case development
meetings where mediators meet in person and in private with each party to the conflict prior
to the mediation. Because they view their work more broadly than the mediation process,
mediation practitioners may be less concerned about isolating the overall educative effect of
the mediation encounter itself. While I did not find much reason in the conflict narratives of
participants to think that a broader definition of “the mediation process” that includes intake
and case development would lead to significantly different conclusions, this was admittedly
not the focus of my research.151 My research has also overlooked the possible educative
effect of the Toronto CDRs for staff and volunteers themselves and has not taken into
consideration all of the work they do that falls outside the community mediation program.152
Nevertheless, my exclusive focus on the mediation process remains important for
the field of community mediation and to CDRs generally. This is because, the importance
of the other work CDRs do notwithstanding, the mediation process is the centrepiece of
normative claims about community mediation. This research suggests that the deliberative
moment of the community mediation process, where participants meet face-to-face with a
One way to explore this possibility further would be to include those cases that went through intake and
case development but did not proceed to mediation- cases like these have been excluded from this analysis.
152 A comprehensive look at the educative effect of the Toronto CDRs would need to take into account many
other facets of their work including, but not limited to, casework that does not proceed to mediation, training
and mentoring of staff and volunteers, training offered to the public, and a host of other projects that fall
outside the community mediation program including youth work, court-related work, and organizational
consulting.
151
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mediator to discuss matters of shared concern, does not meet the educative aspirations that
some mediation advocates have attributed to it. It calls into question the arguments of those
who base community mediation’s normative value on its “transformative” effects (Bush and
Folger 2005; Shonholtz 2000; Wahrhaftig 2004; Herrman 2006). It suggests that educative
outcomes are possible but rare and limited and that claims about the normative value of
mediation should not rest too heavily on its educative potential. It calls for restraint in
attributing dramatic changes of this kind to the mediation process.
Certainly the scope of this research requires caution in drawing overly broad
conclusions that generalize to all CDRs. To start, I have only interviewed 31 mediation
participants. I have also conducted the field work at two organizations that share a common
geography, philosophy and practical approach to community mediation. The experiences I
heard about here may not match the experiences of participants at other CDRs and it is
certainly possible that more dramatic educative effects result from the mediation process in
other organizational contexts. It is worth recalling however the logic behind selecting the
Toronto CDRs as the site for this research. The approach and structure of their community
mediation program is especially focused on educative goals. My interviews with practitioners
confirmed that this commitment is shared by most staff and volunteers. While my research
did reveal that mediation cases at the Toronto CDRs do not always match the ideal process
as described in training and interviews, it did not suggest that limited educative effects can be
explained by mediator strategies or shortcomings.153 Instead, it suggests that the barriers to
educative effects stem more from the orientation of participants, the psycho-emotive
complexity of their conflicts, and the experience of danger and threat they have during their
interactions. It is not likely that such factors are unique to Toronto and it is therefore
153

For further discussion of mediator techniques and strategies see Section 6.3.3
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unlikely, given the energy invested by Toronto CDR practitioners into generating educative
effects, that the outcomes here would be far surpassed in a different context. Therefore,
while this study certainly does not exhaust the need to investigate this question further in
other CDR contexts, it recasts educative expectations in a way that is relevant to community
mediation advocates in general. In the next section, I discuss the relevance of these
conclusions to the study of deliberation more generally.
6.3

DOES DELIBERATION MAKE BETTER CITIZENS?
The rationale I have presented for studying deliberation in the context of community

mediation is that it presents a crucial case for investigating educative goals. This is because
community mediation is a deliberative venue with features that, according to theoretical
expectations, make it most likely to generate educative effects: it empowers participants to
make binding collective decisions in face-to-face settings, has high intensity, and addresses
issues that are limited in scope. In Chapter 2, I suggested that not finding educative effects
in this context would raise considerable doubts about the educative potential, not only of
mediation, but for deliberation more generally. My findings, summarized above, do indeed
raise doubts about the educative effects of community mediation and suggest there is good
reason to question the better citizen claims of deliberation enthusiasts more broadly. In
addition to casting doubt on deliberation’s better citizen claims, the study of community
mediation has generated several insights that are relevant to the wider study of deliberation.
These insights, which I elaborate below, relate to the centrality of relationships, the educative
potential of deliberation in conflict settings, and the role of moderators.
6.3.1

The Centrality of Relationships
First, the mediation context points to a strong connection between relationships and

the educative potential of a deliberative venue. Mediation participants are usually
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deliberating under circumstances that include a relationship history produced by intimate ties
or residential proximity. This relational context has proved highly relevant to the educative
effects reported by participants because their efficacy, interest, and relationship claims are
usually limited to descriptions of their ongoing interactions with their mediation partners.
Contrary to the aspirations of practitioners, they rarely attribute changes to the mediation
that transfer to their interactions with others in a broader sense. If the lasting educative
effects of mediation are tied to the mediated relationship, this suggests that deliberative
venues where participants have less tangible pre-existing relationships will not be able to
generate even these modest educative effects. In deliberative settings where participants are
in relationship for the first time because of the forum or in less tangible ways than they are
in mediation, we should not expect the kinds of changes observed in the mediation context
to be possible.
But perhaps this conclusion overlooks the fact that what makes the relationship
circumstances in the mediation context unique is that they actually comprise the content of
the deliberation in a way that is not likely in settings where the scope of the issues are
broader and more public. If in fact this is the relevant distinction about the mediation
process, it suggests that educative effects in other deliberative contexts will not transfer
beyond the issue at hand. Participants may understand a particular issue better but this is not
likely to transfer to other issues or change their approach to politics more generally. At this
point, the distinction between better decision and better citizen claims begin to collapse.
Further study of deliberative venues with broader issue scope and different relational
contexts are needed to test these speculative conclusions. In the meantime, these findings
from the mediation context suggest, at least provisionally, that the normative justifications
for deliberation may need readjustment.
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6.3.2

The Double Bind of “Hot” Deliberation
Second, the mediation process has generated insights about the educative potential

of deliberation in contexts of high conflict, which Fung has called “hot deliberation” (Fung
2007b). Fung notes that “as far as I know we have no empirical evidence regarding the
relevant merits, and appropriate circumstances, of hot versus cold deliberation” (165). My
research has highlighted what I refer to as “the double bind of hot deliberation” from the
perspective of educative effects. While the conflict context does appear to produce the
psychic investment of energy and resources needed to generate educative effects, it also
produces barriers to their realization. The study of mediation has revealed that when people
are in conflict, and particularly one that is challenging enough for them to bring in
facilitators to formally convene a deliberative moment for confronting it, their experience is
not consistent with the better citizen ideals of theorists and practitioners.
Their experience is usually one that makes interdependence more than selfdetermination salient, one that highlights the limits rather than the power of talk to generate
mutual understanding, and one that often needs to be managed through relations of pretense
and avoidance instead of genuine care and friendliness. As I will discuss in the next section,
these outcomes appear to draw on a different mode of citizenship than the one that is
embodied in standard better citizen claims. Taking those standard claims at face value
however suggests that neither cool nor hot deliberations are likely to have dramatic effects
on efficacy, interests, or relationships. While “cool” deliberation lacks the preconditions
thought necessary to generate educative effects, “hot” deliberation creates circumstances
that stand in their way.
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6.3.3

The Role of Moderators
Third, the mediation context highlights the role played by moderators in contributing

to the educative potential of deliberation. It suggests that practical tensions arise when
moderators are oriented towards educative goals. Specifically, mediators’ desire to have
participants hear and understand each other at a level that can generate lasting changes to
their dispositions and relationships can motivate interventions that run counter to selfdetermination, a principle at the heart of deliberative processes. For example, in the
introductory training at the Toronto CDRs, mediators are instructed to formulate and ask
participants questions with the intention of uncovering the psychological and emotional
content of the conflict. They are further instructed to ask participants to paraphrase each
other’s statements back to each other in order to confirm that they are hearing one another.
Structuring the communication process of participants in the mediation to that
extent has paternal overtones. Though it does not overtly pressure participants to agree or
settle, it pressures them into an artificial communication process that they may find
condescending. Though this level of process control may not be adopted by moderators in
other contexts, the example illustrates how an educative agenda can establish a temptation to
become paternal in ways that are in tension with the core value of participant selfdetermination. This is an area of considerable debate in the mediation field154 and suggests
lessons for deliberative theorists and practitioners more widely. I have presented evidence
above to suggest that moderator strategies and techniques are not usually successful in
realizing educative goals at the Toronto CDRs.155 In addition to this however, I have found
that there are practical risks associated with the pursuit of educative goals in deliberative
See for example Bush and Folger (2005).
This evidence nevertheless has its limits. I have not observed many mediations directly or interviewed
mediators in depth about the strategies and techniques they use. Further research is needed to develop a better
understanding of the role played by moderators in shaping the outcomes of deliberative processes.

154
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settings. That is, moderator strategies intended to accomplish educative goals can undermine
important principles of the process. This suggests another reason to adjust deliberation’s
better citizen claims. In the next and final section of this chapter, I will elaborate the sort of
adjustments that I envision.
6.4

FUTURE DIRECTIONS: EMPIRICAL, NORMATIVE,

AND PRACTICAL

While I have argued above that there are good reasons based on the findings in the
mediation context to generalize to the broad range of deliberative venues, there is of course
also good reason to test these conclusions in other deliberative contexts. Beyond the
substantive findings, a goal of this study has also been to contribute to the analytical and
methodological approach of scholars who wish to investigate deliberation’s educative effects
further. First, I hope to have made the case that an investigation of deliberation’s educative
effects must begin from a typology of deliberative venues that takes these goals as its starting
point. My own typology, based on the three categories of collective decisions, scope, and
intensity, has gone some distance to sorting deliberative venues for this purpose and
provides insight about additional venues that are ripe for study. For example, deliberative
venues with high intensity of a different kind from mediation warrant further examination.
Though the mediation context is categorized as high intensity due to the small number of
participants, a mediation session lasts for a few hours at most and the process is usually
limited to one or two sessions. Studying deliberative venues with high intensity due to
longer duration and recurrence would further our understanding of deliberation’s educative
potential. This might also allow for the study of deliberative venues that are relatively intense,
but include more participants than is typical in the mediation context. This would help to
clarify the relevance of group size to the educative potential of deliberative processes.
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Second, I hope to have provided a convincing argument that the analytical categories
of efficacy, interests, and relationships are faithful to the better citizen claims advanced by
theorists. They therefore offer more promising ways to operationalize those claims for the
purposes of empirical study than previous efforts and will hopefully be of wider use.
Notwithstanding the need to contextualize educative expectations, as I have done through
practitioner interviews at my field sites, these broad categories should apply generally to
deliberative contexts of all types. Third and finally, I hope to have shown the value of a
qualitative approach to the study of deliberation generally and to its educative effects
specifically. Future qualitative research of deliberation can complement existing
experimental and quantitative approaches by providing rich data about the experience of
participants before, during, and after the deliberation.
While awaiting the results of future research, it appears warranted to take up a
measured and skeptical stance towards deliberation’s better citizen claims. I argue that this
should motivate two major adjustments to the normative and practical parts of the
deliberative democracy project. First, it calls for a rebalancing of normative justifications to
deemphasize better citizen claims and place the primary burden on better decision claims.
Second, it requires that good citizen ideals be reconceptualised so as to make those better
citizens claims that remain more consistent with empirical reality.
The first adjustment, to downplay better citizen claims in favor of better decision
claims, is prompted by the limited evidence of deliberation’s educative effects I have found.
It has implications for both the normative and practical sides of the deliberative democracy
project. My findings suggest that, within the domain of normative theorists, arguments for
deliberative democracy should not hinge a great deal on its educative promise. Overplaying
these claims makes the deliberative project unnecessarily vulnerable to charges of utopianism.
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Much of the time charges of utopianism against theories of deliberative democracy fail to
understand the normative aims of the project. They do not see it for what it is, an effort to
articulate a regulative ideal for collective decision making, regardless of and indeed because
of the fact that “real life” collective decision making does not proceed in this way.
Understanding this makes clear that the simple observation that real life deliberation does
not meet regulative ideals does not undermine the project’s normative power (Thompson
2008; Mutz 2008). Yet unlike the moral arguments about legitimacy that are mobilized by
deliberative theorists, better citizen claims rely on empirical assumptions, and these are
assumptions that I have shown there are good reason to question. Therefore, when
normative theorists advance better citizen claims, they make themselves unnecessarily open
to charges of naiveté and in so doing undermine the normative strength of the deliberative
project. It is therefore not possible for standard better citizen claims to perform the
normative work for the theory of deliberative democracy. Those normative arguments
should instead be driven by legitimacy claims.
On the practical side, determining the implications that follow from these normative
arguments is not typically the main concern of political theorists. It is instead the domain of
organizers, policymakers, and democratic reformers, seeking to increase the use of
participatory deliberative processes into real world collective decision making domains. But
on what grounds do they justify their work? Certainly the practical implications that follow
from accepting deliberation as a regulative ideal are not obvious. Given that we know the
myriad ways that real world conditions do not conform to these ideals, it certainly does not
follow that more deliberation is always better (Fung 2005; Estlund 2007, 19). In other words,
practitioners need more than moral arguments about ideals to justify the reforms they seek.
These efforts need more practical justifications because they are occurring in the “real
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world”, and therefore require tangible real world evidence that they are better in some
empirical sense from the alternatives.156 One avenue for doing this is to champion
deliberation’s better citizen effects. Another is to herald its better decision effects. These
two avenues are certainly not mutually exclusive. In fact, I show in Chapter 1 that
deliberative practitioners have often mobilized both with equal force. But the results of my
research suggest that it will be more fruitful to concentrate on the latter set of claims.
The call to increase citizen deliberation would be more persuasive if it can be shown
to produce or contribute to better decisions when compared to other processes. In addition,
citizen deliberation may be argued for on procedural grounds, through a demonstration that
when properly structured and organized it can offer, in reality, a collective decision making
process that is more fair than the alternatives. Clearly, this requires further analytical
elaboration to clarify what makes procedures more fair and decisions better and how to
measure this against the relevant alternatives. Here, I have in mind a practical application of
something along the lines of David Estlund’s philosophical framework of epistemic
proceduralism, which aims to justify democracy through a combined appeal to its procedural
fairness and modest epistemic value (Estlund 2007).
Estlund’s work is intentionally carried out at a very abstract level. His aim is to
provide a moral argument justifying democratic authority and legitimacy and not at all with
an empirical justification for reforms within an already established democratic system.
Nevertheless, I think his arguments provide a useful guide for thinking about more practical
aims and it is up to scholars interested in these practical questions to develop this further.
Along these lines, I am suggesting that deliberative practitioners should focus more of their
attention on demonstrating when and how citizen deliberation can provide a better process
For an excellent proposal about how to integrate normative theories, practical reforms, and empirical
realities concerning democracy see Fung’s explanation of “pragmatic equilibrium” (Fung 2007a).
156
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and generate better decisions than relevant alternatives. Though gathering the empirical
evidence for these claims will certainly present serious practical and methodological
challenges of its own, I believe that focusing on this task will be more fruitful than
committing rhetorical and real resources to promoting and substantiating deliberation’s
educative potential.
The second adjustment, to reconsider good citizen ideals, is prompted by the nature
and quality of the educative effects that I do find. Though I have just argued for reducing
the normative weight placed on deliberation’s better citizen effects, there is also evidence to
suggest they should not be entirely abandoned. Reconceptualizing “good citizens” in
response to the results of this study provides a way for those better citizen claims that do
continue to be advanced to be rendered more consistent with empirical realities.
Standard better citizen claims draw on particular conceptions of what it means to say
that a democratic citizen is better than they used to be, better than others, or simply good. In
its broadest terms, this study has raised questions about those conceptions by highlighting
the alternate modes of democratic citizenship described by mediation participants. Rather
than seeing their accounts merely as a failure to measure up to standard ideals, I have
suggested that they compel us to rethink existing conceptions of good citizenship. The idea
of a good citizen is certainly multifaceted, and I have attempted to capture some of what is
meant by this with the three categories of educative effects. Community mediation has shed
the most light on the category of relationships between “good” citizens, and I therefore
confine my discussion here to what democratic theory has had to say about ideal democratic
social relations. I argue that the prominence and nature of avoidance in the narratives of
mediation participants points to a competing mode of citizenship that, under certain
circumstances, should be understood as one way of being a “good citizen”.
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As I have already noted, the relationship ideals of democratic theorists advocating
participatory deliberative approaches are modeled after the ideal of friendship. In my earlier
presentations of this in Chapter 2, I drew on the work of Benjamin Barber who seeks “a
politics that works not only to citizens’ mutual advantage, but also to the advantage of their
mutuality” (Barber 2004, 118). I do not mean to suggest that democratic theorists like
Barber have set their sights on a political community that is sustained by civic bonds that are
identical to intimate friendships. Barber himself locates the ideal in the middle ground
between friends and strangers, suggesting it should be described by the metaphor of
neighbors.
A neighbor is a stranger transformed by empathy and shared interest into a
friend- an artificial friend, however, whose kinship is a contrivance of politics
rather than natural or personal and private. This distinction is crucial in the
civic process, for the attachments we feel toward natural kith and kin can be
constricting and parochializing; they can exclude and subvert rather than
nourish citizenship. Empathy, however, as an artificial product of political talk,
arouses feelings that attach precisely to “strangers,” to those who do not belong
to our private families or clubs or churches. … Politics is the art of engaging
strangers in talk and of stimulating in them an artificial kinship made in equal
parts of empathy, common cause, and enlightened self-interest.
(Barber 2004, 189)
Though Barber calls the kinship between citizen-neighbors artificial, he wants it to simulate
intimate forms as much as possible without replicating their parochializing effects. Though
more limited than intimate kinship, it is nevertheless sustained by civic bonds of affiliation
and affection that are grounded in empathy. In other words, on the long road between
strangers and friends, Barber wants citizen-neighbors to be a good part of the way home.
Danielle Allen has advocated for a similar dynamic in the everyday interactions
between citizens (Allen 2004). She argues that we can generate the resources needed to
survive the psychological challenge of loss and sacrifice that characterize democratic politics
by acting as if strangers are our friends- even though we do not feel the same emotional
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attachment towards them. Allen draws more explicitly than Barber on Aristotle’s conception
of political friendship and she places more emphasis on feelings of trust and norms of
reciprocity than on empathy or affection. Yet her account of ideal democratic social
relations is similar to the extent that it pushes citizens to model their interactions on
friendship with the expectation that this will, in time, produce genuine feelings of attachment.
Though this will be a distinct form of civic rather than intimate attachment, it will still be
based on authentic feelings.
The ideal of political friendship seems to rely on a belief in the perfectibility of
human nature, the idea that despite the constraints of a plural mass democratic society,
citizens can still work towards relations that are based in genuine positive affect. Barber
seeks a politics that “ordains concourse with strangers” (Barber 2004,189) and Allen urges us
to “talk to strangers” in ways that will transform us into neighborly strangers (Allen 2004).157
Though I do not wish to overdraw the neighbor metaphor employed by Barber, my study of
the way real neighbors actually relate to each other in a plural mass democracy prompts very
different conceptions of civic relations. It is worth remembering that the term “neighbor”
has two quite distinct definitions. According to Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary,
the term can mean “one who is near in sympathy or confidence” as Barber and Allen hope,
but it can also refer simply to one “who lives near another” (Webster and Porter 1913). My
observations point towards the second definition and suggest that we should abandon
efforts towards a political community of neighborly (i.e., friendly) strangers in favor of one

157 Seyla Benhabib’s work on democratic iterations and just political membership provides another similar
formation. Though she does not draw explicitly on notions of “political friendship”, Benhabib is concerned
with civic relations between strangers- and especially the implications they have for transnational migrants. Like
Barber and Allen she too holds out hopes for the way deliberative processes (i.e. democratic iterations) can
generate just political communities and civic relations grounded in authentic feeling (2004; 2006; 2007; 2008).
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that is made up of courteous strangers and, when necessary, estranged neighbors (i.e.,
physically proximate).
As I noted previously, observing that the real world fails to meet the ideals of
political theorists does not necessarily undermine their normative power. To challenge
conceptions of political friendship at a normative level, one must offer an alternate
conception of human nature to the one grounded in perfectibility described above. Scholars
of political hypocrisy have done exactly that by arguing for a conception of human nature
that renders the ideal of political friendship impractical (Bybee 2010; Grant 1999; Runciman
2010; Shklar 1984). At the outset, they assume that differences are persistent and will remain
at some level irreconcilable. Further, their conception of human nature acknowledges a
moral self, one who wants to be good. At the same time it accepts that our passions will
often keep us from living up to these principles. This mix of principle and passion will,
nevertheless, drive our efforts to appear as though we are good (Bybee 2010: 53-55). It is from
this conception of human nature that one comes to see courtesy as an ideal mode of
interaction in public life. Codes of common courtesy prescribe behaviors that help to
sustain social peace but do not require genuine mutual affection. Because courtesy is
habitual, pleasurable, and useful, it is a social practice that thrives despite our aversion to
hypocrisy and our inherent limitations (66). Though courtesy is not perfect- it can reinforce
unjust hierarchy by dispensing its benefits unequally and resisting the redefinition of archaic
social norms, it is a form of interaction with normative merits (73).
Habits of common courtesy allow those who may wish that they were strangers to
pretend that they are friends, albeit “false friends” (Bybee 2010: 37).158 Though both invoke

158 Bybee credits Grant for the term “false friends.” She uses this term to elucidate her interpretation of
Machiavelli’s meaning for the Italian amici in sections of The Prince where he discusses the need for hypocrisy in
political alliances (1999: 20-21).
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friendship in some form, courtesy is distinct from political friendship, owing to its reliance
on pretense and its grounding in a different conception of human nature.159 Embracing
courtesy as an ideal provides a practical alternative to the impossible ideal of civic
relationships grounded in authentic feelings. Relationships with intimates grounded in
authentic feeling are of course possible, and the boundary between true friends and false
friends will not always be clear. Courteous behavior is therefore not always fake and may be
motivated by genuine feelings of affection. But courtesy functions effectively as a social
lubricant because its underlying motivations are ambiguous. Seeking to remove this
ambiguity and ground every relationship in authentic feeling- even in a weaker civic form, is
not consistent with basic human limitations and the circumstances of plural mass democracy.
Courtesy therefore operates on the understanding that, though morally flawed, we
are capable of creating a political community of courteous strangers. Indeed, the narratives
of mediation participants recounted in the previous chapters are most compatible with this
sort of community. Some of what they described involves what I have called courteous
avoidance, where participants minimize their interactions as much as possible- and when
required to interact, they do so in ways that are polite though they may not be sincere. Their
accounts lend credence to my argument that a political community of courteous strangers
might be thought of as one that is comprised of good citizens.
But what about when citizens wish to remain and act like strangers or even pretend
to be strangers when they are not? Some mediation cases I described in Chapter 5 fall into
this category, and participant narratives recount relationships that fall outside the bounds of
courteous avoidance. In these instances, citizens have instead become estranged neighbors
in the sense that while they remain in physical proximity to varying degrees, they eschew
Recall the distinction I drew in Chapter 5 which acknowledge some use the term courtesy and civility in a
way that does, like political friendship, invoke human perfectibility. I do not use courtesy in this way.
159
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even courteous avoidance in exchange for a more blatant form of avoidance. They turn the
other way when they see each other, they refuse to communicate except in writing, or they
build larger and more opaque fences to delineate the boundaries they do not want crossed.
And yet these departures from courteous avoidance do not prompt a break down in social
peace. In these particular cases, they seem to be the only thing that can enable it.
Furthermore, most estranged neighbors are relieved to have these new arrangements replace
the manifest conflict pattern that preceded them. Their relief is unapologetic in its embrace
of this blatant avoidance, suggesting that they are unmoved by the mechanisms that typically
motivate polite behavior. Their relief is not complete however, as they continue to feel
apprehensive about their proximity to someone they consider unpredictable and threatening.
This sense of threat is central to understanding the need for blatant avoidance in the minds
of estranged neighbors. I argue that it is in cases where a sense of threat and danger
intensifies to a certain degree that the potential for courteous avoidance is replaced by the
need for its more blatant form.
How should the experience of estranged neighbors inform our thinking about ideal
democratic social relations in a mass plural society? One response is that it should not.
Many will find the outcome of these cases disappointing on first blush. My work is not alone
in uncovering empirical evidence that citizens avoid politics and disdain conflict (Eliasoph
1998), and some have even tried to reconfigure our democratic ideals based on these
findings (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). But a more standard response to these
observations is to lament the distance we still find ourselves from our ideals and to redouble
our efforts to approximate them. My approach differs in at least two ways from these. First,
it moves beyond an analysis of everyday political discussion to focus on broader concerns
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about the quality of everyday citizen interactions in general.160 Second, it suggests the need to
theorize more deeply about the normative merits of alternatives like blatant avoidance. I
argue for this approach because accepting the conception of human nature outlined by
scholars of hypocrisy and courtesy rules out the possibility that we can escape the
parochializing harm of seeking civic relations grounded in authentic feeling. On the other
hand, the limitations of a more practical ideal grounded in pretense and courtesy cannot be
denied either. Though courtesy offers great potential for social peace, its reliance on
hierarchy makes it suspicious from the vantage point of justice. If we aspire to democratic
social relations that reach towards both peace and justice, then we must develop further our
understanding of the limits of courtesy within the bounds of its corresponding conception
of human nature.
This requires thinking about the merits of discourteous, uncivil, and rude behavior in
order to bring nuance to the argument for courtesy as ideal. As others have noted, we may
consider rude behavior justified when it is intended to shake up existing hierarchies and
remedy injustices that are reinforced by the courtesy norms of the day (Bybee 2010: 72). But
can blatant avoidance be cast in this light? Its private and peaceful qualities might make us
doubt that these examples belong in a category with the sit-ins performed by civil rights
protesters and the “die-ins” staged by gay rights activists (67). Though the performance of
blatant avoidance is not public or collective like organized activism, it shares qualities with
complimentary and more widely practiced forms of “everyday activism” (Mansbridge and
Flaster 2007). Mansbridge and Flaster define “an ‘everyday activist’ in a social movement as
anyone who both acts in her own life to redress a perceived injustice and take this action in
the context of, and in the same broad direction as, that social movement” (629). Their work
160

See also (van Leeuwen 2010; Rosenblum 1999).
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focuses on the everyday use of language drawn from a social movement, specifically the case
of “male chauvinist”, but they insist that such instances “are only one small, visible portion
of a much larger, less visible set” (629).
The actions of blatant avoiders are certainly intended to redress a perceived
individual injustice- after all, what justice claim is more fundamental than a concern for one’s
physical and psychic safety? Though it is not explicitly or systematically linked to an
organized social movement, the sense of injustice in these cases is often grounded in a group
identity. Gender in particular is salient in the narratives I heard.161 This too is consistent with

161

See comments from Sylvia, Rita, Catherine, Beverly, Lorna:
“And he picked on me because he knows I live alone here and he knows there’s not much I can do…
if there is a man living [here] he would never do it. I can tell you that. I know definitely that” (Sylvia).
“So it was really uh, unnerving, for a single woman, to feel that watched” (Rita).
“He seems to be a misogynist, like he seems to hate women. Um, but you know having said that, he
was friendly with the lady on my side … [but] doesn’t really speak to anyone else, women or not in
our street, but they were friendly. So I can’t say he’s a misogynist…. But it’s certainly appeared that he
disliked women”(Catherine).
“But I say he’s not my cup of tea, he’s too ugly. Any way it appears, when I move here first he did not
knock on the wall, the floor as much. But after he found out in his mind that I don’t want him, then
things get sour. And this is really what happened. So he was looking in my direction upon what he
told her. But because he see, I’m not looking in his direction, he keep tormenting me, knocking,
knocking on the door” (Beverly).
“He has issues with women. I don’t know what his problem is really because at one point he cornered
me on the elevator and he was yelling, it was, not that I was afraid but by the time I got off my body
was shaking from the energy, it was yelling. … talking to a lot of women who had had conflict with
him and they said, and they just encouraged me not to give up something that I really liked a lot and
to fight for it” (Lorna).

Characterizing threat in gendered terms is not limited to heterosexual women, as these comments from Anne
illustrate:
“I knew that there were a lot of kind of undertones of things like domestic violence… which I later
found a domestic violence, it’s called a power and control wheel, and when I read that, and kind of
enumerated the various things involved in like domestic violence. I was like that is what happened to
me, and it was suddenly very, very clear. So like, at the time I knew that there was a lot of kind of
power stuff going on … I was kind of always forced to be doing the femme things, even though I
don’t identify as femme and like … so there was a lot of kind of gendering going on and like, and like
this sort of thing is like very obviously kind of for someone who’s inside of it or inside that world like,
it’s very much gender related violence, but for someone who and I, I’m pretty sure both of our
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“everyday activism”. It typically operates based on “only a minimal oppositional
consciousness”, which is the “loose and messy continuum” of principles, ideas, and feelings
that include claiming and affirming a once subordinate identity, as well as identifying and
demanding redress for injustices done to this group (2007, 632; see also Mansbridge and
Morris 2001).
Blatant avoiders are willing to disrupt norms of common courtesy enough to
communicate their sense of injustice to their conflict partners and other observers
(mediators, friends, neighbors). They refuse to participate in even the pretense that past
wrongs are forgiven or to risk opening themselves up to fall victim to such wrongs again by
practicing courteous avoidance. In this sense they are everyday activists. Yet their reliance
on avoidance suggests that they are not, or no longer, willing to risk social peace in order to
directly confront those they believe to be perpetrating everyday injustice. Furthermore, they
justify their blatant avoidance on individual grounds that are only weakly, if at all, linked to
the aims of a group oriented social movement. In this sense, their challenge to existing
social hierarchies is quite limited and does little to reconfigure courtesy’s potential to offer
social relations that are at once peaceful and just. This places blatant avoidance somewhere
between the open confrontation of everyday activism and the artificial friendliness of
common courtesy.
This analysis suggests that, from the standpoint of ideal democratic social relations,
there are grounds for defending blatant avoidance to the extent that it makes a modest

mediators were like very straight, like it probably didn’t look that weird, it was like ok, here’s the girly
girl and here’s a less girly girl” (Anne).
Jonathon as well, who did not wish to be recorded, described feelings of threat in the presence of Catherine’s
family members who he believed intentionally made repeated homophobic comments within his earshot. He
described the conflict as sexist in nature, said that it involved hate, and that he was not being treated as an
equal. He further noted the irony of the fact that at the same time that Catherine felt threatened by him as a
single woman living alone (see above), he felt threatened by she and her family as a gay man.
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contribution to advancing justice while, at the same time, preserving social peace. It also
makes clear the risks of uncritically embracing this mode of social interaction. First, because
it is motivated by a sense of injustice that is only weakly tethered to broader collective justice
claims, its capacity to deliver meaningful redress is seriously limited. A response to injustice
rooted in avoidance may reinforce apathy, keep citizens demobilized, and presents a serious
obstacle to the overt politicization necessary to bring about social change.162 Second, as I
have presented it here, blatant avoidance is motivated by perceptions of danger and threat.
While a single woman’s refusal to “be nice” to a male neighbor by whom she feels
threatened and bullied may be convincingly presented as contributing to the cause of equality
between the sexes, not all feelings of threat are equally justified. Allegations of threat can be
intentionally manipulated or inaccurately perceived by members of oppressed groups.163
Perhaps more importantly, threat perceptions are heavily influenced by racial prejudice and
other forms of bias.164 Distinguishing instances of blatant avoidance that challenge injustice
from those instances that reinforce it will not be a simple task. Though not possible here,
further exploration of these issues will be the focus of future work. I will conclude here by
simply asserting that the modes of courteous avoidance, blatant avoidance, and everyday
activism together present a promising set of categories upon which to base a practical ideal
of everyday democratic social relations that offer the promise of both peace and justice.
Indeed, these risks have been emphasized by several critics of mediation (Nader 1993; Abel 1982;
Hofrichter 1982).
163
Victor suggests this is what is going on in his conflict with Sylvia:
“She always take advantage of being single, and she ah, she’s alone. She’s the only person in the
house, only lady so I’m ah, I’m ah stalking her, …
H: do you think she really believed that those things were happening or she made them up?
V: she made them up just to upset me because I’m removing everything the retaining wall, and her
retaining wall”
164 For example consider this comment from Martha about the immigrant run organization operating next door
to her home:
“There are cultural differences, their outlook on and their idea of what they could do in Canada and
what they couldn’t do… they don’t see communities the way we see them. There is quite a difference,
especially when you have a gang and they are a gang … they’re attracting the same type of people that
will harass you” (Martha).
162
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Recasting our conceptions of “good citizens” to acknowledge the value of courteous
avoidance, blatant avoidance, and everyday activism sheds new light on the educative
potential of deliberation. In Chapter 5, I presented evidence that the mediation process
plays a role in generating relationships of courteous and blatant avoidance between citizens.
Embracing this relational outcome as an ideal points to a new way of conceptualizing the
educative potential of deliberation. My research suggests that although deliberation does not
often “educate” citizens in a transformative sense, by increasing efficacy, clarifying interests
or establishing friendliness, it can enable the establishment of avoidant relationships that
have normative merit. I therefore conclude, based on these and the other findings of this
study, that deliberation does not often make “better citizens”, and that when it does, its
effects challenge existing ideals. These conclusions impel deliberative theorists and
practitioners to reduce the normative weight they place on better citizen claims and to adjust
their remaining better citizen expectations to be more consistent with human limitations.
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APPENDIX I

Below I provide additional information about interview participants in step one
(practitioners), interview participants in step two (mediation participants), their mediation
cases, and those who used the mediation services at CDR1 or CDR2 during July 1, 2006-July
1, 2007 that were not interviewed. Table 0.1 includes a complete list of practitioner interview
participants by CDR, pseudonym165, role, and interview type.
Table 0.1: Practitioner Interview Participants
CDR1
Pseudonym
Role
Alyssa
Volunteer
Andrea
Volunteer
Ariana
Volunteer
Arnold
Volunteer
Caitlin
Volunteer
Carlos
Volunteer
Cenk
Volunteer
Cynthia
Volunteer
Denise
Volunteer
Frank
Volunteer
Gary
Staff
Gloria
Volunteer
Jill
Volunteer
Joshua
Volunteer
Karen
Staff
Leila
Volunteer
Lorena
Volunteer
Maureen
Volunteer
Maya
Volunteer
Roslynne
Volunteer
Sophie
Volunteer
Susanna
Volunteer
Vivian
Volunteer
Table 0.1 continues on next page.

Interview Type
Individual
Individual
Focus Group 1
Focus Group 1
Focus Group 1
Focus Group 1
Focus Group 2
Focus Group 1
Focus Group 2
Focus Group 2
Individual
Individual
Focus Group 1
Focus Group 1
Individual
Focus Group 1
Focus Group 1
Individual
Focus Group 2
Individual
Focus Group 1
Focus Group 1
Focus Group 1

Participants’ names have been changed to protect their anonymity. Where possible, pseudonyms have been
chosen to preserve the gender and ethnic identities of participants within the sample.
165
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Table 0.1 continued.
CDR2
Pseudonym
Ajay
Anita
Carly
Cheryl
Courtney
Jessica
Jim
Kate
Kevin
Lindsay
Melissa
Meredith
Nikola
Paul
Richard
Vivek

Role
Volunteer
Volunteer
Volunteer
Volunteer
Volunteer
Volunteer
Volunteer
Staff
Volunteer
Volunteer
Volunteer
Volunteer
Volunteer
Staff
Volunteer
Volunteer

Interview Type
Focus Group 1
Focus Group 1
Focus Group 1
Focus Group 2
Focus Group 2
Focus Group 1
Individual
Individual
Focus Group 1
Individual
Focus Group 1
Focus Group 1
Focus Group 2
Individual
Focus Group 1
Individual

Table 0.2 includes a complete list of mediation participant interviewees by
pseudonym. They are grouped by mediation case along with information on the total
number of participants in the relevant mediation case, the relational context of the mediation,
and a brief description of the case. Those cases in the “intimates” category include family
and romantic relationships,166 while those in the “neighbors” category include conflict
partners that associate as a result of residential proximity.167

One exception to this is the case of Jaime and Anne who were close friends that lived together. Though they
did not characterize their relationship in romantic terms, their circumstances seem to fit best in the intimate
category since their relationship was more than a neighborly one even though the relationship did involve
residential proximity.
167 One exception to this is Loretta, who was in conflict with a former business partner. Even so, Loretta’s
circumstances best approximate the “neighbor” category.
166
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Table 0.2: Descriptions of Mediation Cases
CDR 1
Interview Participants
Martha
Mr. Kim

Total Participants
2

Dalia
2

Loretta
2
Max
Lynn

4

Sara
2
Sylvia
Victor
Evelyn170
Julie
Alice
Michelle

2

6

2

Beth
2
Jeffrey
Leslie

4

Tracy***
Alec

7

***Excluded from the analysis.171

Brief Description of Case
(Neighbor) Long time resident elderly resident and
pastor of the congregation using the church next
door discuss use of the grounds and future
interactions.
(Intimate)Mother and adult daughter discuss the
history of their relationship, their living
arrangements, and the guardianship of daughter’s
12 year old son.
(Neighbor) 168 Former business partners discuss
disagreement about an informal agreement about
payment for work.
(Neighbor) Long time married couple169 residents
and newly arrived married couple discuss the
placement of an air conditioner in the space
between the houses and its subsequent effects on
one party’s health and well being.
(Neighbor) Two mothers discuss an altercation
they had after a fight broke out between their
school aged children.
(Neighbor) Long time and newer resident discuss
fence, retaining wall, and trees located at the
property line between the two homes as well as
history of interactions over these matters.
(Intimate) Six adult siblings and their two aging
parents discuss arrangements for sharing use of
the family cottage.
(Intimate) Husband and wife in the process of
separating discuss living arrangements, care, and
support of their son as well as the past and future
of their relationship.
(Intimate) Adult siblings discuss the inheritance of
a sentimental item in their deceased mother’s
estate.
(Neighbor) Married couple and adult sons of their
mentally ill neighbor discuss problems coping with
her mental illness.
(Community) Circle process convened between a
troubled youth, his mother, his teacher, his
outreach workers, his pastor and others to address
an act of vandalism.
Table 2.4 continues on next page.

Loretta and her conflict partner were former business partner. Although their relationship did not involve
residential proximity, Loretta’s circumstances best approximate the “neighbor” category.
169 I conducted my interview with Max and Lynn (a married couple) partially together. I also interviewed each
of them individually. Jeffrey and Leslie (also a married couple) would not agree to be interviewed separately, so
I conducted their interview together. I coded each of their narratives within the joint interview separately.
170 In this case, Evelyn participated in mediation with the help of teleconferencing technology because she lives
at a significant distance from Toronto which precluded her participation in a face-to-face mediation session.
168
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Table 0.2 continued.

CDR 2
Interview Participants
Jaime
Anne

Total Participants

Brief Description of Case
(Intimate) 172 Former roommates and close friends
2
discuss the logistics related to moving out,
dividing belongings and paying final bills.
(Neighbor) Neighbors discuss mutual driveway as
Catherine173
2
well as history of interactions over this matter.
Jonathon
Norm
(Intimate) Adult siblings discuss the current
Lauren
6
physical and mental health of their mother and
Christine
her care as well as their relationships and
communication in general.
Alfred
(Neighbor) Two elderly residents of a social
Beverly
2
housing unit for seniors discuss noise and their
history of interactions over this matter.
Lisa
(Intimate) Ex spouses and co‐parents discuss
Alan
2
financial arrangements for their daughter’s higher
education and the history of interactions over this
and other matters.
Lorna
(Neighbor) Residents in a housing cooperative
3
discuss noise and the history of their interactions
over this matter.
Jeremy
(Neighbor) Resident and business owner discuss
3
noise and safety concerns relating to the
operation of the business near a residential area.
*Debbie
(Neighbor) Two elderly residents of a social
Joan
2
housing unit for seniors discuss election of tenant
representative and history of interactions relating
to this matter.
*Rita
(Neighbor) Neighbors discuss mutual driveway,
Nigel
2
noise and history of interactions over these
matters.
*Indicates that observation of case development meetings and mediation sessions took place. Only the
participant with a * participated in a post‐process interview. These mediations took place between July
2007 and July 2008.

171 Tracy and Alec’s case was excluded from the analysis because it was convened as a restorative justice circle
process rather than as a “normal” community mediation process. The extent of its uniqueness was not clear
until after interviews were completed. Out of all the cases at CDR1 and CDR2 from July 1, 2006-July 1, 2007,
this one is unique in its departure from the standard mediation process and therefore the only case excluded.
172 Jaime and Anne were close friends that lived together. Though they did not characterize their relationship in
romantic or familial terms, their circumstances seem to fit best in the intimate category.
173 This case is atypical because Catherine and Jonathon actually never met face-to-face in mediation. The CDR
staff and volunteers involved in the case reluctantly agreed to Catherine’s request to convene a “shuttle
mediation” where participants were located in different rooms and met one at a time with the mediators who
conveyed messages back and forth. Catherine refused to participate in face-to-face mediation because she felt
physically and psychologically threatened by a direct encounter with Jonathon- her next door neighbor at the
time. Though a significant departure from the typical mediation process employed at the Toronto CDRs (see
Section 2.7), the case includes enough basic features of the typical mediation to warrant inclusion in the analysis.
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Of course, if those mediation participants listed in Table 0.2, who agreed to be
interviewed, are systematically different from those who declined interviews or were
unreachable, this would have implications for the analysis. To address these concerns, I
compare the cases in my sample to those who did not participate according to available
information in the CDR databases about cases (mediation outcome) and participants (sex).
Table 0.3: Mediation Participant Interviewees and Non‐interviewees174
CDR1 Interview Participants by Mediation Outcome
Agreement
Interview
15 (100%)
No Interview
20 (91%)
Total
35 (95%)
Missing: 8 [3 Interview, 5 No Interview]

No Agreement
0 (0%)
2 (9%)
2 (5%)

Total
15 (100%)
22 (100%
37 (100%)

No Agreement
5 (38.5%)
2 (14%)
7 (26%)

Total
13 (100%)
14 (100%)
27 (100%)

CDR1and CDR2 Combined Interview Participants by Mediation Outcome
Agreement
No Agreement
Interview
23 (82%)
5 (18%)
No Interview
32 (89%)
4 (11%)
Total
55 (86%)
9 (14%)
Missing: 8 [3 Interview, 5 No Interview]

Total
28 (100%)
36 (100%)
64 (100%)

CDR2 Interview Participants by Mediation Outcome
Agreement
Interview
8 (61.5%)
No Interview
12 (86%)
Total
20 (74%)

CDR1 Interview Participants by Sex
Male
Interview
5 (28%)
No Interview
12 (44%)
Total
17 (38%)

Female
13 (72%)
15 (56%)
28 (62%)

Total
18 (100%)
27 (100%)
45 (100%)

CDR2 Interview Participants by Sex
Male
Interview
5 (38%)
No Interview
8 (62%)
Total
13 (48%)

Female
8 (62%)
6 (48%)
14 (52%)

Total
13 (100%)
14 (100%)
27 (100%)

CDR1and CDR2 Combined Interview Participants by Sex
Male
Interview
10 (32%)
No Interview
20 (49%)
Total
30 (42%)

Female
21 (68%)
21 (51%)
42 (58%)

Total
31 (100%)
41 (100%)
72 (100%)

174 Totals in Table 0.3 reflect the universe of mediation participants at both CDRs within a one year period
(whose mediation case concluded between July 1 2006-July 1 2007). Following observation of two mediation
cases in July 2007 and July 2008, I conducted two additional post-process interviews with Rita and Debbie.
Because their cases are drawn from outside the original sample boundaries, they are not included in Table 2.5.
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As Table 0.3 shows, based on these factors those who participated in interviews do not
differ dramatically from those who did not (though it appears that women were more likely
to participate in an interview than men). Furthermore, as I discuss in Chapters 3, 4, and 5,
these interviews suggest that the mediation process has minimal educative effects (at least
when educative effects are understood according to practitioners’ expectations). This
suggests that the main sample bias hazard, that those who participate in interviews are also
those more likely to report lasting effects, has not drastically skewed the results.
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